Problem slijeđenja pravila u mišljenju i jeziku

undergraduate thesis

• Title (english): The Problem of Rule- Following in Thought and language
• Author: Barbara Babič
• Mentor: Tomislav Janović (mentor)
• Committee member: Tomislav Janović (predsjednik povjerenstva)
• Granter: University of Zagreb; Faculty of Croatian Studies; Zagreb
• Defense date and country: 2024-07-10, Croatia
• Scientific / art field, discipline and subdiscipline: HUMANISTIC SCIENCES; Philosophy

Abstract

Ovaj rad problematizira fenomen značenja (meaning) u mišljenju i jeziku te njegovu vezu s fenomenom slijeđenja pravila. Polazi se od Wittgensteinovog odmaka od tradicionalnog shvaćanja značenja i njegovog novog razumijevanja njegove biti. Wittgenstein odriče mentalnim stanjima ključnu ulogu u uspostavljanju i razumijevanju značenja. Umjesto toga ističe važnost upotrebe jezika i analize različitih konteksta – različitih „jezičnih igara“ – u kojima riječi poprimaju značenja. Originalnom interpretacijom odgovarajućih dijelova Wittgensteinovih Filozofskih istraživanja Saul Kripke je postavio poznati skeptički argument čiji je zaključak da značenje ne postoji. Taj će argument biti izložen u trećem dijelu rada, dok će u četvrtom dijelu biti objašnjeni uvjeti koje teorija značenja mora zadovoljiti da bi izbjegla kripkeovskom prigovoru. Jednu takvu teoriju je predložio Paul Horwich pod nazivom
„upotrebna teorija značenja“ (Use Theory of Meaning ili UTM). Ta će teorija biti tema petog dijela rada. U šestom, završnom dijelu razmatra se zamisao da aktualni sustavi umjetne inteligencije poznati kao Large Language Models (LLM) ili chatbotovi operiraju značenjima, pod pretpostavkom da se značenja riječi mogu svesti na njihovu upotrebu u skladu s kontekstualno osjetljivim pravilima.

Abstract (english)

This thesis deals with the phenomenon of meaning in thought and language, and its relation to the phenomenon of rule-following. It starts from Wittgenstein’s departure from the traditional conception of meaning and his new understanding of its origin. Wittgenstein rejects the idea that mental states play a decisive role in establishing and understanding of meanings. Instead, he emphasizes the importance of language use and of analyzing different contexts —different “language games”—in which words acquire their meanings. Offering an original interpretation of the relevant parts of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, Saul Kripke has set up a well-known skeptical argument whose radical conclusion is that meanings do not exist. This argument will be presented in the third part of the paper. In the fourth part, the conditions that a theory of meaning must satisfy in order to avoid Kripke’s skepticism will be explicated. One such theory was proposed by Paul Horwich under the label “Use Theory of Meaning” (UTM). This theory will be presented in the fifth part of the thesis. The sixth, final part considers the idea that current artificial intelligence systems known as Large Language Models (LLM) or chatbots operate with meanings, provided that meanings of words can be reduced to their use by application of context-sensitive rules.

• Keywords: Wittgenstein; značenje; jezik; skeptični argument; Kripke; Horwich; teorija značenja kao upotrebe (UTM); umjetna inteligencija
• Keywords (english): Wittgenstein; Language; Meanings; Skeptical Argument; Kripke; Horwich; Use Theory of Meaning (UTM); Artificial Intelligence
• Language: croatian
• URN:NBN: urn:nbn:hr:111:382567
• Study programme: Title: Philosophy and Culture (Double Major); Study programme type: university; Study level: undergraduate; Academic / professional title: sveučilišni/a prvostupnik/prvostupnica (baccalaureus/baccalaurea) filozofije i kulture (sveučilišni/a prvostupnik/prvostupnica (baccalaureus/baccalaurea) filozofije i kulture)
• Type of resource: Text
• File origin: Born digital
• Access conditions: Open access
• Created on: 2024-11-13 11:27:24