

The New European Paradigm of Workforce Range

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Source / Izvornik: **Security Crises in the 21st Century and How to Manage Them: Social and Security aspects, 2021, 48 - 65**

Book chapter / Poglavlje u knjizi

Publication status / Verzija rada: **Published version / Objavljena verzija rada (izdavačev PDF)**

Permanent link / Trajna poveznica: <https://um.nsk.hr/um:nbn:hr:111:202106>

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Download date / Datum preuzimanja: **2025-04-01**



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SECURITY CRISES IN THE 21ST CENTURY AND HOW TO MANAGE THEM

Social and Security aspects, Volume 1



Proceedings of the international scientific conference held online
October 13 and 14, 2020.

CARUK, HUMS, IRMO and Libertas, Belgrade, 2021.

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scientific conference held online,
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ISBN: 978-86-902810-1-5

CARUK, HUMS, IRMO and Libertas, Belgrade, 2021.

PUBLISHERS:

Center for Risk Analysis and Crisis Management (CARUK), Belgrade, Serbia
Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO), Zagreb, Croatia
Croatian Association for International Studies (HUMS), Zagreb, Croatia
Institute for Standardization of Serbia, Belgrade, Serbia

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Printed by: Jovšić Printing Centar

Copies: 200

**Security Crises in the 21st Century and How to Manage Them:
Social and Security aspects, Volume 1**

(Proceedings of the international scientific conference held online, October 13 and 14, 2020; Organizers: Center for Risk Analysis and Crisis Management from Belgrade (CARUK), Croatian Association for International Studies (HUMS), Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO) and the Libertas International University.

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EDITORIAL

Dear readers,

International video conference entitled “Security crises in the 21st century and how to manage them”, held in October of 2020 and organized by the Center for Risk Analysis and Crisis Management (CARUK) from Belgrade and Croatian Association for International Studies (HUMS), with a comprehensive logistical and technical support by the Institute for Standardization of the Republic of Serbia, in cooperation with the Institute for Development of International Relations (IRMO) and Libertas International University from Zagreb, has shown the scope of importance of exchanging experiences in risk and crisis management, especially in the context of COVID-19 pandemics, as well as regarding numerous other social, economic and security challenges we are facing.

The conference gathered leading scientists and experts from regional states, as well as from the United Kingdom and, as organizers, we opted for a multidisciplinary approach to contemporary security challenges, aware of the fact that a long-term solution must be sought for in linking different academic disciplines, and above all in biomedicine, technical and political science, as well as in security studies. Exactly due to this, the conference enabled expert and scientific authorities of various profiles, as holders of public functions and members of crisis teams from the countries of the region, to articulate their attitudes in the context of security challenges and strengthening regional response.

The proceedings entitled “Security crises in the 21st century and how to manage them” represent a continuance of a dialogue which started at the conference, and through this selection of papers, we tended to problematize the burning aspects of contemporary security crises which arose as a consequence of global structural changes in international relations, formed through multidimensional processes of globalization and growing geopolitical tensions. The scientific works are thematically divided into two parts, whilst authorized speeches given by the British scientists and security experts – Lord Toby Harris and David Rubens, are attached.

In the first part of the Proceedings (VOLUME 1), entitled RISK AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT, the papers of authors (V. Cvrtila; S.P. Simonović; A. Jovanović; S. Šterc; M. Komušanac; B. Bajalski; I. Pekić; S. Stošić; M. Pešić; Z. Keković; J. Dinić; and others) thematize risk management and new types of security threats – from ethnic and religious conflicts, terrorism, organized crime, global migrations, demographic disbalance, drainage of natural resources, climate change, increased poverty, to COVID-19 pandemics. Namely, globalization has changed the identity of human communities everywhere and formed a global *risk society*, which fundamental features are insecurity and uncertainty, and thus, it became evident that its political, economic, security, social, but also individual challenges ask for a shift in focus of the

international public towards risk management, prevention, as well as collective risk management. The collapse of the Cold War order resulted in changes in security politics, as well as recognition and determination of priorities of new challenges, but also the increasing challenges in security system management and organization, exactly due to the change of nature of sovereign conflicts which transited from wars between states into a conflict within the global society that is, as Fukuyama states, strongly fractured into narrow identities.

Traditional approaches to security management have shown numerous shortages in responding to contemporary challenges and structural weaknesses emerging from interaction of complex systems. The synergy of natural, social and technical science is of essential significance, emerging with the goal of creating new knowledge and solutions in order to respond to complex challenges, and first of all, by overcoming traditional management models based on hierarchical structures of power and, at the same time, by strengthening the resilience of a society.

In the second part of the Proceedings entitled “COVID-19 AS A SECURITY CHALLENGE”, the authors examine methods of health crisis management, within which international relations became marked by a new dimension of distrust and competition of great powers. COVID-19 is undoubtedly testing all elements of Western leadership – global economy, and thus globalization, crisis management of governments and international organizations, and especially alliances within the European Union and NATO. Namely, contemporary world is currently in a big historical transition, on the crossroads, given that greatly accelerated technological revolution, as well as development of artificial intelligence and *Big data*, all in the circumstance of health crisis, are currently facing new unprecedented challenges. The change of scope and broadness of available information serve as an incentive for a change in perception of politics, management and value attitudes. Still, the (un)expected limitations of fundamental civil freedoms reveal a totalitarian dynamic of bio-politics as a dominant political strategy during the COVID-19 crisis, a tool of scientific power, but also the policy of institutional practice. As a consequence of such approach, the existing techno-engineering creates a permanent state of instability and anxiety within a society, due to which liberal democracies are gradually growing into a techno utopia. It is evident that communication strategies of the ruling elite increase disorder within social structures, cause systemic instability which acute forms can easily cause mutation of the system, that is, its revolution. Exactly due to that, it can be expected that the challenges of political management will soon enough become one of the biggest challenges in the times that lay before us.

COVID-19 revealed all weaknesses of the unique foreign and security policies of the European Union – from unpreparedness, disunity, inexistent solidarity, up to non-efficiency of the idea of national project while, on the other side, the narrative on the return to nation state strengthened. The new role of Russia and China drifting towards multipolarity has renewed political rivalry in international relations, due to which

numerous security threats have become a part of a new uncertainty the world is to face after the current crisis. Namely, epidemics, migrations, challenges posed by terrorism and conflicts, climate changes, genetical engineering, artificial intelligence and numerous future digital challenges can transform into either paradise or hell – it is our choice. All insecurities we are facing in current times, inevitably influencing states, societies, organizations, but individuals as well – represent a risk. However, all previously mentioned security challenges have stressed the global character of contemporary security, as well as the significance of growing interdependence of all actors in international relations.

All in all, we are more than ever in need of a crisis management able to ensure resilience of our societies, adapt them to the changed conditions, offer hope and direct recovery. The COVID-19 global pandemics showed the world that not a single government, whether we are speaking of developed or developing countries, was equipped or ready to prevent or manage such sudden exogenic shock that soon enough transformed into a global systemic challenge. As stressed by dr. sc. David Rubens, COVID-19 was not an expected event. What was unexpected was the impact of the pandemic to our societies. Despite that, we still do not have relevant recovery models, even though it can be assumed that, in the near future, we will be facing new pandemics too, as well as other security challenges for which we are not prepared.

Efficient crisis management should not be solely strategic, but also transparent, which implies empathy and pragmatism. Leaders should listen to the ones who lead, as well as understand what they are facing. This might be the time for creativity and innovation, but it still demands great caution. If strategic management has any significance, it most definitely must be found in the creation of a rational image of what the world really is, the challenge which carries along solutions we can offer as well – this is one of the messages passed by the British security expert Lord Toby Harris.

COVID-19 is a very powerful call for action, due to which it is necessary to start speaking in professional and scientific discourse, in a critical, analytical and objective manner. It is important that we, as scientists and experts from the territory of former Yugoslavia, do it, aware of the fact that we are present in all games played by the grand players, and thus, in the geopolitical vaccination game, we are still always turning to each other, left alone. Our goals were to exchange knowledge and experience, scientific and critical attitudes during this conference, and we hope that these proceedings that lay before you will at least partly offer responses to many unanswered and unsolved questions, which represent an integral aspect of the public health and security crisis caused by COVID-19.

Namely, in the situation of collective danger and uncertainty, these problematized questions have a strong impact on attitude of the public, and definitely demand answers. The approach which negates debate widens social cleavage between the government and the citizens, and thus increases mistrust towards health experts and media reports. Therefore, without a doubt,

argumentative social dialogue should be set in motion in the European, as well as in regional public environment, in order to renew the trust of citizens into governmental institutions, and no less in science. Scientists are only human, and important scientific discoveries occur through research process (common mistakes are a legitimate part of the process). Moreover, it is important to remember that, during the past century, the humanity witnessed a terrible abuse of scientific discoveries and achievements, and thus, advance technological tools were many times transformed into weapons of mass destruction.

Therefore, strengthening regional response to the COVID-19 pandemic, to which our encounters and dialogues should contribute, would also enable Croatia, as a member of the European Union, but also the countries of the region which strive towards becoming one, to take a more balanced stance in finding a solution to the pandemic. The recovery of the devastated health, social and economic system, raising standards and quality of life of our citizens, and above all, the readiness to cooperation and overcoming the existing animosity, would allow us to develop a higher level of preparedness and response to crisis that inevitably await us in the future.

Once again, I offer my sincere gratitude to all authors of papers published in the Proceedings of “Security crises of the 21st century and how to manage them”.

In Split, March 2021.

In the name of the Editorial Board,

Doc. dr. sc. Jadranka Polović

PART ONE: RISK AND CRISIS MANAGEMENT

UDC 005.334:355.02

Vlatko Cvrtila*

SECURITY MANAGEMENT AND NEW THREATS

Abstract:

The goal of this discussion is directed towards technology of security management during the 20th and the 21st century. The collapse of the Cold War order and the emergence of new challenges, which required developing new structures and response capabilities that demanded cooperation, emerged preconditions for change. In this paper, we focus on changes, contents and models of new forms of security management in democratic political systems.

Key words: Security management, new threats, security, crisis, management.

INTRODUCTION

The contemporary civilization has interpreted security differently in different historical times. The goal of this discussion is not directed towards reviewing these interpretations, but towards technology of security management during the 20th and the 21st century. In the 20th century, the world faced two world wars and numerous local and regional wars and violence which affected the understanding of not only security, but the methods of management as well. For almost ninety years of the twentieth century, the countries were directed towards maintaining survival, defending territorial integrity and sovereignty, given that dominant threats were linked to the possibility of aggression and total wars, as the ones that occurred in the previous century. Military threats were the centerpieces of strategies of national security, which demanded hierarchically homogenous and highly organized structures of security that were supposed to ensure its defense or prevention. Homogeneity in reaching the key goals of security policies was one of the main principles embedded in normative and strategic documents. All social and state capacities were organized for the purpose of military defense, and defense preparations were aimed at reducing vulnerability only in conditions of imminent threat of war, that is, the war itself. The response mechanism to key crisis (war) functions because institutional mechanisms and comprehensive preparations can fulfill the need of the community (prevention and resistance in war). With the collapse of the Cold War order in the early 1990s, military threats significantly reduced, especially in Europe, which resulted in changes in security policies, identification and prioritization of new challenges, as well as challenges in security management and organization. In the times of facing new challenges for which the existing resources (institutional and material) are no longer sufficient, it was necessary to approach the changes and establish new mechanisms that will meet the security needs of the society and the state.

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After the collapse of the Cold War order and the decline of military threats, as well as the emergence of new non-traditional threats, risks and unexpected disorders the society might face in the future, the need for new organizational forms of security management increased. Although the need was indeed identified, the changes and adjustments were quite slow. Only in the last ten years have there been gradual changes in which the principle of homogeneity in the operation of the system is abandoned, and the principle of heterogeneity is gradually introduced which, instead of maintaining the system around “natural” balance points (survival, defense, war) by normative/disciplinary techniques, redirects the system towards improving the capacity for adaptive responses in the conditions of expected and unexpected shocks, that is, to reduce vulnerability and increase the resilience of the society.

Hierarchical structures of national security that were founded on the authority of normative and political power have created the stability of response to external military threat through institutional forms and less by redirecting towards nature and results of interactions within a complex international environment. Cooperation was not the primary expected result, since organization and security management were determined by the foundation of national interests, of which survival stood as the most significant one. The collapse of the Cold War order and the emergence of new challenges, which required developing new structures and response capabilities that demanded cooperation, emerged preconditions for change.

In this paper, we focus on changes, contents and models of new forms of security management in democratic political systems.

1. Security management

On a general level, we can speak of three concepts from which emerged models of security management. Hellman (2017) divides them into human, national and transnational security, whilst human security represents a new concept, while the other two existed even before, but have changed contents and descriptions of challenges due to new circumstances. Hellman (2017) offers three observations regarding the “old” concept of national security: first of all, with national security, there was always a difference between local and foreign, internal and external; secondly, the borders of a state and its territory played a significant role in determining the concept of security and management technology; third, the notion of threat was always linked to endangering sovereignty and territorial integrity from the external enemy. These three observations direct towards the question to what extent was the logic of national security maintained in the new circumstances of the changed environment and the occurrence of new challenges, that is, the reduction of direct military threats from outside. Taking into account the reluctance of large systems to change, as well as the fact that the state is still

the main actor in security which determines the content and methods of action, we can assume that it will be the main driver but also the main brake in developing new management technologies that require the circumstances of current development and an uncertain future.

Mark Webber (2002, 44) defines security management as an “international system of governance, dependent on the acceptance of the majority of the affected countries, which manages activities across the security spectrum and security areas related to security through regulatory mechanisms (both formal and informal)”. This broad definition includes the system, actors and their relations in complex international conditions. Sperling (2014) believes that conceptualizations of security management can be divided into four categories: the first, management focused on state interaction; the second, focused on networks; the third, referring to managing systems of international and transnational regimes; the fourth, management in a transformative manner in new conditions of widened security agenda. As the actors, problems, challenges, threats and risks multiplied, it became clear that even the (military, politically and economic-wise) stronger states did not have sufficient capacities for solving everything that emerged in the field of security during the last thirty years (Kaldor & Stiglitz 2013).

Since the end of the World War Two until today, we can identify several formed concepts that were used as a response to dominant threats in different contexts. Juntunen and Virta (2019) name them “security mentalities” as well, which imply the existence of ingrained attitudes and practices which influence the formation of policies. They list four key “mentalities”, that is, concepts: defense, protection, prevention and resilience as a new concept. When observed through the logic of defense, the main security threats are the ones coming from other states. In the logic of protection, the main threats emerged from structural social distortions such as poverty, inequality and other cultural practices that cause structural deviations and internal resistances. In the logic of prevention, security policy is more focusing on the general welfare of the society and its readiness to unexpected events. Here it is assumed that the majority of threats emerge from organized illegal activities or specific disorders in the society which threaten the sense of internal security. The security logic founded on the concept of resilience emerges from grand openness and vulnerability of contemporary societies. The primary goal of politics and management based on resilience is not increasing material resilience of critical infrastructure and the capacity of the power of state, but creating the need for increasing mental and physical flexibility of individuals, communities, the private sector and the civil society in order to face the unpredictable and unavoidable threats. The policy of resilience wishes to improve the functionality of society and its resilience to uncertain challenges which will be faced in the future (Pursianinen 2018).

Table 1 – Four concepts (mentalities) of security policy

	Reference object of security management	Dominant perception of security	Main security agents	Agenda of the security policy (published or implicit)	Relations between politics and security
Defense	Territorial integrity of state and its borders; critical infrastructure and continuity of state functions	Fear and uncertainty caused by other states or some other highly organized political actors; conflicts between state actors	Defense power and other key factors that protect territorial integrity and continuity of key state functions and internal order	The intentions of (rational state) actors can be influenced through practice of external protection, allied politics, projection of power, etc.	The issues of security are often separated from other social processes and normal political order; security as the field of excellency; enemy image might prevail
Protection	Vulnerable individuals, groups and communities	Political, economic and social structures that cause inequality and suffering; global warming, lack of resources and its destruction; interstate ethnic conflicts	Local government (responsibility to protect); international and nongovernmental actors that provide humanitarian help and interventions	Explicit ambition to remove structural sources of insecurity and to free the threatened from suffering	The issues of security are comprehensively anchored in socio-economic structures of society and culture; state security worries are often politicized
Prevention	Political, social and public order and welfare of the society	Organized crime and violent extremism; illegal migrations and human trafficking; terrorism and radicalization; crime, violence and disturbance of public order	Participants in law enforcement such as police, the emergency service and other state participants; also, more and more, participants in provision of social security, private companies and communities	Including pacification of the society through a mixture of welfare policy and crime prevention, as well as counterterrorism, visible police action and law enforcement	Political legitimacy and authority of the security service provider is the main, or else the relation of security and politics is ambiguous and contested
Resilience	Processes of maintaining cohesion and everyday functioning of the society	Unpredictable non-linear threats such as threats to the environment and other challenges; blurring the outer and inner spheres of security	Civil society, local communities, private sector, citizens; the invisible government ruling in silence	Strengthening autonomous capacities of individuals and societies for adjustment, recovery and reforms	Not clear: it reduces the need for relying on articulated threats and enemy image typical for the logic of defense, but increases society securitization

Source: Juntunen and Virta (2019).

The complexity of the contemporary world, as well as numerous dangers and risks that are emerging or might emerge, put security management to big challenges. Traditional management models that were characteristic for the national security system can still exist for issues linked to sovereignty and territorial integrity, but it is important also to notice the need for developing new models that would suit more to contemporary conditions in which the state is not the only reference object of security anymore. It seems that responsibility for provision of increasing the resilience of society is increasing with the number of actors that should be included in the preventive activities. However, this leads to expectations of greater responsibility of individuals and communities without real transfer of power towards them. The state still maintains all levers of security management in its hands, and thus new actors are awarded some responsibilities, but not the resources and participation in strategic processes that define concrete practices and goals of security management as well (Gladfelter 2018). This might mean that simultaneous existence of all four “security mentalities” within a community is possible, whilst some of them might be dominant (most often the ones linked to management technology characteristic for classical national security).

2. New security environment and challenges

Never before did Western democratic societies have such level of absence of military threats as it was the case in the beginning of the 21st century. Such state influenced supplementation of the role of armed forces that was not solely directed towards defending territories anymore, but its tasks spread to participation in peace and stability building through peacekeeping operations, as well as to providing aid to the population in cases of natural and humanitarian catastrophes. It seemed that the world is entering the new era in which the security will be observed much wider than the military security. In such world, it is expected that there will be less and less shocks in the international environment that could have serious consequences to the entire international order. However, after the terrorist attack on the US on September 11, 2001, catastrophe once again became a dominant political imagination of the uncertain future, since this showed how much a great power can be vulnerable to such type of violence. Ulrich Beck (2002) wrote that this terrorist attack taught us a lesson that we are currently living in the world of risk, in a society in which there are some non-controllable and unpredictable dangers from which protection is indeed impossible and where the issues of prevention and compensation for damages, minimalizing responsibility and prevention of occurrence of harder consequences has lost all its social significance, given the shock that can be produced by such events. Shocks always impact the continued production of catastrophic narratives and warnings about possible catastrophic consequences.

Ulrich Beck believes that our civilization today is facing uncontrollable and inconceivable dangers which are direct consequences of human impact and

technology (Beck 1999). According to Beck, the society of risk “refers to the developmental phase of the modern society within which social, political, economic and individual risks are harder to escape the control of security institutions, as well as the ones in charge of protection of the society” (Beck 1992, 5). Giddens (2002) believes that we are nowadays living in the times within which we ourselves produce risks, which consequences we will face in the future. They both believe that the contemporary society has suitable knowledge on their own production of risks, which leads us towards increasing implementation of principles of caution which differ from the previous preventive approach to risk management (Ewald 2002).

Rasmussen (2004) believes that in the world, and especially in democratic countries, after September 11, 2001, developed anxiety and uncertainty in which one cannot guarantee predictability, security and control anymore, as it was before. Beck believes that such state contributed to the development of the “hidden central issue in the world society of risk: how to maintain the control under the uncontrollable – in politics, law, science, technology, economy and everyday life” (Beck 2002, 41). If we accept Beck’s concept of the society of risk, then the paradigm of security management depends on what numerous authors called “the neoliberal management” (Dean 1999; Larner and Walters 2004; O’Malley 2004; Simon 2007). It means that it is necessary to implement a comprehensive approach to security, integration of abilities of state sector, integration in international actions, as well as inclusion of the society and individuals within society as partners in realization of security, in which they did not participate before. Deborah Lupton (2006, 14) believes that this new paradigm implies more and more policies and practices for avoiding risks, which impacts the “formation of the ‘good citizen’. Avoiding risk has become moral action that refers to the question of self-control, self-recognition and self-improvement”. Understanding security as a practice used for developing partnership between the government and citizens enables development in which all potentials of a community can be used comprehensively in the security practice. Butler (2004) explains that governmental security measures are not anymore unique and hierarchical, since the environment and challenges changed, and thus they must be diffuse and distributed to all citizens. Tactics used by governments are marked with inclusion of citizens in preventive, reactive and post-crisis activities. The trust of citizens is the key point of the will for participation in the new crisis management. In the war against terrorism, Butler (2004, 52) believes, personal responsibility for avoiding risk is promoted in national strategic documents that “encourage citizens to be ready for catastrophes and to be aware of the everyday risks”. Ericson (2007, 63) believes that inviting citizens to participate in mutual efforts are based on the statement that we must all be ready for the occurrence of terrorism, “in all places and in every moment”. Citizens are being encouraged to include “awake visuality” in their everyday lives by observing their surrounding with the intention of sighting the “unusual” and reporting the said sighting to the state authorities (Amoore 2006; 2007). Numerous non-governmental

organizations dealing with the protection of human rights believe that such invitations of citizens to vigilance is an inappropriate tool in the technology of security risk management, and thus states should not be using their citizens for such activities because it can cause deeper social consequences that are inappropriate to a democratic political system.

Risk allocation to citizens does not quite fit into the paradigm of neoliberal rule, even though it occupies an important place in the new concept of governance. In such model of government, there are dangers of neglecting total social needs in comparison to the security needs of the state. Given the characteristics of new dangers and risks, the difficulties in prediction and dimensions of potential damage, modern states are taking up a number of steps in order to strengthen capacities that were not important in the security management before. For example, after the emergence of terrorism and increase of risks from terrorist attacks, states strengthened their capacities for early detection and prevention of terrorist attacks, which resulted, at the same time, in reduction of fundamental freedoms and human rights given that, with the implementation of new security measures, all citizens could have been included in the actions of the state, no matter whether they have some links with terrorism or not. As a consequence, Hay and Andrejević (2006) warn that such approach might be justified in relation to the risk we are facing, but that, at the same time, the consequences might be long-term in the sense of violation of liberal values on which democratic political order was based. Here we arrive to quite a paradox: on one side, participation and responsibility of citizens is expected while, on the other side, their rights, freedoms and privacy are being violated.

Hay and Andrejević (2006) describe the concept of homeland security, believing that it has united new technologies of risk management under the control of the state that has “hegemonized” the governing practice, even though it stands up for partnership with citizens. Such act of the state should not be surprising, since it is based on current assessment and interpretation of danger, and the states actually have the biggest abilities of detecting risk, as well as mechanisms which they can use for influencing their interpretation, politicization and securitization (Douglas 1992, 44).

Aradau and van Munster offer an approach to analysis of new technologies of risk management which moves away from the concept of the “society of risk” of Ulrich Beck, given that they deem it not sufficiently precise as an analytical model for discussion on contemporary risks, especially in the light of occurrence of new and very specific dangers (Aradau & van Munster 2008). Therefore, they start from conceptualizing the risk as a dispositive, that is, as a “heterogenous set of discursive and material elements for managing social problems” (2008, 24). Instead of ideological attempts of “monitoring” the risks in the society of risks and the necessary prevention, towards which Beck directed the discussion, Ardanau

and van Munster believe that contemporary policies of risk management are being formed around the precautionary dispositive. They believe that contemporary threats direct us towards choosing the concept and the precautionary measures, given that it ensures rational behavior of the government in managing perspectives of futures in which numerous risks await. Ewald believes that the “precautionary principle does not target all risky situations, but only the ones marked with two main features: the context of scientific insecurity on one side and the possibility of serious and irreversible threat on the other” (Ewald 2002, 282). This means that the risks that can be overcome with scientifically proven and effective means will not cause fear from apocalyptic future as the ones that could happen, and for which we neither have experience, nor scientifically proven responses. In the events when there are certain “unknown unknowns”, they cause increased fear due to vast damages that might be caused. For example, the fear of flu epidemic or the occurrence of rabies is small, since we have health and experienced proven means for prevention and reaction to them, while there are grand fears from mutation of viruses for which we do not have vaccines and still don’t have experience for fighting against such occurrence. The best illustration for this statement is the occurrence of the *COVID-19* virus. Even though the science predicted that virus mutations might occur, that is, that viruses very fatal to human life exist in the animal world, we were not ready for suitable reaction. Measures and recommendations that are currently being enforced (washing hands, masks, distancing) are the framework of response implemented in all cases of spread of epidemic. Science and scientific community did not have any responses to this crisis but the ones we enforced before, and which are based on previous experience and partnership with citizens, given that the success of implementation of measures depends of them. The level of “obedience” of citizens depends on many factors, among which are also mentality traits and threats of penalties in case of not adhering to the measures, that is, implementation of authoritative forms of control in order to prevent the spread of virus.

Common knowledge on risk activates technologies of responsibility, while the “known unknowns” provide insight into occurrence and possibility of occurrence of risk in the future. In this case, we assume that, in the future, it is possible that a certain risk might occur that could be managed with the help of statistical probability and other form of assessments because we have, among other things, already experienced it, that is, we can, on the basis of existing knowledge and experience, predict that it might occur in the future. For example, if statistics point to the increase in numbers of individuals killed in traffic accidents in the last five years, we will probably assume that such increase might continue and that we might face even harder consequences. Based on available knowledge and statistical probability, we will take precautions of which we know (or assume) that they could reduce the number of the unfortunate and the killed. We do this due to the need for preventive measures based on the existing knowledge and which

combine awareness and punishment. Such approach assumes that the risk from the past will continue appearing in the future, whilst we interpret linearly the relation of past and the future and thus take measures in order to reduce the potential growth, given that we believe that it might increase. Therefore, we accept that the risk will continue appearing and having harmful consequences, but that they will be acceptable on a certain level due to its reduced volume and the said measures, and thus will not cause broader catastrophic social consequences. Finally, it can be said for “unknown unknowns” that they represent catastrophic events which we cannot manage by the use of the existing technology of risk management in the uncertain future. The unknown unknowns are the future outcomes, events, circumstances or consequences that cannot be predicted, cannot be included in plans, since we lack significant elements, meaning that we cannot determine which management technologies we will use. Given the development and multiplication of risks, we can assume that even such “unknowns” will keep appearing in the future, and thus, the question arises what abilities of the contemporary civilization could help managing the unknown risk in the moment of its occurrence. It is obvious that we cannot rely solely on the existing technologies and scientific discoveries, and that we cannot rely on experience and already used management technologies. The responses to the assumption that we will face and be facing the “unknown unknowns” in the future direct the society towards the application of precautionary principles and strengthening resilience and flexibility of the entire society, and not only the ability of certain actors professionally engaged in crisis management.

As previously stated, technology of risk emerging from the precautionary principle takes into consideration both “known” and “unknown” unknowns for which we can assume that they might occur and cause great damage. When states face great uncertainty within which the darkest scenarios might develop, the most often reaction of the ruling structures in passing decisions of the principle of precaution. In such situations, it is quite hard anticipating what will actually happen, given that there are certain “unknowns”, but the actions are being set in motion in order to comprehend that, following previous experiences, sudden situations and occurrence of risks might transform into unforeseeable and unacceptable consequences. In political life and the decision-making process, it is important to act, pass decisions and seem as if everything is under control, and hence the need for passing decisions in situations when we are not sure how the situation will develop in the future as well. We can again use as illustration the recent situation with the COVID-19 virus pandemic. Many governments are nowadays passing not only epidemiological and health measures, but also economic measures in order to save the economy, and thus they are attempting to assume what trends will appear in the near future. It is clear to everyone that we are speaking of an unknown future and that it is hard to predict the direction of the development (or stagnation) of the world economy, as well as what will happen to certain sectors. Still, the decisions are being passed in order to implement the

precautionary measures and principles, that is, to express responsibility (which is indeed expected from the governments), even though they know of future events maybe slightly more than an average citizen who regularly follows the media. Maybe the best illustration of the previously stated is embodied in a part of the speech of Tony Blair given on April 10, 2004 in the Royal Society, when he reflected on the critics of his position, attitude and decisions regarding the invasion of Iraq in 2003: “Sit in my place. Here is the intelligence sector. Here are the advisors. Will you ignore them? But, of course, the intelligence work is simply that: intelligence work. It is not something unknown. It has its own limitations. In every occasion, one should make the most suitable judgement, taking into consideration everything we know and all the advice available. But when making that decision, would we prefer to act, even if it turns out that that is not OK? And let us assume that we did not act, and that the intelligence proves to be valid, how many people will forgive us for not acting?” (Blair, 2002). Following this logic, we can assume that, in such situations, governments act not because they know exactly how to act or what risk they are facing, but because they want to represent themselves as responsible in the interest of their citizens. It is true that there are also examples in which the ruling structures do not take up timely actions or actions that do not consider the seriousness of risk. The example of such behavior is president Trump, who ignored the warnings of experts, did not start acting in time, and when he did start, he contributed more to confusing the public by refusing to wear a mask and by his incoherent interpretations of danger.

Corry (2012) warned that it must be paid attention to vulnerability of society, meaning that security management should be directed towards strengthening resilience and imposing long-term measures that would maintain and strengthen the said resilience. In his interpretations, vulnerability is a feature of reference object for which we do not have to act by implementing long-term measures that would change vulnerability through vigilance and preventive measures into resilience. The vulnerability is expressed as a trait of the reference object to which special attention should be paid in security management, since if vulnerability is high in a society, big damages might occur, and that is something that a community cannot afford. Within the security management developed the concept of resilience, that is, elasticity/flexibility through which higher resilience of a society to contemporary risks might be achieved. Wanglin and Galloway (2017) believe that it is impossible to understand the notion of resilience without linking it to the notion of adaptation and transformation. The notion of adaptation comes from evolutionary biology and refers to an action that enables a form or a structure (community, group, region or even a country) to cope better with stressful states and sudden events. The adoption process stresses the need for modifying the system (or an entity) in order to fit better into the changed or changing surrounding. Smit and Wandel (2006) believe that structures and systems with higher ability of adaptation are more resilient, and the ones that did not develop the

trait of adaptation are facing a bigger danger from developing highly harmful consequences. In order for a system or some other entity to achieve certain level of ability and resilience, certain changes should be made. Systems are usually not prone to change and prefer to remain in the achieved state. In order to set the changes in motion, the system must have the capacity for change, that is, the ability to change (transformability). Moreover, a system must be aware of the need for change, which is a necessary prerequisite for generating capacities and abilities for change.

Holling (1973) researched how to achieve resilience in a complex ecosystem in which it is hard to achieve balance and homogeneity in action due to numerous and different actors. In such conditions, encouraging evolution (change) of the system is demanding if it is insisted on control and a unique pattern of action. However, if we take the existing heterogeneity of the system into consideration, as well as the interests and features of different actors, changes seem necessary since the system must move away from the said traits that limit its actions, given the character of risk. The management approach, which intends to develop resilience, should observe the surrounding through numerous and open options, as well as through heterogeneity of actors and its interests. It believes that every event should be seen from different perspectives in order to spot better the traits and processes which are important to us for developing resilience of a society. Moreover, it is not enough anymore to rely on the existing knowledge, but it is necessary to admit that we do not have sufficient knowledge of the unexpected events and risks that await us in the future. He concludes that “the frame of resilience can adapt this change in perspective since it does not demand for a precise capacity for predicting future, but only qualitative capacity for designing systems that can absorb and adapt future events in any unexpected form” (Holling 1973, 16-17). In his approach, he deviates from techniques directed towards balance in order to achieve systemic stability, but is interested in optimizing the conditions for the survival of the ecosystem and the reference object (the society and an individual). Holling, Gunderson and Peterson (2002) believe that resilience can be improved by widening the domain of stability around the inner circle, that is, the core which has already adapted and is ready for encouraging and spreading changes. They conclude that such approach increases resilience and the ability of a system to withstand the impact of big and destabilizing shocks, and thus allows fast and efficient reorganization (adaptation) with the goal of using the created capital of knowledge and experience in new unexpected situations.

CONCLUSION

In contemporary strategies of national security, a growing concern for spreading different threats, risks and feelings of increasing insecurity are noticeable. In such conditions, providing security becomes more and more difficult for the nation state, since its range of control cannot efficiently respond to transnational threats, impact of globalization and new risks that impact the

development of uncertainty and insecurity. Today, it is becoming harder and harder to recognize dangers and risks because they are becoming increasingly unpredictable in time and range. As a result, classical notion of security can be seen as less useful in forming technologies of management, because it is not possible to efficiently prepare and react to all imaginable threats. Such situation created favorable conditions for including resilience into national security strategies, and thus it is increasingly being promoted as a potential solution for security management which can be used for achieving resilience and elasticity. However, even though resilience today appears in all strategic documents of democratic states as one of the solutions for facing future risks, national state still kept its fundamental responsibilities for traditional national security, which is more of a preventive and territorial nature, and which is not always harmonized with the principle of resilience (Fjäder 2014).

The increasing complexity of challenges and non-linear changes in contemporary societies and global politics represents justification of changing the security management towards creating higher level of resilience and flexibility of a society. In the last few years, the policy of resilience is more and more appearing as a suitable concept in comparison to the context within which we find ourselves, and traditional ways of thinking of security management, such as classic concept of national security, defense, protection and prevention (Chandler 2017; Corry 2014; Virta 2013). Security management based on resilience transforms current approaches to security issues. The policy of resilience in the sense of management represents a response to the assumed lack of ability of our societies and governments to ensure security through preventive and proactive politics. This lack is not a consequence of intentional activities, but the consequence of increasingly complex and intertwined nature of our societies and new challenges and threats we are facing (Rosa, Renn & McCright 2014). However, even though we can notice in strategic documents and security practices the move from the principle of homogeneity towards acknowledging the existence of heterogeneity and forming the system which tends to ensure resilience of a society and an individual through development of partnerships, this does not mean that transformation, which would prepare the society for new security management in a short period of time, did occur. The system of national security is changing slowly, and it is dominated by certain actors who tend to maintain their important role and who are not prone to distribution of responsibilities with other actors, and especially not with the society and individuals. This means that societies will remain unprepared for unexpected shocks, that is, that adaptation to new conditions will not be conducted in a suitable way, and thus the necessary resilience and flexibility in societies, which will not be changing their habits and systems, will not be achieved.

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UDC 005.334

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QUANTITATIVE RESILIENCE – DECISION CRITERION FOR MANAGEMENT OF DISASTERS

Abstract:

This paper provides an original systems framework for quantification of resilience. The framework is based on the definition of resilience as the ability of systems to absorb disturbance while still being able to continue functioning. The quantitative resilience measure is based on (i) system performance (in time and space) and (ii) system's adaptive capacity. The framework is designed to provide for: (i) better understanding of factors contributing to system resilience; and (ii) support of decision making through comparison of adaptation options using resilience as a criterion. An illustrative example demonstrates the utility of the proposed measure. The web-based tool is developed, and presented in the paper, to illustrate the use of quantitative resilience as a decision-making criterion.

Key words: resilience, disasters, decision-making.

INTRODUCTION

There are practical links between disaster risk management and sustainable development leading to reduction of disaster risk and re-enforcing resilience as a new development paradigm. There has been a noticeable change in disaster management approaches, moving from disaster vulnerability to disaster resilience; the latter viewed as a more proactive and positive approach (Simonovic 2016). As hazard is increasing, at the same time it erodes resilience. In the past, standard disaster management considered arrangements for prevention, mitigation, preparedness and recovery, as well as response. However, over the last ten years substantial progress has been made in establishing the role of resilience in sustainable development. Multiple case studies around the world reveal links between attributes of resilience and the capacity of complex systems to absorb disturbance while still being able to maintain a certain level of functioning. Disasters do not impact everyone in the same way. It is clear that the problems associated with sustainable human wellbeing call for a paradigm shift. Use of resilience as an appropriate matrix for investigation arises from the integral consideration of overlap between: (a) physical environment (built and natural); (b) social dynamics; (c) metabolic flows; and (d) governance networks. The disturbance depends on spatial and temporal perspectives and direct interaction between impacts of disturbance and system adaptive capacity to absorb disturbance.

The terms ‘hazard’, ‘vulnerability’, ‘disaster’ and ‘risk’ cover a very broad range of phenomena and are interpreted and understood by different people in

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different ways (Simonovic 2012). Many definitions of disasters are limited by notions of impact and damage. The term such as ‘disaster risk’ and ‘disaster losses’ are essentially our interpretations of the negative economic and social consequences of hazardous events. Human judgment is subject to value systems that different groups of people may have and therefore these terms may be subject to different definitions. The disaster risk, at various locations, may increase by human activity – like inappropriate land use practices. Also, the disaster risk may be reduced by protection structures and/or effective emergency planning. The real disaster risk therefore, stems from the likelihood that a major hazardous event will occur unexpectedly and that it will impact negatively on people and their welfare. Many hazardous impacts result from a combination of physical exposure and human vulnerability to hazard. Physical exposure reflects the type of hazardous event that can occur, and its statistical pattern, at a particular location. The human vulnerability reflects key socio-economic factors such as the number of people at risk, the extent of defense works and the ability of the population to anticipate and cope with disaster.

Traditional disaster risk management is defined as the combination of three elements: (i) the hazard that is - in the context of this work - the probability of occurrence of a hazardous event; (ii) exposure that is the location of people, property, infrastructure and industry relative to the hazard; and (iii) vulnerability that is the susceptibility of people, property, infrastructure and industry to damage caused by the hazard (World Bank 2015). In order to manage disaster risk, measures are taken to reduce the vulnerability of the system components exposed to the hazards. More recently, however, there has been a shift from the traditional, vulnerability-driven approach to disaster resilience that is the foundation of the presented research (Simonovic & Peck 2013).

Resilience - in the context of disaster management - is defined as: "*the ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, accommodate or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in a timely and efficient manner, including through ensuring the preservation, restoration or improvement of its essential basic structures and functions,*" (Simonovic & Peck 2013; Simonovic 2016). While disaster risk management focuses on the reduction of pre-hazard vulnerabilities, disaster resilience is achieved by introducing adaptation options that enable the system to adapt to the impacts of the hazard and enhance the ability of the physical, social, economic sectors to function in the event of a disaster. These adaptation options help the system components to cope with and recover from hazard impacts in order to return to a pre-disaster level of performance as rapidly as possible. Adaptation options can be grouped into four categories: (i) robustness that is the strength or the ability of the system to resist hazard-induced stresses (ex. flood protection measures); (ii) redundancy that is the ability of a system to provide uninterrupted services in the event of a disruption (ex. a twinned pipeline); (iii) resourcefulness that is the utilization of materials (monetary, technological, informational, and human resources) to establish, prioritize and achieve goals (ex. mobilization of disaster management

funds); and (iv) rapidity that is the capacity to return the system to a pre-hazard level of functioning as quickly as possible (Bruneau 2003) . Evidently, resilience is a proactive means of disaster management making it more desirable for implementation.

The following section of the paper presents a quantitative resilience measure. In the third section the use of the proposed measure is illustrated through a presentation of one example. Section 4 is introducing a web-based tool developed to illustrate the use of quantitative resilience in disaster management. The paper ends with a brief discussion and a set of conclusions.

1. Quantitative resilience

The quantitative resilience measure, first introduced by Simonovic and Peck (2013) following Cutter et al (2008), has two qualities: inherent (functions well during non-disaster periods); and adaptive (flexibility in response during disastrous events) and can be applied to physical environment (built and natural), social systems, governance network (institutions and organizations), and economic systems (metabolic flows). The measure is theoretically grounded in systems approach, open to empirical testing, and can be applied to address real-world problems in various communities.

Generic presentation of system performance used for the quantification of dynamic resilience is shown in Figure 1. The solid line in Figure 1 represents the consequence of integrated system performance under the disturbing event with current system adaptation capacity. The slope of the declining section of the performance curve provides insight into system redundancy and slope of the rising section of the performance curve offers the information about system resourcefulness. Robustness of the system and rapidity are clearly illustrated with the system performance level at time t_1 and difference in time between t_0 and t_r , respectively. Implementation of various adaptation measures results in the change of the shape of the performance curve (two examples are shown in Figure 1 using dashed lines). For example, proactive measures will result in curve (a) and reactive measures may results in curve (b). Adaptive capacity is defining the shape of the resilience curve through the four values of robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness and rapidity.




Figure 1. Generic representation of system performance under disturbance

The quantitative measure of resilience is based, as previously stated, on two basic concepts: level of system performance and system adaptive capacity. Figure 2a illustrates the reservoir performance under disturbing event.




Figure 2. Generic presentation of system performance under disturbing event (a); Generic presentation of system resilience (b)

The area between the initial performance line P_0 and performance line $P(t)$ represents the loss of system performance, and the shaded area under the performance line $P(t)$ is used as the representation of the system resilience. In Figure 2a, there are three possible outcomes in resilience simulation: (i) resilience returns to pre-disturbance level (solid line in Figures 2a and b); (ii) resilience exceeds pre-disturbance level (dashed line in Figures 2a and b); or (iii) resilience does not return to pre-disturbance level (dashed and dotted line in Figures 2a and b). By integrating the shaded area in Figure 2a and then normalizing its value, the system performance is converted into system resilience shown in Figure 2b. System adaptive capacity is defined by the shape of the resilience curve through the four values of robustness, redundancy, resourcefulness and rapidity. The implementation of quantitative resilience assessments is done by using system dynamics simulation. The quantification concept is

easily expanded to assess the spatial distribution of resilience by implementing simulation process at various locations in space and then by connecting them creating a dynamic map that captures the temporal (simulation in time) and spatial (integration in space) quantitative characteristics of the resilience measure. Simulation modelling (for obtaining system performance and resilience in time) is integrated with GIS (Geographic Information System) processing (for obtaining resilience value in space).

The other quantitative representations of resilience are available today and the most comprehensive review is provided by Ayyub (2015).

The presented concept of quantitative resilience in this paper has been implemented in assessing the resilience of:(a) the Vancouver City to climate change caused flooding (Simonovic & Peck 2013); (b) a multipurpose reservoir operation under changing inflow and demand for water from the reservoir (Simonovic & Arunkumar 2016); and (c) complex municipal infrastructure network to single and multiple disasters (Kong et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2018a; 2018b) among other applications. The application results show that the quantitative resilience is a powerful tool for selecting proactive and reactive adaptive response to hazard events that could not be achieved using the traditional risk-based approach.

2. An illustrative example

A simplified example based on the Vancouver study (Simonovic & Peck 2013) is selected to illustrate the implementation of the quantitative resilience concept introduced in the previous section.

There are two hospitals (herein referred to as HA and HB) which service a city (see Figure 3a). This city area covers 124 x 148 raster cells (18,352 cells). The population within each raster cell is known and varies between [0, 6] people. Each of the hospitals, HA and HB, provides health services to a portion of the city population: Service Area of Hospital A (SA-HA); Service Area of Hospital B (SA-HB). Population of both service areas uses a road network to access each hospital location. A “flood” is introduced as a “shock” to the health system (shaded area in Figure 3a). This disturbance affects the performance of health system in the city by impacting access of people affected by the disaster to hospital services. As the road network becomes inundated, the SAs for each hospital are adjusted to reflect the shortest travel distance to service. Thus, a location initially serviced by HA may at some point during the simulation become serviced by HB and the population serviced by each hospital at any given time will change depending on the availability of the road network. These SAs are used to determine a “service population” for each hospital. This value, in turn, is transferred to the system dynamics simulation model and used in final calculation of resilience. The result is a series of maps that show changes in areas and population served by each hospital and the corresponding resilience value (Figure 3b bottom window) and set of temporal graphs that show changes in serviceable population, patients affected by the disaster, and resilience over time (Figure 3b upper window).




Figure 3. Location of hospitals (a); and resilience of hospital A (b).

3. Web-based decision support tool

The quantitative resilience measure described in Section 3 is based on (a) system performance and (b) system's adaptive capacity. To illustrate implementation of the measure in disaster decision making, Shardonong et al (2019) developed a web-based decision support system (DSS) in the domain of natural hazards. Decision support systems are used to provide meaningful inputs for improved decision making in complex domains. The DSS tool created is named *ResilSIMt* and available on line at www.resilsimt-uwo.ca (last accessed October 20, 2020). A detailed technical manual (Shardonong et al. 2018) provides five examples of DSS use. To the best knowledge of the author, this was one of the first tools to use resilience as a measure of the urban system's ability to function in the event of a natural hazard/s as well as recover from the damages. However, the open architecture of the ResilSIMt can be easily adopted to other non-natural hazards. Brief description of the web-based tool follows using material from Shardonong et al (2019).

The tool is using a quantitative resilience measure as a criterion for selecting the most appropriate adaptation option to changing conditions (system performance under disturbance). The procedure for calculating the resilience within the ResilSIMt tool can be described in following steps: (1) selection of the analysis (city, or urban center); (2) organization of the data for input into the tool: layer and networks representing urban system such as buildings, critical facilities, energy, and others, as well as social data; (3) input of the hazard scenarios and damage functions; (4) definition and input of the adaptation measures; (5) simulation of the hazardous event and the computation of the resilience metric.

The GIS interface (Figure 4) of the tool is used in the resilience calculation screen to aid the user in selecting a region of the city for the resilience calculation -

step 1 of the procedure. Additionally, it is used to present all the geographic layers used in the tool's database. The user interface, as shown in Figure 4, is also providing for organization of the data for input into the resilience calculation: layers and networks – step 2 of the procedure.




Figure 4. The ResilSIMt tool user interface

Step 3 of the procedure, hazard inputs, is implemented also through the user interface. Figure 5 shows the input screen which defines hazard characteristics: type, duration, and the affected area. The impacts of hazards can be provided as: damage tables; damage equations and fragility curves (Figure 6).

Hazard scenarios for: **Toronto Pilot**

Hazard scenario, duration and affected area

Select a disaster type:

Start time:

Ending time:

Select a Unit:

Areas and magnitudes:

AREA (KM ²)	ID
0.3206	deb6486a21372668193621aa38adde26
0.2098	460c8046cbf1146e68bd788e79b550d2

Figure 5. Characteristics of a hazard scenario in the web-based tool.

Hazard scenarios for: **Toronto Pilot**

Disaster Scenarios | Edit Scenario | **Damage**

Provide the damage curves (tables) or functions (equations) for physical and/or functional damage.

Select the layer: Category:

Edges Nodes

Damage output unit:

Physical Functional

Write your equation:

When writing the equation use _d to denote the damage variable (Flood depth). The output should be compatible with the selected output unit.

Figure 6. Damage input for the various hazardous scenarios created by the user

Increase in adaptive capacity of an urban system reduces the loss of system performance over the duration of the hazard and the recovery time, and as a result, the system resilience is improved. The ResilSIMt tool in the procedure step 4 allows adaptation options to be freely defined (Figures 7 and 8) for each of the data layers and networks pre-loaded in the database or provided by the user. The adaptation options will improve the overall performance of an urban system when subject to hazards and the user will be able to evaluate their efficiency using resilience as the decision-making criterion.




Figure 7. Adaptation options defined by the user




Figure 8. Characteristics of the adaptation options

The 5th step in the procedure includes system performance and resilience simulation. The user's inputs for the hazard scenarios limit the geographic extension of the resilience calculation in the tool. Figure 9 shows the combined disaster regions (light red shaded areas) from different scenarios for a hypothetical case study. These regions will then be used by the tool's mathematical models to calculate the loss of system performance over time and ultimately the combined system resilience.




Figure 9. Geographic extension of the area defined by the hazards from the user’s inputs

After defining the hazard scenarios and damage functions, the tool calculates the system performance measures and the combined resilience metric. The proactive or reactive adaptation measures defined by the user for each layer and disaster scenario will impact the resilience calculated by the tool. The selection of the adaptation measures is controlled by a set of sliders with upper and lower limits, as defined in the input scenarios (right hand side of Figure 10).




Figure 10. Reactive adaptation measures applied to the system and response of the resilience metric

The user can quickly evaluate the impact of changing the values of the adaptation options on the system’s resilience and, based on the response, identify measure/s with high efficiency in improving resilience in response to the hazard scenario. In Figure 10, the orange line shows the system resilience without adaptation and the blue line with pro-active and reactive adaptation measures.

CONCLUSION

The paper presents an original framework for quantification of resilience through spatial system dynamics simulation. The quantitative resilience measure can combine various impacts (economic, social, health, physical etc.) caused by various hazards. The framework is designed to provide for: (i) better understanding of factors contributing to system resilience; and (ii) comparison of adaptation options using resilience as a decision-making criterion. The developed measure defines resilience as a function of time and location in space. An illustrative example demonstrates the utility of the proposed measure.

The web-based tool is developed, and presented in the paper, to illustrate the use of quantitative resilience as a decision-making criterion. Resilience is an innovative disaster management measure that can assist decision-makers in selecting and prioritizing actions for upgrading complex systems with high exposure to disastrous events.

Acknowledgments: The author would like to acknowledge the financial support for the presented research provided by Chaucer Syndicates (London, UK), Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction (Toronto - London, Canada) and Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC).

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UDC 005.334

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MANAGING RISKS AND RESILIENCE OF UNCERTAIN FUTURE(S): APPLICATION TO CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

Abstract:

The paper proposes a concept that enables quantitative assessment of resilience, developed and applied in a number of European projects. The paper describes the main elements of the innovative, indicator-based concept, explaining the main elements of the resilience assessment methodology (e.g., assessment of resilience level at given point in time, monitoring and referencing resilience level over the time, analysis of functionality of a system during a particular scenario, as well as stress-testing it, optimizing investment in improving resilience). Although the concept and the tool were developed primarily for the resilience assessment of critical infrastructure (the “smart” ones in particular), they can be used for resilience assessment of other systems, and through the extension of the already initiated implementation of AI tools (machine learning), it is even more versatile and easier to use them in the future.

Key words: Resilience, resilience assessment, critical infrastructure, smart systems.

INTRODUCTION – Which future and which future risks do we want/can manage?

At the current pace of change, “the world in the 21st century will experience 20,000 years of advancements, in just 100 years” (WEF 2016). In the changing of the risk landscape, bringing in new uncertainties and new emerging risks, management of these risks becomes essential for the society. Only by managing these risks, some of them potentially decisive for shaping the “unknown futures” of the society, one can ensure sustainable future of and for the society. Therefore, current research efforts and the overall societal efforts, including those in the area of governance, have to provide a much-needed prediction and insight methodologies and tools to deal with emerging risks and manage them adequately.

When looking at emerging risks as decisive drivers and influencing factors of the “unknown futures” of the society, one faces a number of issues:

- a) The new, previously unknown or not considered, emerging risks can pose the greatest challenges to resilience, safety and operational and business continuity. These “new and/or increasing” risks can be related to different areas of activities, such as new processes, new technologies, new types of workplace, or social or organizational change.
- b) The emerging risks can also come from the side of long-standing issues, now newly considered as a risk due to a change in social or public perceptions or due to new scientific knowledge. This can mean for these risks, for example,

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that the number of hazards leading to the risk may be growing, that the exposure to the hazard leading to the risk is increasing, or that the effects/impacts of the hazards are getting worse (e.g., seriousness of effects and/or the number of people affected).

- c) The emerging risks may interrelate with the processes such as globalization, digitalization, innovation, cross-boundary operations and they can, directly or indirectly, influence each other, being interconnected, systemic and/or interdependent. In this context, the world can be considered as one complex system, as *de-facto* global “infrastructure-of-infrastructure”.
- d) New possibilities to deal with emerging risks (e.g., the use of social media and/or crowd sensing), may help, but they may, at the same time, both increase and decrease the level of trust in process of managing the “unknown futures”. New technologies and solutions will help only if they are well accepted by the society and perceived as a fair, transparent and well-being oriented. Mistrust or lack of confidence, lack of fairness and/or transparency of innovation can damage or even stop the innovation in a particular field.

In the context of “multiple futures” (Figure 1), the main problem remains related to the question “which future, out of many possible ones, should we look at”. Answering by saying “the important ones”, is not enough, because it leads immediately to another question, “how to identify the important ones”, which in itself leads further to an ever increasingly complex decision-making problem.




Figure 1. In the context of “multiple futures”, one has to focus on the important ones, but the complexity of the global system and multiple interdependencies make it extremely difficult (EU 199210)

The disaster managers, insurance companies, standardization bodies and all the others that have stakes in the process of ensuring “safe and sustainable futures”, are therefore trying to find a solution based on the concept of resilience. Instead of analyzing largely unknown emerging risks, one should implement translation of risks into scenarios (e.g., the disaster scenarios) and checking if the

“value we want to protect”, as defined by ISO 31000, will be able to “resist and adapt” (EC Communication 2000; ISO 22316) to the challenges posed by the emerging risks. In other words, whether the “value” (can be, for example, an organization, a system, an infrastructure) will be resilient. Or, in other words, as stated by the Hudson Institute⁸, “we did not really get to choose what we have to prepare for” (Jovanovic et al. 2020). Not knowing what exactly to prepare for, the pragmatic concepts and tools have to help us “prepare better for the unexpected”. Practical forecasting has to be more about preparation than about prediction.

1. X-threats

The EU, in its recent efforts, also focuses on increased societal need to “expect the unexpected” (EC 2017), leading to the need to:

- (1) prepare better for multiple, new, emerging and/or unknown future threats – the *x-Threats*, extending current EU approaches;
- (2) align better EU and international approaches within a *ONE* framework-of-frameworks, going beyond the first response phases of the resilience cycle, integrating (a) situational awareness, (b) analysis of interdependencies and (c) resilience analysis-based decision-making;
- (3) introduce the (*ONE*) new societal disaster resilience index related to *x-Threats* – the *DRI-x*, allowing to benchmark, quantify and better manage societal resilience, and include the “behavioral perspective” (defaults, biases, behavioral fatigue, fake news, loss-of-trust) of *x-Threats*;
- (4) integrate better the all above mentioned with new AI, situational awareness and crowd-sensing based methods, in relation to the existing ones;
- (5) integrate better all of the above (the “one” resilience) within the new *RwafS* – “resilience-with-and-for-society” concept.

2. Transparency and precaution

In the above process, transparency is a requirement set up by both public bodies and general public. The transparency is a precondition for having governance, management, research, innovation and all other elements of the process, perceived as balanced, fair and beneficial. However, the question if a particular solution is beneficial for the society often cannot be answered in a simple and straightforward way. It leads to the question “how can one be sure that the risks related to the solution are acceptable”, which calls for application of the precautionary principle. This principle is well rooted in Europe and in the EU policies, both on the highest level and in a formal way (EC 2000; EU 1992; Wiener 2009; Wiener et al. 2010). But when deciding about the best balance between the advantages of a technology and possible risks, different approaches are possible. Namely, for instance, the EU and the US have often followed different ways, e.g., in the cases of climate change, toxic chemicals or genetically modified food.

The practical answer to the question generally consists of:

- agreed principles, usually within an agreed general framework
- reference methodologies (e.g., ISO/IEC 31010*IEC/ISO 31010:2019), mainly in the form of guidelines and
- tools supporting application of the principles and methodologies mentioned above.

The framework is, thus, one of the key elements of the overall solution, and it defines the practical agreed way of dealing with emerging risks and the method of their management. It is necessary to set a transparent agreed way for management of emerging risks and provide the basis for development by:

- acquiring emerging risk notions/precursors and monitoring their development;
- identifying similarities with known risks or their precursors;
- better identification of the most critical emerging risks;
- better recognition of interdependencies and relations among emerging risks;
- better knowing triggers, factors and drivers of emerging risks;
- better monitoring and optimized follow-up for the emerging risks, and
- systematic interlinking between hazards, vulnerabilities and stakeholders.

3. Resilience

Given the lack of knowledge regarding probabilities and possible impacts the elements needed to assess the emerging risks, the main practical way remaining is the one of assessing resilience, i.e., assuming that the risk will materialize, assess and improve resilience of an organization or an infrastructure, regionally and globally, as an ability to absorb and adapt in a changing environment. (Figure 2) (ISO 22316:2017).

The concept proposed during the Treaty of Maastricht (EU 1992) suggests resilience analysis in 5 phases, namely:

- Phase 1: **understand and anticipate risks** – including new/emerging risks – threatening the critical functionality of the infrastructure,
- Phase 2: prepare for anticipated or unexpected disruptive events, optimally
- Phase 3: **absorb/withstand** their impacts,
- Phase 4: **respond and recover** from them, and
- Phase 5: **adapt/transform** the infrastructure or its operation based on lessons learned, thus reducing the critical infrastructure fragility




Figure 2. Resilience as a concept

4. Resilience and intelligence of modern systems

Modern systems are becoming increasingly intelligent (e.g., the smart cities, smart energy supply). In short-term, making the infrastructures smarter usually means making them smart within their normal operation and use: more adaptive, more intelligent etc. systems. In this way, smart systems can learn smartly and react smartly.

The smart systems used in the CIs have three key characteristics:

1. Integrated and interconnected
2. Intelligent
3. Autonomous

However, in long-term, this increased intelligence makes these infrastructures also more complex and more vulnerable to the unknown and emerging risks. In such a networked system, the disruption in information technology (IT) within one smart system can potentially disrupt the functionality of other smart systems. Furthermore, the IT in itself is a system-within-a-system, and so, the question arises, what if IT itself fails?

The respective current challenges to be addressed in the use of these smart and new technologies are to be focused on:


1. Vulnerability due to interconnectedness,
2. Vulnerability due to centralization/decentralization,
3. Compromises-related individual privacy,
4. Governance-related challenges.

5. Resilience assessment procedure

The procedure for the indicator-based resilience assessment, proposed and applied in the *SmartResilience* EU project, as well as 10 other EU projects in the framework of the *DRS* series of projects (EC 2017), is shown in Table .


Table 1:

Step 1. General, scenario independent, assessment of the resilience




The resilience indicators show how a system is prepared for an adverse event, how can it withstand it and then recover, possibly adapting afterwards. The assessment result is the “Resilience Level” (a number) that allows monitoring changes in resilience over the operation time. This assessment normally does not concern any particular scenario, but covers issues and indicators applicable in general. The resilience level can be monitored in time and/or compared among different infrastructures.

Step 2. Assess possible outcomes of a predefined adverse event/scenario?




The functionality of an infrastructure (e.g., does the energy plant produce electricity, can passengers be transported, etc.) by considering resilience indicators showing the status of single “elements” of functionality of the infrastructure. The assessment is based on resilience indicators during the course of the adverse/disruptive event (“scenario time”). The result is a prediction of the functionality of the infrastructure after the event (e.g., “as before”, “better”, “worse” or “lost”).

Step 3. Stress-testing resilience



The same type of assessment can be done in order to check whether the behavior of the infrastructure is within the prescribed limits, e.g., the loss of function smaller than the maximum allowed, e.g., following the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group stress-test definition.

Step 4. Analyze interconnectedness & interdependencies




It is important to know and understand how an adverse event within one system, e.g., an infrastructure, may impact operation of other infrastructures. The assessment is based on resilience indicators: they show interconnectedness and interdependencies. The systems involved and the indicators thus form the logical network that conduct analysis in order to model the propagation of effects from one infrastructure to another. Thus, the cascading and ripple effects can be modelled and the dynamic behavior of the network (“system-of-systems”) can be analyzed.


Step 5. Optimize resilience and get the best return-on-investment in resilience enhancement

ALTERNATIVES	CRITERIA	RL	Total Cost	Implementation Time	Robustness	...	Total score
OpA1		0.58	€	100	80%	...	0.87
OpA2		0.81	€€€	100	40%	...	0.17
OpA3		0.41	€€	100	60%	...	0.21

The methodology allows optimization of resilience of decision-making: e.g., in cases when various “resilience improvement portfolios” (the optimization alternatives “OpAs” in the figure!) are considered. Different/multiple criteria can be taken into account (e.g., implementation time, total cost, robustness improvement...), but the main one is the Resilience Level Improvement (delta RL).



Step 6. Visualize and map resilience



Checking resilience of the first response (health) system in a case of a multiple terrorist attack. The intuitively understandable and explicit visualization is a necessary precondition for practical application of any resilience analysis methodology, visualizing the indicators used in different scenarios, GIS (geographic information system) resilience mapping, or visualization in terms of business intelligence (BI) and the “Resilience Cube” – the “trade mark” of the SmartResilience methodology.

Step 7. Reporting resilience

Resilience analysis as a routine – from the simple checklists to familiar-format reports: Although a significant amount of high-level expertise, often by experts from different domains, is usually needed for resilience assessment of complex systems and infrastructures, the results must be reported in a simple and straightforward way.

6. Assessing resilience practically

Over 30 resilience assessment case studies, primarily in the EU research projects, have followed the methodology described above and used the related tools¹⁾. In these case studies, over 300 single assessments have been made and their results were reported (Figure 4, Figure 5). The cases have covered various critical infrastructures, such as water supply systems, energy supply systems, flood protection systems, chemical plants, port facilities, storage plants, pharmaceutical plants, transportation systems, radar and special purpose plants, smart cities, health systems, etc. The typical threats included into the scenarios were the following:

- cyber attacks
- terrorist attacks
- extreme weather-related threats

¹⁾ <http://www.resiliencetool.eu-vri.eu>.



Number of indicators per cell

Phase Dim\	I.Understand Risk	II.Anticipate/prepare	III.Absorb/witstand	IV.Respond/recover	V.Adapt/transform
a. System/physical	1	0	4	4	0
b. Information/smartness	0	3	1	0	0
c. Organization/business	3	3	1	1	1




Figure 4. Examples of an energy plant exposed to underground fire in its storage facility (resilience indicators over the phases of the resilience cycle and the resilience curve during the scenario)

Point	Real Time	Relative Time (%)	Description
0	01.11.2017 10:00:00	0	Normal operational time
11-12			
11	01.11.2017 11:00:00	1	Petrol and ship tanker commence the regular unloading operation
12	01.11.2017 14:00:00	4	A flying drone is briefly spotted just north of third basin area in Port of Koper
12-13			
13	01.11.2017 14:00:30	4.0083	Petrol's personnel at the terminal briefly spot the approaching drone
13-14			
14	01.11.2017 14:00:35	4.0097	Drone hits the pier's equipment, likely targeting the unloading arm close to the interface with the ship. Explosion.
14-15			
15	01.11.2017 14:00:36	4.01	Equipment perforated, oil product (gasoline) massively released, fire.
15-16			
16	01.11.2017 14:02:36	4.5433	Emergency declared - mobilization of the response teams
16-17			
16-17			All activities in the second basin are stopped due to emergency situation
17	01.11.2017 14:07:36	4.1267	On-shore response teams arrive to the scene - start of firefighting
17-18			
18	01.11.2017 14:14:36	4.2433	Firefighting ships and maritime protection services arrive to the scene - start of firefighting
18-19			
19	01.11.2017 14:24:36	4.5707	Firefighting successful
19-110			
110	01.11.2017 20:34:36	10.5767	Area clean-up completion (oil products, smoke, foam, shore and sea)




Figure 5. Visualization of interdependencies based on indicators: terrorist attack (drones) on a port facility (InfraStress project)

The portfolio of recent scenarios (Jovanović et al. 2020) has also included resilience of a country (Austria) health systems exposed to threats raised by COVID-19 pandemics.

CONCLUSIONS: Future of future insight into different future(s)?

Based on the results of the preceding research work and projects, the paper proposes adoption of a broader view on risks, including an enhanced multidisciplinary risk assessment and management, which considers communication and levels of acceptance as an integral part. These include the recommendations to:

1. focus more on the extreme phases of the resilience cycle, namely on the phase of emerging risks and the phase of adaptation and transformation,
2. use more the resilience indicators as a part of international benchmarking and improved communication of all players in the big resilience game,
3. better align and standardize best practices globally, primarily the approaches, principles and methods (e.g., by means of international standards) and the tools and ways for dealing practically with extreme adverse events (e.g., those like COVID-19).

The proposed approach is largely based on resilience indicators, but when using this approach, one should be always aware of limitations linked to the indicators and approaches based on them. The main ones would be the following:

- a. The indicators used in the analysis can hardly give a complete picture of the complex situation;
- b. The definitions of these indicators can vary in different cases;
- c. The values of indicators are, generally, more difficult to obtain, and the indicators are the most interesting;
- d. The values of indicators are practically always referring to a given point in time;
- e. The (perceptual, cognitive and contextual) salience of indicators, their efficiency, as well as their independence and capacity to discriminate differences, should always be included into the analysis.

The crisis management of the future, based on the proposed approach, will provide a better basis for the “new ethics of disaster management” – questioning the principles embedded in traditional approaches and allow to better quantify and stress-test the unknown futures.

Acknowledgements

A part of the research leading to results presented in this paper was funded through the European Union’s *Horizon 2020* Research and Innovation Programme, under the Grant Agreement No 700621. The views and opinions related to this research are solely those of the authors and contributors, not those of the European Commission. Standardization related results refer to the work conducted within JWG1 of the ISO technical committees TC 262 and TC 292. The work owns a lot to great collaboration with partners on several EU and other international projects (such as iNTeg-Risk, SmartResilience, ResiStand, InfraStress and others), as well as the support of the Steinbeis R-Tech and EU-VRi current and former colleagues.

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UDC 005.334:314.74(4-672EU)“20”

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THE NEW EUROPEAN PARADIGM OF WORKFORCE RANGE: SECURITY CRISES IN THE 21ST CENTURY AND HOW TO MANAGE THEM?

Abstract:

The European immigration idyll of workforce range was interrupted by large migration waves towards Europe in 2015, after which equally large traces on the image of an orderly, developed and democratic community remain. Suspensions of constitutions and borders, closure of certain countries with walls and wires, as well as the great sufferings of migrants are certainly not the features of the orderliness of the European society and space, but they do represent an announcement of the complexity of forced migration, as well as the wishes and plans to address the need for workforce only through the immigration model and basically by repressing demographic and migrational issues from strategic, economic and other developmental planning. The negativity and conditions observed in this large migration wave towards Europe confirmed a cleared and unequivocal planned need to return to complementary patterns of demographic revitalization and the workforce range needed by European economies. Classical incentive population policy and selective immigration should be placed in the foundations of economic development and raised to the strategic level of development planning and European security.

Key words: *migrations, security, workforce, new patterns, development.*

INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH SUBJECT

The issue of migration and the demographic in general are becoming a predominant issue in modern societies facing the classical challenges of integrating immigrants, and especially immigration security and development aspects. Relatively little attention was paid to the consideration of this issue until 2015, given that the prevailing attitude stated that the negative demographic processes of the “aged Europe” would be inertly solved by immigration of, as a rule, cheap workforce, without considering a planned strategy for integrating immigrants and assessing their impact on changing demographic structures and the society in general. Developed European countries with large percentage of elderly population have almost completely neglected classical population policy, as well as its consequences to the future demographic and overall development. A large migration wave of about 2.5 million migrants towards Europe in 2015, or the so-called European migration crisis, shattered the myth of the workforce “range”. Having in mind quantitative scope of large-scale migration and Europe’s dominant

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demographic traits, it has become clear that it is necessary to move away from the simplified understanding of immigration and to consider the development and security implications of this process as the basis for modern approaches to migration. First of all, the principal question is whether a large migration wave from North Africa and the Middle East towards Europe, in accordance with the economic and political situation in this region since 2011, could have been foreseen and predicted? It is especially interesting to answer the question whether, in the end, these migrations were primarily conditioned by the existing demographic trends, movements and structures of the migration source area, as well as whether they were systematically directed towards Europe? One of the key questions is why the possibility of setting the great migration potential from North Africa and Southwest Asia towards Europe in motion has been neglected?

In addition to considering these issues, several basic assumptions have been made regarding the legalities of contemporary migrations that can represent the starting point for a new approach to international migration and security crisis management in the 21st century. Above all, this refers to the inexistence of absolutely free migrations (wherein we do not speak of the criterion of voluntariness), given the constitutionally defined order, sovereignty and territorial integrity of societies and states. Precisely in order to preserve cultural and civilizational values, identity peculiarities and even the way of living of a certain society, migrations are carried out through selective migrational models, and are being applied mainly by all developed countries, regardless of democratic order. Migrants generally adapt to the way of living of the local population in those segments they deem as important for their fundamental existence (such as the working environment), while during their free time, they basically do not adapt to the national and religious peculiarities of the new environment.

1. Proportions of the big migration crisis in 2015

The European migration crisis in 2015 showed and opened a number of problems linked to the increased entrance of immigrants, especially towards the more economically attractive Western European region. This has caused the biggest humanitarian crisis after the World War Two, given the large number of refugees and their differences in profile (ethnic, cultural, religious, minority differences, etc.), and thus posed major challenges in their reception and care in major European migration destinations. The identity distinction of the immigrant population from the domicile European one will be presented by the analysis of basic and structural indicators of demographic changes and trends in the field of emigration. The analysis of movement of a part of international migrants by the end of 2015 has confirmed the increase in international population mobility, as well as the attractiveness and importance of certain regions, and thus, it indirectly announced the possibility of big migrations, although the analytical approach itself could not predict the scale of it. According to the data provided by the UN

Population Division (United Nations 2019b), the total number of international migrants world-wide from 1990 to 2015 has increased by 91 million, that is, by 60%, and thus, a trend of their absolute and relative growth was observed in both developed regions and the developing countries. A significant increase occurred from 2000 to 2010, when the average annual change amounted to almost 5 million migrants, while during the previous periods it was smaller, as it averaged to about 2 million in the period from 1990 to 2000 and 4.4 million from 2010 to 2015 (United Nations 2016). On a global level, the total number of international migrants amounted to 243.7 million in 2015, and 57% of them inhabited the developed regions, while 43% of them lived in the developing countries. During the last twenty-something years, Europe has become the most attractive immigration region in the world, and about 76 million, or one third of the total number of international migrants, lived in it in 2015. Migrants were especially attracted to traditional immigrant states: Germany (10.2 million), UK (8.5 million), France (7.8 million), Spain (5.8 million) and Italy (5.7 million), with a total of 52% of foreign nationals in Europe residing in them (United Nations 2015). The proportions of the big migrations of 2015 are confirmed by numerous considerations and exact analytical indicators, of which the most important ones on the global (world) and European level should be mentioned. Forced displacement of the population has, in 2015, reached the highest level since World War Two, given the dramatic global increase of number of refugees, asylum seekers and internally displaced people from different parts of the world, but mainly from Africa, the Middle East and Southern Asia (Ibid). Different regions of the world have, by mid-2015, taken care of around 15.1 million refugees, which is an increase of 45% in comparison to 2012, and the total number of “new inhabitants” amounted to 8.6 million of people only in 2015 (Ibid). Among other things, this resulted in the occurrence of big and sudden migration waves from 2014 to 2015 by sea towards Europe, which brought about a million people, primarily to Greece (853,000) and Italy (154,000) (Ibid). According to data provided by FRONTEX, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, over 2.3 million illegal crossings of the external EU borders were recorded in 2015 and 2016 (Europski Parlament 2017). The increased pressure, fear, uncertainty, the degree of coercion, etc. have led to an increase in the number of tragically lost, killed and missing migrants that tried to reach Europe and cross international borders, and thus the death rate during migration towards Europe increased by 15% (compared to 2014) (IOM 2020). By the end of 2015, the European Union has received a total of 1,255,600 applications for international protection from the arriving asylum seekers within the Member States, which is twice as many as in the previous year (EUROSTAT 2016). A total of 350,000-400,000 individuals were granted refugee or similar status, which is more than in any other refugee crisis since the World War Two (OECD 2015). By comparison, during the humanitarian and refugee crisis in the early 1990s, the then 15 Member States of the European Union accepted about 47% less applications for asylum (672.000) in

1994 (IOM 2020). According to the Eurostat Report (EUROSTAT 2016), within the structure of applicants for asylum, Syrians, Afghanis and Iraqis took the lead, accounting for 52.76% of the total number of applications. With 362,800 applications, that is, 29% of the total number of applicants, Syria was the main country of origin of asylum seekers, and almost half of these applications were registered in Germany. The absolute majority of applications, that is, a little bit over one third, was submitted in Germany (441,800 or 35% of the total number of applications), Hungary (174,435), Sweden (156,110), Austria (85,505) and Italy (83,245) (Ibid), thus confirming the fact that the migration flow was directed and concentrated on certain states, that is, towards five countries which altogether registered about 941,000 applications, that is, one third of the total number of applications. According to the same source, the highest number of applicants in comparison to the total number of inhabitants for the year of 2015, that is, per one million of habitants, was registered in Hungary (17,699), Sweden (16,016), Austria (9,970), Finland (5,876) and Germany (5,441). The characteristics of the migration wave were diverse and complex both on a quantitative and qualitative level, given the number of refugees, spatial orientation, demographic structures of migrants, repressive factors, etc. The big migrations of 2015 have primarily caused a humanitarian crisis with big challenges to the asylum system and refugee reception system in migration destinations, and it brought up many security issues, from the issue of border control, protection of space and population, illegal migrations, models and ways of managing security crises, to the issue of suspension of state constitutions (Adams 2006, 167). The demographic conditioning of the European migration crisis, combined with political and economic factors, announced the importance of migrations in the future development of Europe, as well as the necessity to address the causes and consequences of the refugee wave of 2015 (Tadić, Dragović & Tadić 2016, 15). UNHCR estimates that at least 100 million people were forcefully displaced from their homes over the last ten years, to which contributed the major crises and conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Libya, South Sudan, Ukraine, the Sahel region, Ethiopia and other parts of the world (UNHCR 2021). According to the data provided by UNHCR (2019), a total number of registered Syrian refugees in 2020 (On December 31, 2020) amounted to 5.5 million, in comparison to 2016, when the said number reached 4.6 million. The most current available data confirm that about two million, that is, 36.3% of Syrian refugees are located in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, 3.5 million, that is, 63.1% in Turkey, and 33,000 (0.6%) in other countries of North Africa. Taking all the previously stated data in consideration, monitoring economic and political events in these parts of the world is becoming a European necessity, given the complexity of the main driving factors that show no signs that the situation should calm down soon. Reaching a consensus regarding a mutual migration policy of the European Union, as well as managing the security crises will definitely be the main development issues of the EU, and the demographic immigrational problem represents one of the fundamental challenges of the

demographically aged Europe that will, according to the middle variant of the UN assessment (United Nations 2019a), lose about 37 million of its inhabitants by mid-century, and even 118 million of its inhabitants by the end of the century, that is, about 15.79% of the total population in 2020. It is clear that, in the circumstances of losing demographic potential of the domicile population, as well as the pronounced immigration of identity-wise different population, demographic considerations of migration represent one of the modern approaches to understanding the selectivity of these processes in emigrant and immigrant regions.

2. Contemporary approaches to international migrations

The scientific and research issues of contemporary migrations are predominantly more focused on the responsibility and the problem of immigration states, that is, states receiving migrants, and consider less the responsibility of migrants to the environment into which they are coming. Since the 1970s, traditional approaches to international migrations were predominant, with a great emphasis on the problems of adaptation and integration of migrants and the different degrees of their assimilation. Some traditional teachings have stressed that the level of assimilation, as well as the type of assimilation depend largely on the characteristics of the immigrant group as well as the way they seemingly assimilate to a sufficient extent, enough for enabling their fundamental and work functioning in the destination country, and less often culturally and socially (especially when speaking of populations that differ on many levels) (Mesić 2002, 288-289). The mentioned aspects of adaptation are an integral part of immigrant integration process, but they are also observed through the obligations of countries that receive migrants and that provide financial and technical support for language learning, access to education, adequate health and housing help, social assistance, professional orientation upon the search for jobs etc. Research on immigration phenomenon has been reduced to partial scientific research or to only certain aspects of immigration, which are most often of sociological, cultural, psychological, economic, demographic, political and other aspects, and less often to development and security aspects. The European migration crisis of 2015 has confirmed the said pattern, given that the migration wave was primarily observed on an operative, technical and normative level, while the issues of determination, control and selectivity of migration waves were less pronounced, which can, to some point, be justified due to Europe's (un)preparedness and (in)attentiveness to the force of migrations. The major migration challenge has shed light to the shortcomings of the European Union's asylum system and confirmed the inefficiency of collecting and storing data on migrants, poor border control, uneven distribution of the "immigration pressure", lack of coordination at different management levels, as well as the lack of consensus among the Member States in crisis management models. The development of asylum policy in the EU has gone through several phases, followed by the processes of integration and the

emergence of a series of sectoral policies that have played an important role in the process of completing the unique European market (Koturović & Bošković 2016, 99). Security policy has evolved as part of the European Union's foreign policy, and the complete abolition of border controls between the Member States has caused a number of challenges in the field of migration and asylum policies (Koturović & Bošković 2016, 100). In the autumn of 2020, the European Commission proposed a new regulation on migration and asylum, as well as the revision of the Dublin III Regulation no. 604/2013, which defines the EU asylum policy, that is, which sets out the criteria and mechanisms for determining which Member States are responsible for examining the asylum applications (Službeni list Europske Unije 19(sv.15) 2013). The Dublin Regulation from 2013, as well as the implementation of the principle of the so-called first entrance or the introduction of the rule of examination of the submitted asylum applications and the primary responsibility of the Member State through which borders the said asylum seeker entered the EU territory for the first time (Bačić & Selanec 2013, 47), has caused numerous critics of experts, who emphasized the main consequences of the implementation of this regulation. Above all, they have emphasized unequal distribution of responsibility and "the burden" among the member states, as well as the geographical exposure of the members states on the southern and eastern borders, that is, the border states which are in fact responsible for the protection of asylum seekers (Bačić & Selanec 2013, 47). Consideration of security aspects of migration, that is, the era of the so-called security studies, emerged after the terrorist attacks on the United States of America in 2001, when the world faced a series of security challenges and threats (Tatalović & Malnar 2015, 23). The dynamic of economic, political, social, foreign policy, democratic and other processes at the regional and global level shows and confirms their distinct connection, dependence and conditionality. The emergence of any sort of instability or insecurity might be an indication of a new contextual consideration of these phenomena and processes as potential security risks and pressures. The security approach to international migrations, used on the example of the great European migration crisis, shows that the primary security issues focus on security and protection of external borders from illegal migration, cross-border crime, smuggling of people and goods, asylum abuse and terrorist threats (Tadić, Dragović & Tadić 2016, 26). Such an approach is dominant, while the categories of national security and border security are interdependent. The concept of national security is based on the inviolability of state borders, and the security of the border areas (border security) emerges as a basic precondition for internal security (Dragović 2003, 61). Such more or less classical considerations of security are usually combining and integrating elements of border policy that ensures the stability and security of the border area. The phenomenon of illegal migration is undoubtedly a major security problem given that, according to the data provided by FRONTEX (Portal otvorenih podataka EU-a 2021), a total of 1.8 million of attempts of illegal crossings of the European border were registered in

2015, and 511 million of them in 2016. Illegal migrations were on the rise even before the migration wave, and therefore, for example, from 2010 to 2015, a total of 4.6 million people were arrested during their illegal stay in the EU Member States, while only 28% of them were removed from the EU territory (Vurnek, Bengez & Perkov 2018, 165). Still, one should have in mind the fact that the majority of immigrants in 2015 entered the European space primarily due to economic reasons, and according to the analysis conducted by UNHCR, it is possible to categorize a total of seven individual causes: loss of hope, deepening poverty, limited opportunities for a better life, lack of funds for assistance programs, obstacles to restoring legal residence, scarce educational opportunities and the dominance of feelings of insecurity (UNHCR 2015). The authors Tatalović and Malnar (2015, 25) stress that illegal migrations can represent a threat to security of state borders on three levels – political (political insecurity), social (unrests and increased crime) and economic (taking jobs from local population, use of social benefits). Such approaches represent a sort of distancing from the classical notion of security, considered through the challenges of geopolitical and external interests, production and economic growth, as well as internal security, and within all this, migration policy must be an instrument for ensuring these three dimensions (Rudolph 2003, 603). The results of the Eurobarometer, a public opinion poll conducted at EU level in 2015 (European Commission 2015) and in 2016 (European Commission 2016), showed that the two most important European issues are immigration and terrorism, followed by economic situation and unemployment in third and fourth place. Negative opinion on immigration outside the EU, positive opinion on internal migration (migration from other EU Member States), as well as advocacy for a common EU migration policy were the prevailing attitude of Europeans in 2015 and 2016 on the main (im)migration challenges. Contemporary debates on migration and security cannot be complete without a demographic approach that, in addition to its elementary subject principles, considers the impact of immigrant population within the new space and assesses the level of demographic structural changes in the immigration society. Primary changes in demographic structures announce indirect reflections in other social systems, that is, economic, sociological, cultural and other, and this is extremely important for determining the demographic potential of the domicile population and considering the possible models of revitalization of the European population by either permanent or immigrant population (Šterc & Komušanac 2012, 704). This is an issue that, due to its conditionality and consequent breadth, requires reliance to scientific laws and projections, and simultaneous implementation of security, surveillance and border control measures, as well as exercise of refugee and humanitarian law, migration control, etc.

2.1. Demographic approach to the European migration crisis of 2015¹⁾

Despite almost 50 years of labor migration primary from Southern, Southeastern and Eastern Europe, North Africa and Turkey towards more developed European regions and states and extensive experience in adapting immigrants to new environments, Europe has not realized the importance of large population movements. There was no free migration in the classical sense towards Europe and within Europe towards its developed parts, and democratic and developed European societies and policies completely neglected the basic legality of migrations according to which adapting to the basic values of new environments is the only serious way of establishing a new and identically diverse population. It is undisputable that some European economies solved the problem of shortage of mostly less educated and cheap workforce that initially enabled economic growth, but a much greater burden was borne by domicile societies responsible for the social care of immigrants and their increasingly difficult integration of life. The migration wave towards Europe in 2015 was a consequence of long-term transition processes in the Middle East and North Africa as part of the so-called Arab Spring, which has caused economic and political stability and a humanitarian crisis in neighboring counties, especially in Turkey and Lebanon (Tadić, Dragović & Tadić 2016, 15). The potential influx of large populations to Europe could have been predicted in accordance with the high concentration, growth and distribution of the population in Africa and Asia, that is, its individual regions. The demographic picture of the world in 2015 and the projections of demographic trends until the end of the century confirms this. According to UN data and estimates, in 2015 (Table 1.), more than three fourths of the world population, that is, 5.6 billion of people, lived in Africa and Asia, and this percentage will, by mid-century, grow by up to 83%. The total world population will continue to grow until the end of the century, when it will reach the level of 10.8 billion, and in this global growth, demographic potential of Africa is primary, given that its population will increase 2.7 times compared to 2015.

¹⁾ The author's maps and individual views were presented in a column in *Globus 2014*. (Šterc S., 2016.: Velika seoba naroda, *Globus*, 22.04., 1324, Zagreb, 28-34.). In this paper, those views are further elaborated, additionally clarified and conceptually set according to the subject of research and introductory research within the project "Network 2050 - Demographic, from challenge to response", Team 1–Migrations and National Security, World Youth Federation Croatia and partners.

Table 1. World Population by Continents, 2015-2100
(average estimate, in millions)

AREA	POPULATION				
	2015.	2020.	2030.	2050.	2100.
<i>AFRICA</i>	1.182.439	1.340.598	1.688.321	2.489.275	4.280.127
<i>ASIA</i>	4.433.475	4.641.055	4.974.092	5.290.263	4.719.907
<i>EUROPE</i>	743.059	747.636	741.303	710.486	629.563
<i>LATIN AMERICA</i>	623.934	653.962	706.254	762.432	679.993
<i>NORTH AMERICA</i>	357.031	368.870	390.599	425.200	490.889
<i>OCEANIA</i>	39.859	42.678	47.919	57.376	74.916
<i>WORLD</i>	7.379.797	7.794.799	8.548.488	9.735.032	10.875.395

Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects 2019.

The population of Africa will grow by 348 million in ten years, by 1.2 billion in 30 years and by 2.9 billion in 80 years; Africa will be inhabited by 40% of the world's population. At the same time, the analysis of the total movement of population of the demographically aged Europe since 2015 shows a trend of a relatively slight increase which will, according to the UN, turn into depopulation from 2021, that is, into a decline that will continue until the end of the century and amount to about 118 million people, that is, 15,79% of the total population in 2020. If we analyze the demographic situation by regions, the mean picture becomes even clearer. It is expected that the number of populations of all regions of Africa will increase by 2100, and most of Africa's absolute population growth refers to East and West Africa, where 2.9 billion, that is, 70% of Africa's population will live by the end of the century. Projections of population movements in Asia for the same period show a trend of slower growth of the total Asian population, with the expected largest relative growth in Central and West Asia. If we take into consideration only the four mentioned regions in which the majority of inhabitants of these two continents live, they will be inhabited by 58% of the world's population by mid-century! It is neither logical nor justified to expect that parts of the world with pronounced demographic pressure will be able to retain its population or prevent the movement of part of that population, given that these data directly announce such possibility, while complex economic and political factors accelerate it. The current author's estimates, based on available data, point out that there is a migration potential of 50 million people in North Africa and Southwest Asia, albeit they are forcibly displaced and located in these regions due to war and other instabilities. The result of all this is a very high concentration of population in the Mediterranean basin, amounting to almost 300 million, while the European population, at the same time, numbers 747 million. According to the UN (2019a) estimate, in 2015, a total of 490 million people lived in North Africa and West Asia (224 million in North Africa and about 258 million in West Asia), and it is significant mentioning that population growth is expected in both regions by the end of the 21st century. Immigration towards Europe was,

until the beginning of summer 2015, mostly on a standard scale and without any indications of dramatic changes. Demographically speaking, Europe and its 747 million inhabitants are characterized by total depopulation, natural decline in number of inhabitants, population ageing, lack of workforce and therefore, quite questionable and limited demographic potential for future economic and overall development. According to the mentioned projections until 2050, it is expected that the total number of inhabitants will continue to decrease, the natural decline will intensify, the ratio of working and retired contingent will be increasingly unfavorable, and other negative indicators will emerge from the basic types of population movements. It is quite a demographic indicator of immigration needs and a call to the population that was forced to move towards Europe in 2015 due to forced migration from North Africa and the Middle East. Cartogram of projections of the total population movement (Illustration 1) confirms the visible and pronounced differentiation between these two regions. According to UN data, Asian and African countries on the Mediterranean coast or near it will have a very high average population change index of 144.96%, among which Iraq, Syria, the State of Palestine, Afghanistan and Egypt stand out, with a population change index raging between 175% and 200%.

In contrast, most of Europe will face a population decline by 2050, with an average change index of 95% on a European level, and out of 40 European countries, 21 of them will face population increase – mainly the countries of Northern Europe. The most pronounced decline of number of inhabitants will be seen in the countries of Eastern and Southern (Southeastern) Europe, with average index values varying between 70% and 80%. Illustration 2 is especially indicative, presenting the reproduction differences between the European and the Middle Eastern-Mediterranean world, as well as possible announcements of migrational leveling of the wider region. A total of 23 European countries had a negative natural change, and among countries that had positive natural change, most of them had low rates of positive natural changes varying between 0% and 4%. Contrary to this, on the other side of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, there was a completely different demographic world in 2015, still facing exponential growth and average rates of natural change of 16.9%, which showed no signs of a significant slowdown.

The average total fertility rate (TFR) of the Middle Eastern-Mediterranean area in 2015 amounted to 2.78, and only 8 countries had TFR below the limit of simple population renewal (less than 2.1). Quite high TFR (above 4) was recorded in, for example, Afghanistan (5.45; among the highest world-wide), Yemen (4.4), Iraq and Palestine (4.25).




Illustration 1. Relative change of the population number of the wider Mediterranean space from 2015 to 2050. Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects 2015.

Contrary to this, the TFR of Europe already in the 1970s fell under the limit of simple population renewal, amounting to 1.6 in 2015, and it is worrisome that no European country has a TFR higher than 2.1, which clearly confirms the loss of the demographic potential of the native population.

In the contemporary Europe, there are about 5.5% Muslims in the total population, that is, about 40,5 million, with the fastest growing trend of all national, ethnic and religious European populations and with a possibility of doubling in about 40 years. The immigration population of different religious and ethnic population of up to 10% of the total domicile population is considered as the upper limit of the selective immigration model, regardless of the level of inclusion in domicile societies.




Illustration 2. Natural change of population number of the wider Mediterranean area from 2010 to 2015. Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects 2019.

Some UN projections based on the works of leading international and UN experts for migrations estimate that there is a possibility of about 500 to 750 million of people entering Europe, which additionally confirms the seriousness and meaning of the possible substitution of population for security and orderliness of the area. Population substitution is a demographic form of conquering and controlling the space which usually occurred in the past during wars, military conquests and violent annexations, and today among the small and endangered populations located in strategically important spaces, points and corridors (Šterc & Komušanac 2012, 704).




Illustration 3. Total percentage of fertility rate of the wider Mediterranean space from 2010 to 2015.
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects 2019.

According to the characteristics and indicators of natural movements, almost two thirds of the European population is affected by natural decline, with estimates that the decline of the European population occurs naturally at around 400,000 to 450,000 people per year (excluding countries registering natural growth), while at the same time, the difference between leaving and entering the workforce in those countries annually amounts to between 3.5 to 4 million inhabitants.

In 2015, this difference in Germany alone probably amounted to over 800,000 individuals, and today it amounts to over 1.5 million inhabitants, and thus, the need of Germany (as, after all, of the whole of Europe) for workforce within standard levels of economic development and without planned increase of economic development and additional needs for workforce is clearly visible. Hollifield (2004, 886) stresses exactly on the example of the German immigration history the enhanced immigration movements appearing in states that liberalized their markets for economic purposes and within which occurred economic openness on one hand, and national (political and legal) closeness on the other. Therefore, one should always have in mind that freedom of movement of people will never be absolute (free), nor is it possible, and migrations will almost certainly become the question of selectivity, security and preservation of one's own spatial and social values. The history has confirmed that not one single country ever solved demographic problems of another country in its national identification space.

2.2. New European paradigm of workforce range

Prior knowledge, patterns and projections were a necessity in the very approach of consideration in order to understand the demographic and migration reality and confirm its significance in development and security planning. Large migrations towards Europe in 2015, with their intensity, direction and destructive impact on the countries of transit, the European way of security and living in general, especially regarding the migrant population, changed overnight the immigration idyll of directing the workforce towards the economically and demographically developed European societies. At that point, Europe did not seem like an organized space, nor did it reaffirm its democracy and the security of the society with a number of social values within its unionist framework. The idea, that is, almost the plan that the refugee population would solve labor shortages quickly turned into an illusion because decisions, as is already customary in political domination, were passed primarily on the basis of political judgments. Previous scientific knowledge about how simple and quick transition of the refugees, that is, in essence the suffering population, into the necessary workforce for the developed Europe was far too complex issue, was gathered all in vain. The return to reality soon followed, even though no announcements could be heard at that point, from the European political top or any national level. There were no announcements according to new patterns of planning or the workforce range, and even less the announcements regarding providing the indisputably needed workforce by stimulating revitalization demographic policy. For many years, the standard idyll for solving this far too important problem, primarily conditioned by the increasing demographic negativities and practically inexistent political response to it, was directed only towards immigration of cheap workforce. At the same time, the question whether the benefit of such a model is more profitable for economic powerful people than the budgetary costs of accumulation of the newly arrived population in new social environments was never raised more seriously. Moreover, social, cultural, political and other changes were generally not even considered in the political and scientific framework. The neglect of the basic laws of migration based on the necessity of social, labor and functional adaptation of the immigration population to new environments and primarily the way of living and working in them, was confirmed in all its forms by large migrations towards Europe in 2015. To a great extent, the planned project did not succeed, and afterwards arose the question whether only the immigration model of range can be predominant to the European need of workforce, or are the new (old) patterns of population, workforce and, to Europe, unquestionably needed demographic revitalization, necessary. The demographic scientific and cognitive aspect of this issue, according to which the human population is the most valuable part and factor of every society and space, as well as every activity within them, unquestionably confirms the special need for economic, political, spatial, regional, developmental, investment, social and other planning. It was unclear until now

how could, for example, European, regional and national development plans be passed without population planning, which is the driver of the development and civilization environment. The demographic and developmental future of Europe with the projection of depopulation by the end of the century, with a peaceful observation of natural population decline and an exclusive pattern of workforce range through immigration, will not be as certain as it still seems to be. The return to the European development model and classical stimulative population and revitalization politics is thus inevitable, with a selective immigration approach which was more or less applied until now in all developed, democratic and orderly countries. The complimentary pattern of planning and workforce range is the European futurism, the needed modernism and security realism.

CONCLUSION

Based on democratic processes and legalities, and the consequent population structures on the examined emigration and immigration European areas, it is possible to single out several basic conclusions and guidelines. Large migrations of population towards Europe surprised by their extent, force, spatial direction (concentration) and extensive losses. All analytic indicators confirm that we are speaking of initially forced migrations with economic aspirations and elements of planned direction of population, and the migration processes are primarily linked to political and war conflicts and tensions in North Africa and Southeastern Asia. Demographic consequences of destruction (“democratization”) of the North African and Middle Eastern countries could have been anticipated, and the large migrations of 2015 showed the unwillingness of Europe to preserve its own borders and values and its vulnerability, raising the question regarding revitalization of the workforce exclusively through the immigration model. Europe will have to return to the classical stimulative population policy of workforce planning if it wants to maintain the achieved civilizational values, built identity and achieved order of the society and space even in the future. Migrations towards Europe due to demographic and migration potential in the Southern and Southeastern European environment will never cease and the model of demographic revitalization will depend solely on Europe. The European return to the complementary revitalization demographic model, as well as the same in planning and workforce range in the function of the total development, is becoming the European necessity in contemporary geopolitical and geostrategic relations. Europe’s immigration policy should be based on other world population with stimulating, selective, planned and organized approaches and models, and demographic and migrational issues must be placed in the foundation of economic, social, spatial and total development.

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UDC 005.334:627.4

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FLOOD RISK REDUCTION SYSTEM IN THE SAVA BASIN

Abstract:

Flooding is a natural phenomenon that is impossible to prevent. Despite significant advances in engineering, floods continue and are now recognized as an essential and growing challenge. One of the considerable problems of scientific research in this area is how to address prevention and risk reduction in floodplains effectively. The Sava River is the third-longest and most significant tributary of the Danube. Bearing in mind that the Sava River Basin area was exposed to numerous flood risks that had multiple negative consequences for people, material and cultural assets, and the environment in the past, this paper aims to identify the institutional and normative basis of flood risk reduction system in the Sava River Basin. Regional cooperation and objectives and risk management mechanisms reduce them to the lowest possible level.

Key words: Risk, risk reduction, floods, Sava river, Sava basin.

INTRODUCTION

The great attention of the professional and scientific public is increasingly attracted by natural disasters and the prevention of their impact, mitigation of damage, and strengthening of preparedness for them. Floods are frequent natural disasters that spread panic, cause significant damage and harm human life and health, economy and ecology, critical infrastructure, social stability, and a country's finances.

The Sava River is the third-longest and the largest tributary of the Danube (25% of the total flow) (International Sava River Basin Commission n.d.). The length of this river from its source in the mountains of western Slovenia to its confluence with the Danube in Belgrade (Republic of Serbia) is about 944 km (Ibid). The Sava flows through four countries - the Republic of Slovenia, the Republic of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina [BiH], and the Republic of Serbia, and connects the three capitals of these countries - Ljubljana (Slovenia), Zagreb (Croatia), and Belgrade (Serbia). Sarajevo (BiH) also belongs to the Sava River Basin. The catchment area is 97,713 km², and it covers a significant part of the mentioned countries, then Montenegro and a minor part of Albania (Ibid). The Sava River is substantial for the Danube basin due to its exceptional biological and landscape diversity; it contains the largest complex of river wetlands in the Danube basin (Posavina - the central part of the Sava basin) and a large lowland forest complex (Ibid).

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Image 1. Sava River Basin Overview Map.

Source: <https://www.dinarskogorje.com/sliv-rijeka-save.html>.

The relief and position of the Sava River Basin affects torrential floods in mountainous areas and the river's overflow in lowland areas. Each of the countries of this basin is endangered by the possibility of floods.

Significant floods, which occurred once in a hundred years, occur much more frequently nowadays, and existing flood defense facilities on rivers cannot provide adequate protection. Climate change, demographic trends, underdeveloped awareness of the importance of preventive action, illegal construction, and insufficient investment in the flood defense system led to floods becoming increasingly frequent.

1. Flood risk reduction system

Disaster risk reduction aims to reduce damage caused by natural hazards such as droughts, earthquakes, floods, and other natural or technological disasters, through prevention, and includes disaster preparedness, disaster mitigation, and disaster management. Flood risk reduction implies the professional implementation of activities through systematic efforts to analyze the causal factors of floods and manage them, primarily through reducing exposure and vulnerability of people and property, prudent management of land and environment, and improving the preparedness of the population at risk. It also implies a robust institutional framework, which can be achieved through capacity building, good governance, promotion of appropriate program policies and legislation, facilitated flow of information, and effective coordination mechanisms (Rodna ravnopravnost i smanjenje rizika od katastrofa 2015).

Each state has the primary responsibility for preventing and reducing the risk of flood emergencies. Flood risk reduction is a common goal of all countries. The extent to which developing countries can effectively improve and implement national policies and measures in the context of their circumstances and capabilities can be further enhanced by ensuring sustainable international cooperation and effective partnership.

In this context, during the flood protection planning process, one must start from the fundamental postulate that an integrated flood protection solution must be defined at the basin level. Not that protection is provided by partial solutions and with local effects, which has often been the practice. Only in this way can a technically feasible, economically, and environmentally justified, sustainable protection solution be defined.

1.1. Flood risk reduction system - institutional basis and legislation in the Sava River Basin countries

There is no complete protection against floods and torrents in the world today. The risk of high water and the protection system's failure cannot be avoided because they are random variables. All countries in the region strive to develop service and capacity for flood risk reduction and flood response, emphasizing capacity building at the local level, where the first response is grounded. The organization and functioning of the services are differently organized and positioned in the region's countries' state apparatus.

Responsibility for water management activities in the **Republic of Slovenia** belongs to the Ministry of Environment and Physical Planning. Part of the Ministry is the Environmental Agency of Slovenia, with the task of monitoring, analyzing and predicting natural phenomena and processes in the environment, and reducing biological threats to people and their property. The National Water Institute of the Republic of Slovenia is the leading research and advisory institution in integrated water management and the standard European water policy in the Republic of Slovenia. The Water Management Department of the National Water Institute develops water and hydrological studies and legislation, including groundwater and groundwater protection, river regulation, floods and erosion protection, solid waste disposal, and wastewater treatment. The Republic of Slovenia's Inspectorate is responsible for controlling the implementation of relevant laws (Law on Waters, "Official Gazette of RS" No. 67/02, 57/08, 57/12, 100/13, 40/14, 56/15).

In the **Republic of Croatia**, the National Water Council is a parliamentary committee established to consider systemic issues of water management, harmonize various needs and interests, and propose measures for developing and improving the water system. The competent ministry for all water management issues is the Ministry of Environmental Protection and Energy. *Hrvatske vode* is a legal entity for water management (national agency), established for permanent and uninterrupted public services performance and other activities that achieve water management to the extent

determined by the plans. The organizational structure of *Hrvatske vode* includes the directorate, water management departments, and water management offices (Law on Waters, “Official Gazette” No. 66/19).

In **Bosnia and Herzegovina**, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations of BiH is responsible for performing tasks related to defining policies, basic principles, harmonization of activities and plans of entity authorities and institutions at the international level in the fields of agriculture, environment, development, and use of natural resources. The Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Water Management, and Forestry performs administrative, professional, and other tasks determined by law related to the Federation of B&H’s water management competence. The Sava River Basin Agency is in charge of water management and flood risks, in coordination with Cantonal Ministries (Law on Waters, “Official Gazette of the Federation of B&H,” No. 70/06). In *Republika Srpska*, the Government of RS, through the Ministry of Agriculture, Water Management and Forestry, and the Public Institution *Vode Srpske*, manages water resources and flood risks. At the same time, in *Brčko District*, the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management conducts water management activities (Law on Waters, “Official Gazette of Republika Srpska”, No. 50/06 and 92/09).

The **Republic of Serbia** manages water through the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management, as well as other competent ministries, and the Republic Water Directorate (administrative bodies within it, the Department for Water Protection, the Autonomous Province, local self-government units, and public water companies) (Law on Waters, “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, No. 30/2010, 93/2012, 101/2016, 95/2018 and 95/2018).

Regular flood defense against shallow waters on the first order’s waters is declared on the river section when the water level at the relevant water meter station or other measuring point reaches the average defense level. It is determined by the criteria for introducing flood protection measures from the Republic Operational Plan or when protective water bodies are endangered due to long-term high-water levels. (Gačić 2021).

Integral regulation and protection of floodplains in the Republic of Serbia is in line with the concept of sustainable development in the field of water protection, and can be achieved by a suitable combination (Babić, Mladenović & Kolarov 2015):

- non-investment works and measures and
- investment (hydro construction) works and measures.

Investment flood protection measures can be divided into:

- active measures: construction and use of upstream “frontal” reservoirs and retentions, regulation of watercourses to increase the capacity of the riverbed,

regulation of catchment areas to achieve more even water flow, relief canals, large canal systems controlled by high water regime and

- passive measures: construction of protective systems, regulation of watercourses, construction of defensive embankments, quays, and protective walls, relief, and peripheral canals, which prevent water penetration into protected areas (Gačić 2021).

Non-investment flood protection measures are administrative, regulatory, and institutional measures for preventing direct, indirect, and potential flood damage. This group of measures includes:

- preventive and operational measures,
- regulatory and institutional measures,
- solidarity measures to mitigate the consequences of floods,
- informing and educating the public.

A significant part of the work in the field of water management is assigned to local self-government units. This division was made according to the division of waters made by law into waters of importance for the state and waters of local matter. The law allocated water activities' performance, as activities of general interest, to companies, other legal entities, or public companies.

The Republic of Serbia is currently transitioning from a reactive to a proactive approach to natural disasters, focusing on reducing risks. In the last few years, there have been severe advances in flood prevention and reduction of their harmful impact on human life and health, after introduction of the drainage fee, maintenance and cleaning of the canal network and maintenance of water management facilities and construction of new barriers in places where weaknesses and threats were noticed after the 2014 floods, which were taken more seriously.

The legislation of the Sava River Basin countries that regulates the area of flood risk reduction consists of the following regulations:

- Law on Waters, Republic of Slovenia ("Official Gazette of the RS" No. 67/02, 57/08, 57/12, 100/13, 40/14, 56/15),
- Law on Waters, Republic of Croatia (Official Gazette 66/19),
- Law on Waters, FB&H ("Official Gazette of the Federation of BiH", No. 70/06),
- Law on Waters, Republika Srpska ("Official Gazette of Republika Srpska", No. 50/06 and 92/09),
- Law on Waters, Republic of Serbia ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia", No. 30/2010, 93/2012, 101/2016, 95/2018 and 95/2018),
- Law on Protection against Natural and Other Disasters, Slovenia ("Official Gazette", No. 51/06, 95/07 and 97/10),

- Law on Protection and Rescue, FB&H (“Official Gazette of FB&H” No. 39/03, 22/06 and 43/10),
- Law on Protection and Rescue, Republika Srpska (“Official Gazette of RS” No. 121/12 and 46/17),
- Law on the Civil Protection System, Croatia (Official Gazette 82/2015).
- Regulation on Disaster Risk Reduction and Emergency Management, the Republic of Serbia (“Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia”, No. 87/2018).

In addition to these laws, planning documents for water management are the following:

- water management strategy,
- annual water management program,
- general and operational plan for flood defense,
- risk assessment and flood risk management plan,
- Vulnerability maps and flood risk maps.

1.2. Regional cooperation

It is desirable and feasible to reduce the risk of floods, especially from the negative consequences for human health and lives, the environment, and cultural and material goods. To minimize these risks to be effective, they should be coordinated as much as possible throughout the river basin. The basis of a systemic approach to risk reduction is certainly cooperation between local governments (at the national level), as well as regional and international.

To join efforts on sustainable management of the Sava River Basin's water resources, the Republic of Slovenia, the Republic of Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, recognized the importance of cross-border cooperation aimed at sustainable development of the Sava River Basin. It included the establishment by navigation, maintenance, and marking of navigable parts of the Sava River and its tributaries to regulate the international navigation regime, protection of waters and aquatic ecosystem, protection from harmful effects of water in the Sava River Basin, taking into account political, economic and social changes, which originated in the Sava River Basin region. Committing to the area's sustainable development, the signatory countries signed the *Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin* in 2002 (Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin 2002). The goal was to integrate this Agreement into the European Union's integration processes, based on equal rights, state sovereignty, territorial integrity, goodwill, and good neighborly relations, through states' cooperation in the region. To this must be added that

there is an awareness of the need to protect the environment and natural resources, recognizing the great importance of the Sava River Basin and its surroundings and natural resources for economic and social well-being and citizens' living standards. To implement the Agreement, the International Commission for the Sava River Basin - Sava Commission, was formed as a permanent working body, with its headquarters in Zagreb (Ibid).

We are recognizing the need for further improvement of cooperation and implementation of joint activities aimed at creating conditions for sustainable flood protection in the Sava River Basin, 2012 the *Protocol on Flood Protection to the Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin*¹⁾ (Protocol on Flood Protection Framework Agreement on the Sava River Basin 2012).

It recalled the Framework Agreement of 2002, as mentioned above, recognizing the vital importance of cross-border cooperation in the exchange of hydrometeorological data and information for the sustainable management of the Sava River Basin and taking into account the significant progress made in the field of hydrological and meteorological data and information about the Sava River Basin in B&H, Montenegro, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Slovenia. They signed the *Guidelines for the Exchange of Hydrological and Meteorological Data and Information in the Sava River Basin*²⁾ (Smernice za razmenu hidroloških i meteoroloških podataka i informacija u slivu reke Save 2014).

Just before the Republic of Serbia was hit by the most significant floods in the last hundred years (April 2014), a project called "*Cross-border flood protection and rescue*" funded by the European Union was completed. All project activities found practical application during the catastrophic floods, and project participants were engaged in performing rescue from the flooded areas (Delegacija Evropske unije u Republici Srbiji 2014).

Instructed by the experience of the 2014 floods between the countries of the Sava River Basin, many other joint programs and projects were presented and signed:

- 2016 - *Cross-border cooperation project "Emergency Response"*, worth 1,160,000 EUR, approved from EU grants. It is about investing funds in improving the safety of people and property in flood-prone areas. The project participants are B&H, the Republic of Croatia, and the Republic of Serbia (eBrčko 2016).

¹⁾ See more at:

http://www.savacommission.org/dms/docs/dokumenti/documents_publications/basic_documents/protocols/protocol_on_flood_protection_to_the_fasrb/8_14.11.2012_uredba_o_objavi_protokola_hr.pdf.

²⁾ See more at:

http://www.savacommission.org/dms/docs/dokumenti/documents_publications/basic_documents/data_policy/dataexchangepolicy_cro.pdf.

- 2016 - Project “*Response to ubiquitous emergencies in the border area (EMBER)*.”³⁾ Institutions in the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Croatia jointly implement this project to increase the level of regional cooperation on flooding in the Sava River Basin and improve the preparedness of border municipalities in case of floods, with particular emphasis to cities in Vukovar-Srijem County and Srem County (Fond Evropski poslovi Autonomne pokrajine Vojvodine 2016).
- 2017 - Cross-border project “*DR SHARE*” (*Disaster Reduction, Standardized Hazard Analysis, and Risk Evaluation*), standardized hazard analysis and risk assessment, funded by the European Commission of the Civil Protection Mechanism. It is a software application that will enable fast communication and adequate response to a catastrophe occurring in a particular area. The project includes the Republic of Croatia (project holder), Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Vukovarsko-srijemska županija 2017).

All catchment countries are members of the **EU Civil Protection Mechanism**. EU civil protection activities aim to support disaster prevention efforts and ensure preparedness of civil protection units to act in the event of disasters at national, regional, and local levels. When the state of emergency scale exceeds the response capabilities, that country may request assistance through the Mechanism. The Mechanism sends help in accordance with the state’s requirements, respecting the laws in force in that state. Through the Mechanism, the European Commission plays a crucial role in coordinating disaster response in Europe and beyond, and contributes to at least 75% of transport and other operational deployment costs. Since 2001, the Mechanism has received over 330 requests for assistance and monitored over 400 cases with catastrophic consequences (Vlada Republike Srbije 2021).

These countries also use funding opportunities through the **EU's Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA)**. Support is most often reflected in the provision of training and professional development services, procurement of necessary equipment, development of plans and assessments. Following risk assessments, construction of new water management facilities and upgrading of existing ones (construction of infrastructure) is carried out according to the principle “build back better” (Ministarstvo za evropske integracije Republika Srbija n.d.).

Through joint exercises and training, cooperation is strengthened, and the states’ capacities are supported by learning from each other.

³⁾ You can see news and activities related to the EMBER project at: <https://vojvodinahouse.eu/srl/vesti/projekat/13/odgovor-na-sveprisutne-vanredne-situacije-u-pogranicnoj-oblasti-ember?page=2>.

2. Flood risk management

In the recent past, floods with catastrophic consequences have acted as catalysts for changing flood risk management policies. There has been a shift towards managing the entire flood system in an integrated and adaptable way, recognizing the associated (deep) uncertainties and considering all potential interventions that can change flood risk. At the heart of this new approach is resilience, striving for an appropriate balance between protection, prevention, and preparedness, both now and in the future (Ping et al. 2016). The new approach to flood risk management is guided by the European Floods Directive (*EFD 2007/60/EC*), in which flood risk management plans should focus on prevention, protection, and preparedness.

The main objectives of flood risk management set out in the European Floods Directive (2007) are the following:

AVOIDING NEW RISKS. Spatial planning and urban, rural, and industrial development and construction, as well as all activities related to physical planning, agriculture, forest management, energy, transport, urban development, etc., should be planned and implemented in a way that excludes increased flood risk.

REDUCTION OF EXISTING RISKS. Preventive and operational measures include activities aimed at combating the danger of floods and reducing harmful consequences in flood defense phases. The purpose of *EFD 2007/60/EC* is to establish a framework for flood risk assessment and management, with the ultimate goal of reducing adverse effects, which, among other plans and regulations defining the obligations and rights of all participants in flood defense, is the most important preventive measure. The group of preventive measures also includes preventive security of flood-endangered facilities.

STRENGTHENING RESISTANCE. To improve its resilience to floods, it must have an adequate emergency response during and immediately after floods, thus limiting the adverse effects. Resilient communities can absorb shocks from the impact of danger, i.e., they can cope with a flood and respond to it before, during, and after the occurrence of such an event. Ensuring a sufficient level of preparedness includes measures to establish or improve flood forecasts or early warning systems, develop or improve institutional emergency response planning (contingency planning), and establish public awareness and preparedness for floods.

RAISING PUBLIC AWARENESS. Readiness is the result of awareness and is based on processing the necessary information to recognize the possibilities for action. Awareness-raising measures include a public presentation of flood and flood risk maps, flood risk management plans, organization of training campaigns, and other educational activities focused on flood risk response activities among municipalities; introducing water management issues in schools and increased participation of the population in flood management and emergency response. Public participation in decision-making is a cornerstone of the successful implementation of integrated and comprehensive action plans.

PRINCIPLE OF SOLIDARITY. States should be encouraged to seek a fair division of responsibilities. In managing the risk of floods along watercourses, the state will not apply any measures, i.e., it will not use measures to significantly increase the risk of floods in neighboring countries upstream or downstream.

Flood protection and rescue include the following measures:

- planning, construction, maintenance, and strengthening of damaged flood protection facilities,
- monitoring and reconnaissance of water levels,
- alerting,
- planning and implementation of the evacuation of population and material goods from endangered areas,
- planning and providing transportation and crossings over rivers and lakes,
- removal of water from flooded buildings,
- finding and retrieving the deceased and drowned,
- care of the endangered population and remediation of the consequences caused by floods (Gačić 2021).

CONCLUSION

The Sava River Basin countries have taken a big step by working together to identify and map flood risks, identify critical points, and implement measures to eliminate or at least reduce the chances of future floods. Cooperation has been strengthened through signing multilateral and bilateral agreements and joint flood protection exercises.

It is necessary to implement non-investment measures in a much higher intensity than those currently represented in the flood defense system. In the Republic of Serbia, but also in other countries, urban planning and land management based on risk information should be promoted to avoid the construction of houses and production facilities in areas prone to flooding. It is also necessary to increase financial resilience by promoting financial strategies for the consequences of disaster risks, including risk transfer and insurance.

In the forthcoming period, it is also necessary to strengthen the capacity to protect from other risks, such as epidemics, which can co-occur with catastrophic floods, thus significantly complicating the response to such (associated) dangers. As small countries with weak economies, such as the Republic of Serbia, have less resilience and recovery more difficultly from natural disasters, the consequences of such an event would be felt for many years after the danger was eliminated.

By raising awareness of the importance of prevention measures and implementing them, flood hazards can be minimized.

Inter-state cooperation, joining the EU civil protection mechanism, and exchanging experiences and experts are essential factors that can reduce or reduce risks.

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UDC 005.334:314.74(4-672EU)''20''

UDC 327.56:551.583

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DANGER OF WORLD CONFLICTS EXPANSION DUE TO CLIMATE CHANGE

Abstract:

Global warming in the 21st century threatens the survival of civilization with its consequences: reduction of Arctic ice masses, rising of the sea levels, changes in precipitations, the frequency and strength of typhoons and hurricanes, earthquakes, forest fires of unprecedented proportions, desertification of soil and the shortage of drinking water. The number of ecological migrants is growing. It is necessary to pay attention to unstoppable dangers of climate change, because that is the most important problem the humanity is facing. Overburdened ecological resources are linked with any country governance potential, and they are the factor that influence the increase of dangers of conflicts caused by climate change. It can be stated that, among other factors, climate change has become a strong risk factor for international security.

Key words: Global warming, climate change, ecological conflicts, environmental migrants, civilization survival.

INTRODUCTION

Alarming climate change poses a danger to the entire ecosystem of the planet. The aim of this paper is identification of the turning point in civilization existence and world conflicts expansion linked to dangers of climate change. The subject of this paper is exhibited by the methodology based on the general social and scientific experience and with the use of the comparative method. Ecological crisis creates the need for sustainable development. The ecological crisis is caused by excessive exploitation of natural resources and environmental pollution. In the 21st century, humanity is exposed to increasingly pronounced consequences of the endangered ecological balance, as well as to the problems in the social sphere which can altogether lead to global conflicts. The results gained through the analysis of materials indicate that it is of utmost importance that scientific community must be included in the political decision-making process regarding climate change.

1. Ecological security

The term *ecological security* was introduced by the UN General Assembly, when, at the suggestion of Mikhail Gorbachev, it adopted the "Resolution on International Environmental Security" in 1987 as a reaction to the Chernobyl environmental and human tragedy (Our Common Future 1987, 7). In its report entitled "Our Common Future", the World Commission on Environment and Development (the so-called

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Brundtland Commission) proposed that “the whole notion of security as traditionally understood in terms of political and military threats to national sovereignty - must be expanded to include the growing impacts of environmental stress - locally, nationally, regionally, and globally” (Ibid). Author Seyom Brown distinguishes seven world interests considering that the modern understanding of security implies not only national, but also global, world security, which implies the protection and realization of world interests, focused on the needs of humanity “because it spatially encompasses the interests of all peoples and nations on Earth”:

- (1) the survival of the human species;
- (2) reducing the killing and elimination of others;
- (3) the lack of conditions for a healthy life for all people;
- (4) protection of civil rights;
- (5) respect for the right of peoples and numerous ethnic groups to cultural diversity;
- (6) environmental protection - irresponsible attitude towards the natural environment [...] produces consequences in a wider space and over time; often at first glance it is not possible to see how disregard for long-term consequences [...], ultimately endangers the interests of all people and nations [...], and
- (7) expanding accountability/responsibility (Brown 1998, 8-10).

It can be concluded that, although Gorbachev introduced the term after the Chernobyl tragedy, 32 years after that terrible event which clearly showed what could happen, the humanity still does not give enough importance to negotiations as a tool for avoiding conflicts and wars, especially taking into consideration the present Atomic era. It has to be underlined that climate change, caused by many negative environmental human activities including hypothetical possibility of an atomic tragedy and the political and global interests of world powers, causes lack of ecological security. Another example of belittling ecological security is the withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Agreement on climate change mitigation in June 2017, as well as their unilateral withdrawal in 2019 from the nuclear agreement with Russia, which has been in force since 1987. Given the threateningly unpleasant increase in conflicts and wars in the 21st century world-wide, which can be observed as the general concept of wars for strategic resources, the ecological security of the entire planet is highly endangered. It can be noted that the ecological security i.e., environmental safety is related to general concept of safety. It concerns the degree of destruction of local and global ecosystems; water shortages, floods; mass and irrational deforestation; environmental pollution and biodiversity depletion. It can be concluded that the conflicts and wars of 21st century, waged with new and increasingly toxic weapons, threaten life on the planet, and together with the negative changes in the environment caused by new technologies of post-industrial development, lead to the ecological crisis of modern civilization. Thus, taking into

consideration opinion of the proponents of the expanded idea of security, any problem related to the environment and the worrying fact of climate change is also a security problem. Author Norman Myers, on the other hand, believes that not all environmental problems lead to a violent conflict, but looking in the long term, a causal link can be found between environmental issues and policy changes (Myers 2004, 3).

Author Thomas Homer-Dixon singles out hypotheses of three groups environmental security threats and challenges:

- the first group is represented by conflicts between states that, at the same time, consider that they have the right to exploit the same natural resources;
- the second group are various migrations of population, which consequently occur due to various environmental disasters and catastrophes in cases when different ethno-religious groups settle in new areas, so there are divisions and conflicts between them, because they do not share the same norms and values;
- the third group of threats refers to the demise of public institutions and internal “social instability”, which can lead to conflicts of unprecedented proportions, and are caused by endangering the population due to disappearance of natural resources, energy and raw materials, environmental pollution, climate change, natural disasters caused by human negligence, etc. (Homer-Dixon 1994, 3-4). Thus, it can be observed that contemporary security threats are caused in high extent by internal conflicts and conflicts between states as well in no lesser extent. In the modern era, the stability and peace of a state can be endangered not only by other states, but by internal-state inefficient management as well.

Author Simić states that Sigmund Freud called the emergence of conflict on the basis of cultural and religious identity within a state “narcissism of small differences” and that the term first appeared in Freud's 1929 work entitled “Civilization and Its Dissatisfaction”, representing the idea that it is precisely the small differences between people who are otherwise similar that form the basis of feelings of alienation and enmity between them (Simić 2002, 49-50). Simić explains that the main consequence that arises from such an internal conflict is the spread of the conflict to nearby, neighboring countries, regions, and even beyond; manifestations of social dangers, endangering something or someone can be unintentional - unconscious or intentional - conscious (Ibid). The author gives an example that technological development is aimed to improve the quality of life, but through inappropriate application, it can lead to endangering the natural basis of human existence on the planet Earth (Ibid). It can be concluded that, eighteen years after the previously mentioned warning, technological development started to be one of the main reasons for rapid climate change and deterioration of ecological security.

This can also be confirmed through the author's Cherry classification, according to which ecological security should deal with maintaining the optimal

relationship between organisms, i.e., animal rights issues, the legal status of nature, and the relationship between humans and nature (Cherry 1995, 87). Cherry indicates three kinds of approaches such as:

- The nature-centric, which starts from an understanding of nature as a separate entity and ecology as a science that deals with relations between organisms and their environment.
- The second approach Cherry calls human-centric, and explains that environmental safety is based on a man as a user and controller of nature. The basis for interpreting the environmental safety of this approach are problems related to natural resources, considering the so-called “environmental refugees” and conflicts between people in relation to the environment, as well as the role of international governmental and non-governmental organizations in creating international security through the creation of policies and international law.
- The third approach Cherry considers as being best described as eclectic. It seeks to contribute to a general insight into the phenomenon of environmental safety, taking into account the interdependence between life forms, ecosystems, the social system, individuals and the technical system (Ibid, 87-89).

It can be concluded that there are a lot of threats to ecological security and that they can be observed in two wide groups. The first group of threats is presented by forms and origins of dangers that are out of range of human influence, and the second group of threats lay within the borders of human influences.

Authors Naude and Alcorta warn that “human-induced climate change and its effects on global development is part of the more general challenge of achieving environmental sustainability. It requires a rethink of the process and outputs of production and of distribution and consumption” (Naude and Alcorta 2010). They agree with the opinion expressed by Sachs that “the global economy is literally unsustainable now and cannot absorb further economic and population growth without serious risks of global destabilization – even collapse” (Sachs 2009). It can be concluded that a lot of authors indicate the threats caused by human influences as a major risk for ecological security of the world.

Author Arthur Westing starts from the relationship between people and nature and believes that natural resources are a prerequisite for human well-being and survival (Westing 1989, 129). In his opinion, population growth and the aspiration for the entire population to reach the standard of living of developed countries contributes to the negative impact on the environment, and the struggle for natural resources can lead to conflict (Ibid). Linking the environment and security, in the context of defining human security, he underlines the intertwining of political security, which includes military, economic and social/humanitarian sub-components, and security related to environmental protection (Ibid). Regarding ecological security,

it can be observed that it is a new, modern form of security which appeared as a necessity for prevention of environmental threats, with a role to protect the components of the environment which are basic for the survival of living beings. Ecological security calls for encouragement and requirements to involve as many participants as possible in order to implement policies, not only to survive but as well to improve the quality of life of the population and ecology. It can be concluded that, although ecological crisis is one of the most dangerous features of 21st century civilization, political rulers of the world still do not undertake any major globally accepted actions for enforcing ecological security in order to provide survival of living beings and the nature.

2. Climate strike

The climate situation in 2020 is difficult, as shown by the findings of European Climate Change Monitoring Service – Copernicus. The average temperature in January 2020 was 3.1 degrees Celsius higher than the average January temperature, which makes it the warmest in the last four decades (Copernicus 2020). Lauren Fox quotes that the Esperanza Research Center in Antarctica in February 2020 measured a temperature of 18.3°C, the highest temperature ever since 1961, when measurements began there (Fox 2020). Authors Wennersten and Robbins underline that “we are now witnessing the human devastation of the earth” (Wennersten & Robbins 2017, 32). It can be concluded that there is an urgent need for a better model of development for the survival of humanity. Author Miltojevic indicates the grate disadvantage of the new industrial mode of production, concluding that technical progress “deepens contradictions between anthropogenic expansive activities and limited potentials of existing natural resources” (Miltojevic 2002, 254).

Even in a state of strictly individualistic capitalism, such as the United States, it is no coincidence that Benny Sanders appeared in the 2019 presidential race, expressing many actually socialist ideas in his program, such as free health care and education. This fact illustrates the extent of unsustainability of the system, in which both America and all of humanity now exist, in the long run. The idea of sustainability is based on the "triangle of sustainable development", widely-accepted concept proposed by Munasinghe at the 1992 earth Summit in Rio. This concept includes environmental protection, economic security and social justice, and opposes to a strictly profitable social development strategy, which is global but has led to environmental crisis (Munasinghe 2010, 11).

It can be stated that the 21st century brought up global inequality and a great gap between ultra-rich and other habitants. Specifically, during the year of 2020, marked by *COVID-19* pandemic, it leads to great unemployment and austerity and very uneven differentiated regional development in the world. Thus, all of these factors brought social insecurity. The previously described dangerous economic situation causes the lack of environmental protection. Accordingly, the humanity

does not properly invest into environment but widely exploit it. It can be stated that all the previously mentioned factors have inexcusable negative effect on environmental security and trigger fundamental damage of people's quality of life which further on may cause risk of conflicts spreading.

It can be observed that the regional development of the entire globe is very uneven. Author Šimleša underlines that the so-called benefits of economic globalization and the rule of the market lead virtually everywhere in the world to reduced funding for social assistance, education and health care, to unfair privatizations and to elimination of the concept of “public good” (Šimleša 2000, 110). It can be concluded that all these factors do not allow implementation of the concept of sustainable development and thus reduce the level of social security, which lead to first climate strike in history.

According to Laville and Watts, Greta Thunberg, climate activist has inspired four million people to the Global Climate Strike on September 20th, 2019, the largest youth environmental protest in history (Laville & Watts 2019). It can be concluded that, although without the decarbonization of the world economy the planet will be destroyed, political circles are not implementing enough international actions in order to cause a global turn towards green economy. Accordingly, the previously mentioned climate strike tries to increase global consciousness regarding ecological security.

3. Climate change as the seed of geopolitical change and danger of world conflicts

Climate change is manifesting itself in an increasing number of natural disasters, affecting the decline of the power of states and endangering world security. The World Bank report for 2018 estimates that Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia will generate 143 million climate migrants by 2050 (Kumari Rigaud et al. 2018, 2). China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Vietnam are in conflict over the South China Sea resources due to overfishing and water pollution (Fridtjof Nansens Institute 2017). According to Evagelos, conflict situation in the Arctic between the USA (Alaska), Canada, Russia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Greenland are related to climate change, shrinking ice surface of Arctic and conflict for large oil and gas deposits and fish stocks. The Arctic warming is happening twice as fast as anywhere on the Earth (Evagelos 2018). It can be concluded that the rivalry of the Arctic nations also leads to destruction of the fish wealth of the Arctic, leading further to environmental crisis and environmental unsafety, which represents a fruitful seed for conflicts between the Arctic nations. It can be observed that problems that arose in the environment as a consequence of anthropogenic action, led to a different angle of thinking about connection between environmental problems and safety in the end of 20th and in the first two decades of 21st century. The connection between the environment and war conflicts was pointed

out through “research on environmental and security issues related to global environmental change, environmental scarcity, degradation and stress, as well as their possible socio-political consequences” (Jovanović Popović 2013, 106). In fact, as the author Bajagić indicates, the growing manifestation of environmental problems contributes to security being defined not only as the protection of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the state. Moreover, contemporary discussions on security include research into multiple and complex relations and processes between states and within the state (Bajagić 2006, 222). It can be concluded that the said discussions are oriented extensively towards relations between human society and nature. Increasing pressure on natural resources causes demographic, economic and political dangerous conflict changes. Autor Lee indicates: “The seeds of conflict will lie in massive migrations, border tensions and disputes over essential resources” (Lee 2009, 82). “The changing climate has always been a factor in the rise and fall of peoples and civilizations. This phenomenon is often accompanied by conflict [...]” (Ibid, 166). Wennersten and Robbins underline that “climate refugees, once thought to be a problem confined to segments of the developing world, are on the verge of becoming a global problem” (Wennersten & Robbins 2017, 32). Although the Paris Climate Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016, the climate change still contributes to migration due to desertification, rising sea levels, pollution of the oceans, air, land, rainy seasons changes and loss of biodiversity. Environmental protection is not effective. Ecological migrations are evidence to that inefficiency. The UN states that from 2002 to 2012, climate change affected the lives of 4.4 billion people (UNHCR Factsheet 2019). It should be noted that impending disasters are huge migrations of the population due to lack of food, water and land, and frequency of intra-state and inter-state conflicts over resources. Climate change is also affecting the emergence of various epidemics and diseases. Authors Welzer and Camiller (2015) state that “whether wars in the twenty-first century are directly or indirectly due to climate change, violence has a great future ahead of it. We shall see not only mass migration, but also violent solutions to refugee problems [...]” (Welzer & Camiller, 2015, 6). It can be concluded that climate change is a dangerous factor that leads to migration of human population on Earth, and that it is a large precondition for the spread of conflicts.

4. Drinking water – a trigger for conflicts

Drinking water expert Gleick states that the planet's water resources represent 70.8%, and that drinking water makes up 2.7% of the total amount of water on Earth. Only 0.36% of drinking water is in easily accessible places. About one billion people do not have access to drinking water, and about 2.8 billion (40% of the world's population) don't have water for basic human needs (Gleick 1993, 79-112).

The authors Gleick and Heberger present the chronology of water conflicts three thousand years ago and give an example of the ongoing, long water conflict - the division of the Jordan River Basin, which has left Jordan, Israel and Palestine

in permanent conflict, and since 1948 there has been no reasonable resolving solution (Gleick & Heberger 2013, 165).

The authors Gleick and Iceland provide a three-part division of water-related conflicts:

- access to or control of water is a trigger or factor that contributes to the development of conflict;
- water or water systems have been used as “weapons” or tools during conflict (for example: water is deliberately released by raising a dam for military purposes or water systems have been cut off to carry out military/political pressures);
- water systems are targeted during wars or conflicts (Gleick & Iceland 2018, 11).

It can be concluded that the shortage of drinking water restricts the growth of the population and the economy. The increase in the number of people on the planet and the development of industry give birth to the struggle for water resources. The fight for drinking water can also ignite different kinds of conflicts.

CONCLUSION

This is only a small part of the extreme consequences of climate change which can be dangerously leading towards conflicts expansion world-wide. Ecological security means urgent development and harmonization of adaptive actions in the world in order to protect the planet from alarming climate changes. It can be concluded that funding for strengthening resilience to climate impacts and education on environmental awareness must be provided. Insisting on social and corporate responsibility for the environment and adopting legislation on climate change in the form of binding documents must be implemented on a global level. The intensification of conflicts and geopolitical changes related to climate change threatens security of the world order as a whole. If the United Nations does not encourage international multilateral negotiations and does not adopt a general plan for the protection of natural resources, an increase in the number of climate migrants and the spread of conflicts is predictable. Increasing climate migration is already a serious security problem. It is alarming that the water shortage represents a great danger to the health of tens of millions of people. Unfortunately, humanity has still not built a multilateral strategy or a solid legal framework that would be responsible for prevention ecological migration and conflicts due to climate change. The elaboration of broader legal norms for the protection of drinking water throughout the world, binding for all countries, deserves special attention. Multilateral strategy and legal framework might be the solid shield against danger of world conflict expansion due to climate change.

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UDC 327.88:341.231.14

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INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A FACTOR THREATENING HUMAN SECURITY

Abstract:

Terrorism has the potential to undermine democracy, as well as the rule of law, but also to achieve the authoritarian tendency of power in the fight against this negative sociological – pathological phenomenon. All internationally recognized states are seeking to increase the efficiency of the fight against terrorism, which necessarily leads to restrictions on basic human rights and freedoms. In this way, the existing security context is changing by putting the individual and his security needs at the forefront. The international community is making great efforts to improve and formulate international documents that make it clear that it is only possible to fight this menace while respecting the basic standards of internationally protected human rights. The aim of this paper is to prove the hypothesis that international terrorism endangers human security. The data collection and research technique to analysis the content of texts of legal and political documents and available literature in this field, relevant internet sources and journals.

Key words: Terrorism, the fight against terrorism, terror, human security, human rights

INTRODUCTION

In different periods of time, from primitive communities to modern times, the field of security has been one of the most important mechanisms that are of great importance for the survival of one community - the state. When we look at various scientific fields, we can notice that the very concept of human security has not played a significant role in various research, studies and scientific disciplines. The field of human security gained its significance in the scientific sense only after the end of the Second World War. The importance of security for a state is reflected primarily in the function of defending the most important values of the state, which are crucial for the overall progress of the social community.

Globalization that accompanies the development of the modern world, in addition to constant positive progress in various social, political, economic and other spheres of life, brings along various negative sides. A large number of countries are the target of numerous security challenges, threats and risks. International terrorism, together with various forms of organized crime within state institutions, is one of the most significant immediate security risks at the global level. Threats from various forms of terrorism gained their primacy during the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. A large number of countries are making great efforts to create appropriate security systems that will respond positively to possible terrorist threats in the right way in the shortest possible time.

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The methods we will use in this paper are as follows:

- By analyzing the existing relevant scientific and literary works, we will make a contribution to the collection of necessary information and data related to the topic of research work.
- The method of content analysis will be the basic method when writing a paper, since through this method we can understand the essential provisions of the subject of research.

1. Problems of defining international terrorism

The discipline of security studies is, as Barry Buzan and Lane Hansen notes, “born as an Anglo-American discipline based on the Western conception of the state” (Buzan & Hansen 2010, 19).

It is common knowledge that for both individuals and social groups, the absence of fear can be equally significant, if not more significant than the objective absence of threats. In addition to the objective and subjective definition of security, there is a third intersubjective understanding of this term. According to this understanding, security is neither an objective nor a subjective but an intersubjective or discursive construction (Ibid). First, international terrorism is when the goals of a terrorist organization are such that they are directed against the security of several countries, or when their plans go beyond the borders of the countries or regions in which terrorists operate. Third, when members of a terrorist organization are originally from several countries (Simeunović 2009, 21).

Terrorism in the broadest sense includes various acts of violence and threats to human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as public or common and individual goods. Terrorism is viewed by some authors as “a violent act that is taken specifically to attract attention, and then through the created publicity to convey the message” (Hoffman 2000, 118).

It is also stated that terrorism is: “premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combat objectives by subnational groups or secret agents, usually with the intention of influencing the public” (Kegley & Slender 2004, 622).

Regardless of the numerous definitions, some common starting points can be identified, and that would be that: terrorism is a deliberate, politically motivated use of violence or threat of violence to intimidate or pressure the government or the majority of the public, terrorism is also a strategy of violence designed to achieve results by gradually causing fear and insecurity (Whittaker 2004, 4).

In essence, in the modern times, there are three types of motivation that determine the activities of certain terrorist groups: national motivation, psychological motivation and cultural motivation (Ibid, 17).

With the development and progress of humanity in technical, material and cultural terms, terrorism is developing, only at an even faster pace, while constantly changing in form, content, types and forms of organization, modes of operation, technical equipment and the like. The perpetrators of terrorist acts are strongly characterized by the intention to surprise the adversary, primarily the initial victim (the government of the attacking state). This can be properly considered if we keep in mind that modern terrorism is a specific conflict between at least two sides fighting to achieve the proclaimed political goals. What is different today is that the new age of terrorism, on the one hand, globally erases state borders and restrictions on terrorist activities, and on the other hand, there is a lethal change in tactics in committing terrorist acts, because the goal is no longer just harassing the public and gaining publicity, but also provoking as many victims as possible by attacking targets inhabited by civilians, and in order to spread fear among as many people as possible (Kegli & Vitkof 2004, 628).

The problems of the fight against international terrorism are constantly and for a long time present in numerous scientific and political debates. The intensification of terrorist activities in recent years has contributed to terrorism becoming one of the biggest problems of the contemporary times. Terrorism is a negation of the key principles advocated by the international community and numerous domestic and international acts. It is emphasized that it should be most vigorously opposed and that it has taken on alarming proportions (Janković 2010, 4).

The nature and organization of terrorism, the fear it provokes and the veil of secrecy that surrounds it create difficulties in applying the standards of the existing criminal procedure. In the modern world, states face very real difficulties in protecting the population from terrorist violence, and it is indisputable that, in order to successfully fight terrorism, states need special powers as well as significant freedoms in choosing ways and means to suppress terrorist acts. At the same time, it is necessary to respect the rights and freedoms guaranteed to everyone by international documents at all times (Ibid).

Since contemporary security challenges and threats are similar everywhere in the globalized world, international security can also be spoken of as a system of common security threats, at the national and global levels. Such a system of threats is conditioned by the transnational character of security phenomena and their actors, and is supported by the use of the most modern technological achievements. The organization and execution of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001 can serve as an illustrative example, during which the connection between terrorism and other transnational threats (illegal migration and organized crime) and transnational logistics and actors is pronounced. The consequences of this attack were grand, not only in terms of the number of victims (estimated at 3,000 people) and material loss, but also in terms of the system's demonstrable weakness in relation to terrorist attacks (Injac 2016, 105).

After the attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, there is almost no country that has not condemned terrorism and joined in the fight against this negative phenomenon of contemporary times. Without an assessment of the real threat, the countries, driven by fear, and perhaps out of awe, towards the United States, took a similar path and included terrorism among the biggest and most dangerous threats to national security. When the United States declared war on terrorism on October 7, 2001, it designated terrorism as a universal enemy against which all civilized nations should fight (Taddeo et al. 2010, 4).

Given that terrorism poses a minor threat compared to many others, it is more persistent, more intense and more frequent. However, its strength lies in the spectacularism, unexpectedness and the great dose of fear and uncertainty that it can produce in any part of the planet. However, what causes the greatest concern among the states is the non-existence of a known enemy when it is possible to sanction, and the fact that this unknown enemy chooses the most vulnerable targets - the citizens. These can be, and most often are, civilians, or members of the security forces. Innocent civilians as targets of terrorists are also called soft targets, because they are almost always completely powerless to resist a criminal act directed against them. It is by attacking the most vulnerable targets that terrorists send a message to the state of their inability to protect them.

2. Problems of defining human security

In modern representations of the intellectual history of security studies, the thesis is often repeated that during the Cold War, the concept of security was state-centric and militarily oriented, and that after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it was expanded and deepened. But it should be borne in mind that, in the background of the main currents of strategic studies, even during the Cold War, an alternative idea of war and peace in international relations began to develop (Buzzan & Hansen 2010, 4).

Barry Buzan and Lenny Hansen have identified five core forces that have driven the development of security studies since the end of World War II (Ibid, 50-65). These are: the politics of great powers, technological development, key events, the internal dynamics of academic studies and the institutionalization of security studies.

The policy of the great powers is probably the strongest driving force for the development of security studies. From the very beginning, which took place in the context of the confrontation between the two superpowers – the US and Russia, to the end of the Cold War, when one of them took down a *Boeing 767*, until September 11, 2001, when the only remaining superpower, the US, declared a global war on terrorism, it gave the main impetus to the development of this academic discipline. The policy of the great powers as a motivator can be divided into three sub-elements: the distribution of power between the leading states, the patterns of friendship and enmity between them and the level of their interventionism (Ejduš 2012, 61).

Technology is another force that has driven security studies. With the development of new technologies, the nature of security threats and the vulnerability of reference facilities have changed. The third factor that influenced the development of security studies were historical events.

The third driving force behind the development of security studies is, as Barry Buzan and Lane Hansen report, the internal dynamics of academic debates. First of all, these are discussions that were conducted in social and political sciences in general and which later emerged in the science of international relations and security studies, and which concern ontology, epistemology and methodology (Ibid, 86).

Finally, the fifth factor that triggered security studies was their gradual institutionalization. As Buzan and Hansen show, there are several aspects, namely the establishment of academic programs at universities, the creation of scientific associations, the development of specialized journals, and the establishment of institutes and think tanks (Ibid, 91).

In some countries, human security has led to reforms in military strategy (following the example of Canada and Norway), while in other countries it has not yet launched a public debate (in the Netherlands so far only a few articles in the magazine). Instead, it must include economic development, social justice, environmental protection, democratization, disarmament and respect for human rights, and the rule of law (den Boer & de Wilde 2008, 2).

The approach to human security is relatively new and specific in that it is primarily focused on the individual level, i.e., on the personal sense of security of the individual, which can be conditioned by various factors. Unlike the traditional approach, which viewed human security as security in relation to the external environment, the concept of human security aims to bring the insecurity and vulnerability of the individual to the forefront and allow us to understand some of the main processes that are not clearly visible at first glance, which endanger the lives of people day by day. The three pillars on which the concept of human security rests are freedom from fear, freedom from deprivation and the freedom to live with dignity (Subotić 2012, 2).

It can be said that the security agenda of the modern world has become richer for the notion of human security since the announcement of the Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 1994. The essence of this report is based on revitalization of those great ideas from the history of human thought that speak of freedom from fear and freedom from deprivation. In this context, human security is seen as a much broader global strategy that would not be satisfied only by preventing violent conflicts, but insists on good governance, access to education and health care, a sense of self-fulfillment, and poverty reduction, increasing economic growth, eliminating the risk of conflict, as interrelated categories that shift the emphasis of security from the national level to the man and his community (Ibid).

Human security is a child that has not died, a disease that was not spread, a workplace that has not been extinguished, an ethnic tension that has not erupted into violence, a dissident who has not been convicted. Human security is not about weapons, it is about human life and dignity (UNDP 1994, 23).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948 unequivocally indicated that security, along with the right to life and liberty, is a basic human right. The Declaration essentially states that everyone has the right to be recognized as a legal entity (Article 6), that everyone has the right to equal protection of the law (Article 7), that everyone has the right to be effectively protected by the competent national courts from violations of fundamental rights, which are recognized by the constitution and laws (art. 8) that everyone has the right to a fair trial (art. 10), that everyone has the right to citizenship (art. 15), that everyone has the right to education (art. 26), etc., while, on the other hand, it mentions that everyone has the right to freedom of movement and choice of place of residence (Article 13), thought, conscience and religion (Article 18), opinion (Article 19), peaceful assembly and association (Article 20), participation in the cultural life of the community, enjoyment of the arts and participation in scientific progress and the benefits that flow from it (Article 27), etc. (Krivokapic 2017, 3).

In addition, human security, as a derived concept and a new social and security concept, does not have the much-needed social support nor does it have the institutional and theoretical capacity of the concept of human rights recognized in international law and accepted in practice. Therefore, human security relies on this infrastructure, as well as on part of the academic and professional argumentation already developed in the doctrine of human rights. It is noticeable that the concept of human security has had a reciprocal effect on human rights in terms of their social empowerment. Ellen Seidensticker rightly notes that human security can mitigate the influence of the state on the exercise of rights, but in the constitutional and legal argument, this concept is brought into an equal normative position with the status of the concept of national security, and notes that if this balance is established, the security of the people would not be neglected in favor of the security of the state (Seidensticker 2002).

Human rights in relation to the state represent the negation of the absolute power of the state over its subjects (Tomashevski 1983, 268).

Unlike human rights, which have institutional mechanisms at their disposal, human security relies on the value system of the individual, i.e., on the subjective feeling of whether they feel threatened or not. In that sense, human security is a broader basis than human rights and aspires to become a paradigm of values in the global world. It encompasses many categories that the concept of human rights does not cover with its theoretical apparatus and institutional mechanisms.

All modern democracies, based on the principles of the rule of law and human rights and freedoms, have great difficulty in striving to ensure human rights as

fully as possible in practice. Although there is a prevailing view that the human rights situation is particularly difficult in the former socialist countries and countries in transition, which are said to be extremely prone to civil and human rights violations in recent times, there are more and more relevant indications that democratic states violate these rights and freedoms the most when it comes to the fight against organized crime, and especially terrorism (Lukic 2019, 1).

3. Conceptual definition of international security

By the most general definition, international security can be defined as the absence of threats to the stability of the international system (Kay 2006).

International security is a complex process, which requires a study from several aspects, precisely proportional representation, because, in the broadest sense, it implies the security of the entire international community (Grizold 1998, 30).

Since contemporary security challenges and threats are similar everywhere in the globalized world, international security can also be spoken of as a system of common security threats, at the national and global levels. Such a system of threats is conditioned by the transnational character of security phenomena and their actors, and is supported by the use of the most modern technological achievements. The organization and execution of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001 can serve as an illustrative example, during which the link between terrorism and other transnational threats (illegal migration and organized crime) was expressed, along with transnational logistics and actors. The consequences of this attack were grand, not only in terms of the number of victims (estimated at around 3,000 people) and material loss, but also in terms of the demonstrated weakness of the system in relation to terrorist attacks (Injac 2016, 105).

The transnational dimension of international security requires the involvement of actors in improving international cooperation, which needs to be adapted to new threats. Some of the most effective mechanisms in the functioning of international security so far are: the system of collective security, cooperation of international institutions in charge of ensuring security, solidarity, a unified approach to security threats and challenges, etc. (Ibid). The events that marked the paradigm of changing international security and the new phase of international relations were the end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism in Europe in the 1990s, and the terrorist attack on the United States on September 11, 2001.

This attack confirmed the general characteristics of transnationality and asymmetry, showed that the world is facing new, extremely dangerous security challenges, but also encouraged thinking about the implications and facing the new threat of international terrorism.

In this sense, the patterns of terrorism and the migrant crisis, as well as their security effects in Europe, are directly related to human security. An example of

this is the fact that indicate that in the last few years, millions of refugees have arrived in Europe, searching for a peaceful and safe environment for life, but this has brought political and security problems to members. Namely, this instability has been influenced by global trends, such as demographic processes and population migration, then the increase in violence and the global spread of terrorism and the terrorist network, as well as others related to human security, economic and environmental challenges (Injac 2015, 105).

4. Human rights in the context of the fight against international terrorism

As part of the fight against terrorism, abuses of fundamental rights and freedoms occur in some countries. No matter how evil terrorism is, it is not justified to fight it at any cost. It is also very dangerous for human freedoms and rights in general, to violate the norms and principles of domestic or international law by legitimizing it by combating terrorism. Terrorists believe that everything that goes in the direction of achieving their goals is justified. However, the fight against terrorism must not be guided by that logic. On the contrary, it should reaffirm the principles of basic human rights to life and liberty (Lukic 2019, 450).

Public opinion in many democracies is that terrorists do not deserve any protection from state democracies. In such situations, human rights violations lead to increased insecurity among citizens. Terrorism seriously violates human rights, threatens democracy and aims to disrupt pluralistic civil society and destabilize democratic governments. However, states are obliged to respect international human rights instruments in the fight against terrorism. The human rights courts have taken the position that states must not violate international law and international humanitarian law (Ibid, 451).

5. Fight against international terrorism

Transnational and interstate terrorism are considered as international. Transnational terrorism, as a form of international terrorism, is perpetrated by autonomous non-state actors, regardless of whether they enjoy a certain degree of moral or material support from one or more states and governments (sponsoring states and governments) or carry out terrorist acts without the assistance of a particular government (Talijan 2012, 38).

Countering terrorism and the fight against terrorism include several intertwined unarmed and armed contents: political, legal, diplomatic, intelligence, security, information and propaganda, educational, financial, military, etc. (Ibid, 57).

The internationalization of terrorism and the association of terrorist groups and organizations, their interconnection and assistance in carrying out planned actions imply the emergence of a parallel process - the international connection of

anti-terrorist forces in the protection, security and defense against terrorism. International terrorism has become a global phenomenon, and the fight against it has been declared one of the priorities of the world community. The anti-terrorist activity has been raised to a level at which all the forces of society act in unison, and with the aim of achieving quality, efficiency and effectiveness of the anti-terrorist activity, there has been interstate integration in countering and combating terrorism by engaging all available potentials (Ibid).

The fight against terrorism is approached by the application of comprehensive measures of anti-terrorist organization and action, both within the country and internationally - from verbal condemnation, criminal, repressive and security defense measures to the organization of domestic special organizations for armed resistance, but also the establishment of international organizations to combat international terrorism (Ibid).

International terrorism in its modern form has become a global phenomenon in the last decade of the 20th century. There are numerous reasons for that, the main one being the formation of the American centric model of international relations after the self-destruction of the USSR, which was characterized by a significant weakening of the center of power and influence on the international scene that could be an alternative to the USA and Western countries. At the same time, the ideas of radical Islam were actively spread, which were used to ideologically support extremist and terrorist activities. During the 1990s, the United States and the West did not want to notice the manifestations of international terrorism, which did not directly affect them, so they reduced the problems of terrorism to local frameworks (Panarin 2019, 314).

Even then, the division of terrorists into good and bad terrorists appeared in their politics. Moreover, in the American-Western discourse, there was no difference between good and bad terrorists. The grand terrorist attacks on Russia in the 1990s were taken lightly in the West without compassion. Some recognition, as time has shown, quite relative in the consciousness of the American establishment, happened only after the attack on the United States on September 11, 2001. This tragic event made the American authorities face the need for international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The world community officially declared war on terrorism on September 28, 2001, when the Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, which also provided for the establishment of a UN Security Council counter-terrorism committee (Ibid, 315).

Following the adoption of this resolution, sometime around December 2001, a global anti-terrorism system was formed under the auspices of the UN. All relevant UN committees - for civil aviation, navy, customs, and others, as well as international organizations such as Interpol and Europol, have formed appropriate units to participate in this war. Practically in all UN member states, structures have been created to fight terrorism. The social movement grew rapidly. All members of the

Security Council were alternately on duty in the Counter-Terrorism Committee, which reported directly to the UN Secretary-General on its activities. The system was built, and according to various estimates, it was opposed by over 500 terrorist organizations. The results proved disappointing: a long period of war showed the complete disunity of the world community in the face of the terrorist threat (Ibid).

6. International terrorism as a threat to the state and human

After the attack on the Pentagon and the World Trade Center, there is almost no country that has not condemned terrorism and joined in the fight against this negative phenomenon of contemporary times. Without an assessment of the real threat, the countries, driven by fear, and perhaps out of awe, towards the United States, took a similar path and included terrorism among the biggest and most dangerous threats to national security. When the United States declared war on terrorism on October 7, 2001, it designated terrorism as a universal enemy against which all civilized nations should fight (Taddeo et al. 2010, 27-38).

International terrorist incidents and deaths increased worldwide between 2002 and 2005. Most of these increases were related to the war in Iraq, where the number of deaths rose from about 1,700 in 2004 to approximately 3,400 in 2005 (Acharya 2007, 43).

What causes the greatest concern among states is the non-existence of a known enemy when it is possible to sanction and the fact that this unknown enemy chooses the most vulnerable targets - the citizens. These can be and most often are civilians, but also members of the security forces. Innocent civilians as targets of terrorists are called soft targets because they are almost always completely powerless to resist a criminal act directed against them. It is by attacking the most vulnerable targets that terrorists send a message to the state of their inability to protect them (Mijalković & Bajagić 2012, 342).

With sudden attacks, terrorists try to punish the countries against which they carry out their terrorist attacks, choosing the model of attack on “soft targets”. Difficulties in carrying out attacks in prominent public places have fueled the process of relocating attacks to “softer targets” such as sports stadiums, shopping malls, hospitals, restaurants, nightclubs, cinema complexes, business buildings, airports and train stations. Due to the high concentration of people who usually gather in such locations, the chance of achieving as many losses as possible increases significantly (Libicki & Chalk 2007, 75-76).

When terrorist attacks are expected, the choice of target, time, place and method of attack surprises the state, domestic and international public, creating uncertainty, insecurity, panic and fear that it is certainly a potential victim (Mijalković 2011, 222).

Traditional state values, such as territorial integrity, are not targets of terrorist attacks. This view is the main support for the opinion that terrorism, starting from the list of priorities, is primarily a problem of human security, and only then of political and economic stability. Other assumptions state that attacks will occur in places where large numbers of people are concentrated and in places where they were not the usual points of attack (Subotić 2019, 471).

CONCLUSION

International terrorism is a kind of threat to human security. It is the scourge of the 21st century, which seeks to overthrow the current government by a terrorist attack, not caring about the number of innocent victims it will produce through that cruel and insidious attack. In a very reckless way, innocent civilians are killed in terrorist attacks, which cause are mass killings, wounds and mutilation of innocent civilians.

Every state should strive to protect its citizens from such frightening attacks. After 9/11, the United States declared war on terrorism and all terrorist organizations in the world. Affected by the most terrible attack in the history of the mankind, they did not remain silent on this heinous act, but immediately responded by sending their military troops to Afghanistan and Iraq. The whole world joined them in the fight against terrorism.

Factors that influenced the development of terrorism are certainly poverty, disease and hunger. Poverty has forced a certain group of people to radicalize and join terrorist organizations, believing that in that way, they will find a better future for themselves and their loved ones. In this way, they also brought along their family to terrorist camps, believing that they would be better off there.

All in all, the conclusion is that terrorism will always be a threat to human security. It is a constant struggle, during which states must apply anti-terrorist measures to emerge victorious in such a struggle.

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UDC 616.98:578.834]:32(497.11)

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COVID-19: GLOBAL ISSUES AND LOCAL SERBIAN RESPONSES

Abstract:

The global COVID-19 outbreak has exposed the complex global interdependencies, as well as local responses to the hereby addressed global issues and challenges. Bearing in mind that the COVID-19 pandemic has inevitably affected the existing socio-political structures and practice, through the holistic approach, we will analyze various topics in this paper, such as: the relationship between coronavirus and Europe's new political fissures; the repositioning of the US in relation to rising China's and Russia's superpower; the importance of health sovereignty; the impact of COVID-19 on global inequality, on digital transformation revolution and on fracture of society. Additionally, particular focus will be given on the relationship between COVID-19 and political leadership as well as local responses from Serbia.

Key words: COVID-19, the world's new fissures, geopolitical repositioning (US-China-Russia), Serbian response health sovereignty.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the time, different virus epidemics have taken place. Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), swine influenza A H1N1 virus (H1N1), and Zaire ebolavirus (Ebola) caused many severe infections and thousands of deaths (Dawood et al. 2012; Aylward et al. 2014). Similarly, the global COVID-19 disease outbreak caused by a cluster of cases of viral pneumonia of unknown etiology (VPUE), now known as novel coronavirus-infected pneumonia (NCIP), occurred in Wuhan, Hubei Province, and was reported to the health authorities on December 29, 2019 (Li 2020, 79).

The COVID-19 virus (2019-nCoV) turned to be worrisome, firstly for its high rate of spread, but also for its relatively high death rate (from 0.75% to 3%) (Wang et al. 2020, 2).¹⁾ Short afterwards, the COVID-19 virus has reached the range of a pandemic range in 2020 and has thrown a harsh spotlight on the state of global governance.

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¹⁾ As opposed to other European countries, Austria did not observe an increased overall mortality rate during the epidemic. Obviously, the death rate varies in regions and countries with different climates and temperatures, and the fatality rate of the COVID-19 is not found to be so high. However, it is certain that the older patients or those with preexisting conditions like cancer, diabetes, high blood pressure or heart disease are likely at higher risk than the average person or younger people without significant prior health conditions.

In this paper, we will try to point out the global issues caused by the ongoing coronavirus crisis originated by the arrival of the COVID-19 virus, in order to show that existing socio-political structures and practices will not be the same as they were prior to the COVID-19. Thus, we will address the following topics: 1) the fact that the COVID-19 crisis has highlighted existing fissures in global politics as well as the shift in influence from EU institutions to national governments; 2) the narrative of a rising China and a resurgent Russia as the main culprits in the destabilization of the global order; 3) the necessity of efforts to protect health sovereignty within *today's* extremely competitive geopolitical context; 4) the impact of COVID-19 on global inequality; 5) the impact of COVID-19 on the rise of digital markets; 6) pandemic psychology and the fracture of society; 6) the impact of COVID-19 on political leadership; 7) local responses of Serbia to COVID-19 crisis.

This paper presents the advantages of an analytical and *holistic view* of the COVID-19 crisis, because it aims to identify its most relevant issues and turning points in order to take an overall approach and achieve a deeper understanding of the coronavirus crisis as the global reset that can only preserve the basic principles and practices of multilateral cooperation through serious *reform of global institutions* and its evolution.

In the first part of the research, by means of a systematic data analysis and through the combination of the *methods of inductive and deductive* logic, we have tried to develop a holistic quality multilevel and multipurpose evaluation approach. In the second part of the paper, as contribution, we have linked the discussion on the impact of the COVID-19 on political leadership with local responses from Serbia and its strategies for mitigating the *COVID-19* pandemic progresses.

The coronavirus crisis has transformed the narrative of international society and global order and, all over the world, governments and societies have come to grips with public health, economic, security, strategic, and psychological challenges. At the same time, against the backdrop of Western policymaking based on openly combative US-China relations, and the amplifying European pushback against China by offering aid and medical supplies and resources for various European countries, China's foreign policy has managed to win the hearts and minds of one-half of a divided Europe, while politically putting the other half out of action.

1. Global order in the shadow of the COVID-19 virus

Although the coronavirus affected the EU member states in different ways and to different extents, almost all found that their public health relied mostly on goods or services from third countries, especially China. Due to its incapacity to coordinate efforts in providing and creating common strategic stocks, The EU

bodies followed the so-called policy of piracy,²⁾ causing feelings of abandonment among the worst-hit countries, as it was, for example, *Italy*. In another words, the coronavirus has perfectly highlighted the fragility of EU solidarity and, at the same time, exposed an overall need for health sovereignty, which is undoubtedly conditioned by the political context.³⁾

From the moment of the outbreak of coronavirus, liberalism has faced its greatest crisis, and a dominant European model has clearly shown that globalism in its current form has collapsed. The evident impossibility of the state of global governance to prevent the coronavirus from becoming a lethal worldwide pandemic is its first and foremost a resounding sign of failure that has pointed out how, in times of crisis, nations always regress into narrow self-interest, or better said, into their *own backyards*.

In that sense, the crisis has also highlighted that, while China and the US are fighting over dominance, no one is really in charge and, actually, from a European perspective, neither the American nor the Chinese model look satisfactory because, due to their confrontation, the multilateral institutions, from the G20 to the World Health Organization (WHO), are almost falling apart.

The COVID-19 outbreak has taken the world aback, leading in short time to a near-total standstill in international trade, travel, and global political interactions. Since early March, the epicenter of the outbreak has rapidly and strikingly shifted from China to Europe and America. A majority of countries in the top 10 (in number of cases) were in Europe, as opposed to East Asia, which impressive ability to stem the spread of COVID-19 has been notable already in July⁴⁾.

In concordance with this, dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, China's General Secretary Xijing Ping precipitated the wave of anti-Chinese pervasive sentiments throughout the United States, due to the extremely high death rate and the standstill of the United States' global economy (Levine 2020, 1).⁵⁾ From the above mentioned, it is clear that the ongoing competition between China and USA to secure their positions and interests at global level will surely continue, which

²⁾ When he realized that 200,000 protective masks intended for Berlin's police force had disappeared, German interior minister, Andreas Geisel, stated in April 2020 that the mentioned situation could literally be interpreted as an *act of modern piracy*.

³⁾ In July 2020 during a four-day summit, there has been bitter debate over debt-sharing and the size and terms of the economic package for the worst affected member states (Boffey & Rankin 2020).

⁴⁾ For example, in comparison with Belgium which confirmed 46 deaths per million, Vietnam reported zero deaths from COVID-19 (Mahbubani 2020).

⁵⁾ Because of the trade deficit of \$378.6 billion in 2018 with China, the United States has vowed to hold China accountable for unfair trade practices that have severely damaged the American economy and businesses. (United States Trade Representative 2018). On the other hand, in June 2019, Beijing released a white paper placing the blame for trade tensions on the United States, while a vice foreign minister accused the United States of targeting China with a campaign of "naked economic terrorism" (State Council Information Office 2019; Guardian May 30, 2019).

will normally affect the global order and individual countries as well. Furthermore, it will put pressure on countries to take a side. Especially the developing and least developed countries, like Serbia, will be under more pressure to agree to the conditions of a prevailing policy.

Therefore, the key questions related to the COVID-19 crisis are whether the global order of the post-COVID-19 narrative should be a partially liberal, partially global, US-led order based on multilateral collective action problem solving, or whether it should be increasingly nationalist, combative geopolitical system of states turned inwards in search of national sovereignty that will, in times of crises like the current COVID-19 crisis, secure them the health sovereignty as well. However, the situation presented also involves a new scenario of bipolarity between the world's two major powers, the US and China.

Being caught in the coronavirus crisis, each country has realized that its health system is an element of security as much important as the one of defense industry or telecommunication infrastructure. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the absence of health security in almost all prosperous European countries has jeopardized their societies as well as economies and nations to compete in geopolitical competition. Like many other areas of international life, health emergencies can also disintegrate the concepts of democracy and human rights, perhaps permanently.

As we live in a world of interconnections, health security, or better said health sovereignty, underlines the importance of the concept of *microbial borders* as relevant to global health. As well as people, goods or information flow across borders, infectious microbes flow as well, creating in that way real borders that are not dependent on human making, which, in turn, require that each state should develop both cooperative and competitive health structures. Although the concept of interconnectedness creates enormous benefits, the concept of microbial borders is relevant to global health and security efforts in general, and, as the pandemic demonstrates, it also represents a societal vulnerability and exposes us all to risk. In order to defend themselves, states can limit these flows ad close borders to some extent, but only at enormous cost to their economies, and their people (Hackenbroich, Shapiro & Varma 2020).

It is an undeniable fact that the pandemic has produced a health and economic crisis unfamiliar in scope and magnitude until now. Enforced lockdowns and the closing of national borders have paralyzed international economic activities, which resulted in laying off millions of workers worldwide, so the possibility of a prolonged economic recession accompanied by the rising poverty and inequality are real threats and problems to be faced (United Nations 2020, 1). Therefore, the COVID-19 will considerably increase the socioeconomic inequality by leading to further economic decline, as well as to faster distinction between the most and the least privileged people in life-preserving medical treatment. Hence, the most vulnerable members of society as the elderly, disabled people, the poor, and especially women and children,

will be extremely hard hit. Additionally, the COVID-19 will mostly jeopardize the societies of the world's most unequal continent, where many depend on informal work for their livelihood, like Africa and Latin America.

The lockdown due to the pandemic has also replaced the physical market with the digital one, leaving it as the only possibility of consumption. In that way, even the most reluctant consumers have had to familiarize with digital platforms. Policies and health prescriptions aimed at limiting the contagion forced producers and consumer's interaction into new modes very quickly, so the COVID-19 served as a strong incentive for firms to carry out the fixed investments necessary to venture into the digital market.⁶⁾ In the context of an emergency situation, the individuals as well as the organizations *have had to adapt* at a dizzying pace to the habit of using digital technology to a much wider extent, like adopting smart working, online education, video-conferencing, e-commerce, online banking etc. However, even when COVID-19 retreats, the non-digital consumers' participation in the digital market has remained, so it is pretty evident that, even though the coronavirus crisis caused temporary shock, it produced as well a long-lasting effect in boosting the digital market (Giordani & Rullani 2020, 1-2, 4.). At the same time, the proliferation of online and home-based leisure activities and the extensive use of virtual and digital communication during the COVID-19 pandemic might have helped easing the burden of lockdown itself and reduce the stress level and anxiety (Fancourt, Steptoe & Bu 2020).

We must be aware that the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has taken a toll on the mental health of millions of people around the world. Stay-at-home and quarantine orders issued by governments led to the largest enforced isolation period in human history. Furthermore, due to physical distancing, many individuals globally faced high levels of adversities, from being diagnosed with generalized anxiety disorder or facing the challenges that impact fulfilling their *basic needs* (accessing food, water, and safe accommodation) to financial problems (including job losses, income cuts, or inability to pay bills). Being female or younger, with lower education lower income, or with pre-existing mental health conditions, and living alone or with children, are all risk factors for higher levels of anxiety and depressive symptoms due to the lockdown and toxic public discourse that suggests that we must be responsible and save lives by staying at home. However, locking down alone does not save lives in the end, it only slows down the spread of the virus because life must go on, and while many people have reported only symptoms of anxiety disorder or depressive disorder, or symptoms of a trauma- and stressor-related disorder due to the pandemic, some people have reported having started or increased substance use to cope with stress or emotions related to COVID-19 lockdowns, or much worse, that they have specific symptoms (such as thoughts of death) and are seriously contemplating suicide.

⁶⁾ For example, the video conferencing software sector was in sudden need for changing the user bases of different products, with the final growth of Zoom over other tools (CNBC 2020a).

The analysis of how did the world end up in a space of thinking, feeling and acting that has normalized extremes and is based on the assumption that biological life is an absolute value separate from politics is essential if we are to understand the real consequences of what is happening today (Caduff 2020, 1). Today's fear of ordinary man is based on neoliberal health policies, toxic media reporting, mathematical disease modeling and frequently contradictory *data obtained from official sources, which generally leads to feeling of apathy and despair or even bitterness.*

2. The pandemic implications on diplomatic jockeying: political leadership and Serbian responses to the coronavirus crisis

The new COVID-19 coronavirus, which has developed into a global pandemic, is bound to have a profound and complex impact on the world order. Nowadays, we are in a time of a crisis, and the COVID-19 has changed the relationship between states, turning the international system into an era of nationalist political trends reasserting the sovereignty of the state because the nationalism has become the country's first strategy. Additionally, this situation has given birth to the so-called strongman version of political leaders.

In the current crisis, prolonged and specific as this one, with such serious consequences, effective leadership is absolutely necessary for any state and safety of its people. As the COVID-19 crisis continues, political leaders must be aware of evolving problems and the necessity of its own physical, psychological and emotional fortitude. Successful leadership in this kind of situations specifically relies on a possibility of political figures to organize people and be adaptive to transcending adversity, with all its attendant stresses. In fact, the leader's ability to transcend adversity implies his ability to *emerge stronger than before*. Only that kind of response can be considered as *resilient*, which requires political possibility to respond and adjust to fluid circumstances across the globe and be responsible and stable in a climate that changes day by day and hour by hour. Besides, with a prolonged adjustment to the *new normality*, successful political leaders must prepare for a significant shift in operational priorities, because their old leadership styles, which had served them before the crisis, needs to be adapted to the novel and unprecedented crisis.

Moreover, the integrity in research and public discourse is essential for maintaining the trust in public institutions because the trust is the foundation upon which the legitimacy of public institutions is built and it is crucial for maintaining social cohesion. Also, public trust is inevitable for the success of a wide range of public policies that depend on behavioral responses from the public, because public trust leads to greater compliance with state regulations in accordance with public health.

In accordance with the analysis presented above, in 2019, Beijing political leadership took new steps to advance the aggressive approach to foreign and security policy in the Indo-Pacific region and around the globe. Using its growing economic

and political influence, Beijing's political actions reinforced ideological and nationalistic messaging strategy towards China's intent to reorganize the international system and ultimately dedicate itself to reform and improve the global governance system.⁷⁾ Under the guidance of the Xi Jinping and his thought on diplomacy, there has been a further rise in China's international influence, given its ability to inspire and shape events. Therefore, China has made continuous efforts to safeguard the world peace, promote global development and maintain the stability of the international order (Jiechi 2019, 26).

The COVID-19 pandemic as a global shock has not spared the Western Balkans. As in other countries, in Serbia as well the COVID-19 crisis has put to the test the efficiency of the health system in all its dimensions: prevention, screening, the research and manufacture of treatments, its financing, etc. In the midst of the COVID-19 turmoil, the Serbian government continued to declare European integration as its strategic goal, but several statements made by high-ranking officials were not in line with this strategic commitment.

Nevertheless, while the US-China relations had significant coverage, less attention has been directed to China's efforts to assist countries that were facing lower numbers of confirmed coronavirus cases, but had less crisis capacity, as Serbia, for example. Chinese aid to Serbia has emphasized not only how Beijing is capitalizing on the pandemic to rewrite its image as a responsible international actor, but also how it has dedicated itself to showing a sign of a comprehensive strategic partner. Between 2005 and 2016, bilateral trade has tripled, and in 2018, China ranked third among the top sources of Serbian imported goods, behind Germany and Italy.⁸⁾

To ease the crisis situation, the Serbian government provided two financial packages in the total worth of 5.7 billion EUR to support the economy. Packages contained budget funds for direct cash subsidies to the private sector, for a programme of favorable loans and for state guaranteed loans. Additional financial aid was announced for particularly affected sectors, such as tourism and transport. Furthermore, the government paid a minimum salary for employees of small and medium enterprises for three months and delayed the payment of taxes and social security contributions. The latter two measures were prolonged in July 2020 for another month and were complemented by the establishment of a new programme granting state support for each newly created job for the period of nine months, and all citizens over 18 were given a

⁷⁾ At Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference held in June 2018, Xi urged China to "lead the reform of the global governance system." (See Xi 2019, 550).

⁸⁾ In 2009, China and Serbia signed an agreement establishing a strategic partnership. The partnership was upgraded in 2016 to a comprehensive strategic partnership and a year later, China and Serbia lifted visa restrictions for travelers to the two countries. Since then, Serbia and China have signed a series of major projects that extend China's Belt and Road Initiative to the western Balkans, including a Belgrade-Budapest railway and a new metro system for the Serbian capital. Separately, the growth of Chinese influence in Serbia is also felt both through cultural and political channels, as well as via the installation of Huawei Safe City technology (Eleanor March 27, 2020).

100 EUR cash transfer. Serbia pledged 2 million EUR at the EU's international conference in May 2020 to help development and ensure equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines, tests and treatments (European Commission 2020, 3-4).

The President, Prime Minister and Speaker of Parliament declared a state of emergency on March 15 to stem the spread of the virus, announcing a night curfew and deployment of the military to protect hospitals and Serbian borders, among other measures.⁹⁾ Chen Bo, the Chinese ambassador to Serbia, joined many of China's other diplomats in opening a Twitter account and has focused on disseminating information about China's solidarity with Serbia and medical help. Following the arrival of the Chinese doctors, the Serbian political elite revised Serbia's response to follow what could be described as a *Chinese model* based on mass testing program and immediate isolation of positive cases, while separating the mild ones in makeshift clinics, serious cases in hospitals, and severe cases treated in intensive care units¹⁰⁾ The President of Serbia welcomed the arrival of China's medical team and publicly stated: "Dear Chinese friends, sisters and brothers, welcome to Serbia! Thank you very much to my brother, President Xi Jinping, the Communist Party of China and the Chinese people. Long live our steel friendship! Long live China! Long live Serbia!" At the same time, Chinese state media have made the most of the Serbian administration's appreciation for Chinese aid and frustration with the lack of European solidarity (Eleanor March 27, 2020).

Simultaneously, Serbia aligned their actions to deal with the pandemic with World Health Organization (WHO) recommendations and imposed wide-ranging temporary measures, including strict curfew hours, closure of schools and universities, bans on public gatherings, freezing of most air traffic and closing of borders, etc.

After the state of emergency was lifted on April 29, the country held elections on June 21 and several precautionary measures were lifted. Amid a rising number of coronavirus cases in early July, the President of Serbia announced the reintroduction of a stricter curfew. This led to protests in Belgrade and several other cities, during which protestors expressed dissatisfaction with the government's handling of the pandemic and wider concerns over the state of democracy in Serbia.

Overall, the final extent in terms of loss of human lives and damage to the economies is still difficult to assess, but early estimates foresee a drop of between 4-6% of gross domestic product (GDP) in the region. Thousands of citizens are at risk of losing their jobs, and temporary government support measures have an especially important fiscal impact (European Commission 2020, 3-4).

⁹⁾ According to the Johns Hopkins University & Medicine Coronavirus Resource Center, as of March 26, Serbia had nearly 400 confirmed cases of the virus, and the President made appeals for international assistance which China responded to by sending much-needed testing kits and a medical team including epidemiologists with COVID-19 experience.

¹⁰⁾ Other countries and organizations have also provided aid to Serbia. Norway sent 5 million euros in economic assistance. UNICEF donated dozens of ventilators, protective gear, and sanitizing supplies. On March 25, the European Union announced a 93-million-euro package for Serbia, including 15 million euros for the purchase and transport of medical supplies and equipment and an additional 78 million euros for economic recovery.

CONCLUSION

As we have emphasized at the beginning, *infectious diseases* have wreaked havoc on *human* communities since *ancient* times and the emerging and re-emerging pathogens still pose great challenges to public health (Gao 2018). If we think more critically and, by means of a systematic literature review, as research method, analyze the global issues related to COVID-19 through holistic approach, the pandemic outburst of coronavirus truly can be seen as the first universal event since the end of the Second World War and the dawn of the atomic age.

This paper has tried to examine the most evident global issues related to the COVID-19 and local responses of Serbian government during the crisis. Moreover, bearing in mind that each pandemic or crisis situation is a test of a country's governance, we have reflected critically on leadership role and the skills needed to navigate emergency situations successfully. By analyzing how the COVID-19 crisis drew China and Serbia closer, we have tried to point out the necessity of fully awareness of the fact that in a post-COVID-19 narrative of the reformed world order, isolated national responses will certainly not be able to solve global problems. Instead, a collective social commitment and political will be required if we intend to obtain global solutions.

Although it is too early to predict with certainty the features of the post-COVID-19 narrative, which can oscillate between the usual neoliberal and be solved after some time, basically similar to the one before COVID-19, to the absolutely apocalyptic and chronic breakdown scenario, we can assume that the real solution would include a more inclusive and flexible order driven by a common imperative in meeting universal challenges, such as climate change, pandemic disease, and global poverty. Therefore, if we want to build a future that benefits the whole of humanity, we must be aware that today, the mankind has become a close-knit community of common destiny, which interests are highly interconnected and co-dependent. In that sense, we must outline that the COVID-19 has brought forward a series of issues that have both short- and long-term implications for international development and global order.

Meanwhile, the pandemic is still unbeaten by any vaccine or therapy, the source of the COVID-19 virus has not yet been determined, and further investigation and large-scale nucleic acid testing are still being conducted. In other words, it is unlikely that the coronavirus will naturally die down by itself. Bearing in mind that fact, as well as the ongoing COVID-19 vaccine war, it is understandable that COVID-19 vaccines have become both a public and political obsession. Therefore, at present, questions like, "What is to be done if a pandemic outburst is to happen again?" or "Can we assume that the COVID-19 crisis could serve us to build a narrative for extra-national communities?" remain open. Among these questions, surely, there are many others, but we consider that one of the most important is related with the concept of health sovereignty.

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UDC 005.931.1:614.841.42(495)

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URBAN COMMUNITIES' RESILIENCE TO WILDFIRE: THE REPUBLIC OF GREECE

Abstract:

Uncontrolled wildfires in the urban areas of the Hellenic Republic have claimed a large number of lives over the last two decades and caused enormous material damage. The economic and migrant crises have weakened the ability of the civil sector to identify elements of vulnerability to fire-prone communities and prevent new disasters through the implementation of comprehensive proactive measures. By using individual resilience capacities as an analytical framework, it is possible to isolate the factors that contributed to the inadequate assessment of routine risks of endangered areas such as the Attica peninsula, the Peloponnese and the autonomous monastic community of the Hilandar monastery. Building resilient urban communities to disasters caused by fires in the Hellenic Republic is a complex process of engaging different segments of society at all levels in order to overcome system weaknesses and strengthen resources for prevention, adaptation to new circumstances and fire recovery.

Keywords: Urban communities, fire, the Republic of Greece, routine risks, resilience.

INTRODUCTION

The Hellenic Republic has been facing the problem of fires in urban and uninhabited areas for decades. The causes of fires are often determined by a combination of human factors (negligence or intentional actions of individuals) and unfavorable weather conditions in the form of extremely high temperatures. The problem of combating uncontrolled fires creates a serious burden on the state, which has been seriously devastated by the economic crisis, various forms of political violence and the migrant crisis in the past decade. Fires in urban areas seriously endanger the safety of the domicile population, but also non-residents who, through their business activities or within their tourist stay, make an economic contribution to one fifth of the total budget of the Hellenic Republic (Hellenic Republic budget, 2015).

The concept of resilience is taken from the technical sciences and applied analogously in security studies through preventive, adaptive, absorption and restorative capacities. Indicators of individual resilience capacities of the Hellenic Republic in the context of prevention, adaptation, absorption capacity and fire recovery are a characteristic that is measurable in relation to an individual event or form of security threat. The devastating effects of the economic crisis, various forms of political violence (resulting from the political crisis) and the migrant

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crisis have had an impact on individual resilience capacities in a country with decades of EU and NATO membership.

The fire in the Hilandar monastery in 2004 caused great attention of regional and world media. The mentioned Serbian cultural heritage from the 12th century suffered serious damage to the monastery complex due to the fire that broke out in the old chimney in the dormitory and then engulfed most of the building. The treasury in which the cultural and historical treasure of Orthodoxy is kept has remained intact. The analysis of the causes of the fire indicated shortcomings in the process of restoration and application of fire protection.

1. Strategies for building resilience of urban areas of the Hellenic Republic

Risks are a set of features and processes that potentially threaten the security of a reference facility. Unlike non-routine risks whose manifestation is difficult to anticipate and which leave severe consequences (Taleb 2007), routine risks are easier to predict based on previous experience and adequate assessment (Kekovic & Ninkovic 2015). The history of fires in the Hellenic Republic classifies the mentioned form of endangering security as a corpus of routine risks.

Resilience in the context of natural disasters and hazards can be quantified through a number of indicators related to individual resilience capacities: preventive, absorption, adaptive, and restorative (Cutter & Burton 2010). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) sets out criteria for measuring resilience in the context of disasters with the aim of making a distinction between different approaches in quantifying resilience (UNDP- Disaster resilience measurements 2014). Elementary criteria refer to units of analysis, elements, levels of analysis, and dimensions of resilience in the context of disasters. The elements of resilience that are taken into consideration during the measurement relate to determining the well-being index in the period preceding the disaster, quantification of vulnerabilities, individual resilience capacities, losses and stresses related to the moment of the disaster and assessing the reaction to an adverse event. Depending on the levels of resilience analysis (global, national, subnational, individual), an adequate resilience index is applied. Resilience scholars in the context of natural disasters (disaster management) apply two approaches: inductive and deductive (UNDP- Disaster resilience measurements 2014). The inductive approach refers to the determination of physical, economic, institutional and other dimensions (variables) whose resilience is examined, while the deductive approach is aimed at establishing “independent indicators of resilience” (Béné 2013,7) and is applied when determining the costs incurred. Due to natural disasters or by using questionnaires as an instrument for determining the subjective perceptions of individuals.

The project called “100 Resilient Cities” funded by the Rockefeller Foundation (100 RC Project 2015) is designed to build the resilience of selected cities to the social, economic and physical challenges of the 21st century. The implementation of the concept of resilience in 100 cities included various forms of security threats such as fires, floods, earthquakes and other (non)routine risks. Urban resilience is defined as "the capacity of cities to function in a way that allows residents, especially the poor and vulnerable groups, to survive and live without the consequences caused by stress and shocks." (100 RC Project 2015)

The Greek capital Athens and the city of Thessaloniki have been selected to participate in the 100 RC project. Based on the risk assessment carried out by experts, a list of potential forms of security threats is provided (corruption, various forms of political violence, migratory waves, earthquakes). Fires are not explicitly listed as a potential risk, but they can be indirectly generated from the risk of extreme heat, which is listed as a form of "shock and stress". The cause of most fires that have engulfed the suburbs of Athens in recent decades has been the human factor (Briassoulis 1992). The motives for committing the crime of causing general danger by arson are different, from political to personal (Deshpande 2009).

As part of the Resilience Strategy published under the 100 RC project during 2017 entitled “Resilient Thessaloniki - a strategy for 2030”, hazards that could jeopardize security of residents and non-residents of the Thessaloniki region such as floods, earthquakes and forest fires (Resilient Thessaloniki) are explicitly listed (Strategy for 2030 2015). Infrastructure facilities located in endangered areas (e.g., infrastructure located in the Cortiatri forest in the suburbs of Thessaloniki) require a special degree of protection (Psilovikos & Doukas, 2011). Thessaloniki's exposure to a large number of hazards requires the synergistic action of numerous stakeholders with the aim of strengthening the capacity of resilience in relation to various forms of endangering the security of citizens and material goods. The program for building the resilience of the city of Thessaloniki within the project "100 RC" included the creation and implementation of local government plans for synchronization of activities related to the preparation and response to emergencies as well as rapid recovery from them. Strengthening existing resilience capacities involves the cooperation of local, regional and national authorities with the aim of creating a comprehensive response to events that could potentially disrupt the functioning of the city and business continuity. Preparation for these events can be done by incorporating the concept of disaster management into the long-term planning system through the risk management process (Resilient Thessaloniki - a strategy for 2030 2015, 109).

2. Resilience of urban areas of the Hellenic Republic in relation to fires as a form of routine risk

Cooperation of civil protection bodies at the national and international level is an important factor in building and strengthening preventive and absorption capacities of resilience. The General Secretariat for Civil Protection of the Hellenic Republic, as the organizational branch of government directly responsible for the protection of people, property and the environment from fire, acceded to the "Fire 4" agreement on civil protection cooperation established between France, Spain, Portugal and Italy. The agreement signed in 2006 in Graz was renamed "Fire 5" by the European Union Monitoring Committee after Greece's accession (Fire 5 Agreement, General Secretariat of Civil Protection 2006). Strengthening preventive, adaptive and absorption capacities through joint exercises, seminars, expert exchanges and procurement of modern equipment aimed to improve the conditions for fighting fires and earthquakes in the Mediterranean countries involved in the "Fire 5" program. The most important factor in fighting fires, especially those that affect urban areas and thus directly jeopardize security of the local population and non-residents, is the existence of a strategic plan to combat this type of routine risk.

The catastrophic fires that hit the Republic of Greece in July 2007. and 2018. were the result of unfavorable meteorological conditions and the human factor. Dozens of lost human lives and huge material damage in the Peloponnese, Attica and the island of Evia are indicators of the non-resilience of individual capacities of services responsible for fire prevention and response. More than a hundred settlements were threatened by fires which, in addition to material damage in populated areas, also destroyed numerous hectares of forest. Following seasonal meteorological indicators (winter season without snow on mountain peaks and absence of rain in the spring months), Greek authorities have strengthened capacities in the form of planes and helicopters to extinguish fires and hire additional employees in fire brigades during the winter months.

The stated capacities for counteracting the fire elements were not sufficient to extinguish the series of fires that occurred in July 2007. and 2018. A detailed analysis of the consequences of the fire identified the factors that contributed to the suffering of dozens of people and great material damage (Lagouvardos 2019):

- the public forestry service lost its fire-fighting authority in 1998, further reducing the possibility of a faster response by field services;
- appearance of wild settlements built without urban plans and fire protection measures;
- reduced interest of citizens in the application of preventive models of behavior in the context of fire risk reduction;
- Insufficient absorption capacity of fire brigades to respond to fires;



Image 1. Satellite image of the territory of Greece affected by the fire in 2007 (NASA Earth observatory 2007).

3. Indicators of (non)resilience on the example of the fire in the Hilandar monastery in 2004

Monastery complexes represent a specific type of buildings which, due to their cultural and historical value, require the application of special measures of restoration and installation of fire-fighting systems. The Hilandar Monastery was built in 1198 on the Holy Mount Athos as an autonomous monastic community formed by the Serbian Nemanjic dynasty, thanks to which, 20 years after the construction of the monastery complex, the Serbian Orthodox Church gained autocephaly. The exceptional importance of the Hilandar monastery building was recognized by the international community in 1988 when it became part of the UNESCO World Heritage Site (About Hilandar 2018).

The status of an autonomous monastic community, one of the oldest communities of its kind in the world, is regulated by the Statute of the Holy Mountain and the Constitution of the Hellenic Republic. Due to the exceptional cultural and historical value of the monasteries stationed on Mount Athos, in 1981 the Center for Preservation of the Authentic Heritage of Mount Athos Monasteries (KeDAK) was established, whose work is under the authority of the Ministry for the Provinces of Macedonia and Thrace (Folic & Bogdanov 2013). Any activity that includes construction works and restoration must be previously announced to the Ministry in order to obtain special permits for their performance. Contractors have the obligation to use identical materials used during the construction of

monastery buildings as part of the restoration and conservation process. Considering the time period from which the Hilandar monastery dates, the materials used during the restoration and preservation process are composed mainly of wood and other highly flammable materials (Folic & Bogdanov 2013). The absence of regulations and fire-fighting systems, as well as giving priority to the preservation of authentic architectural solutions in relation to fire protection, led to the material destruction of parts of the monastery complex during several large-scale fires in the Hilandar monastery:

- In 1639, a fire engulfed a part of the church of Saint Sava.
- In 1722, the northern and western parts of the monastery complex were damaged in a fire.
- In a fire in 1776, monastic cells and two chapels burned down.
- 1891; 1950; In 1981, a series of fires occurred that caused minor material damage.
- At the beginning of March 2004, a large-scale fire broke out in the northwestern part of the konak (“Igumenarija”), spreading to a larger part of the monastery complex. The monastery treasury, composed of archival material, manuscripts, icons and other relics of inestimable value located in the eastern part of the monastery complex, was not affected by the fire in 2004.




Image 2. Review of the damage to the monastery complex affected by the fire in 2004 (Hilandar, O požaru 2018.)

Hilandar Monastery is located in the northern part of Mount Athos at 50 m above sea level, surrounded by mountains. This position improves the air humidity and creates aggravating conditions for fire remediation (Folic & Bogdanov 2013). Access of fire trucks is possible only from the south side of the monastery and the only mitigating circumstance is the proximity of three streams. In addition to fires, material damage was caused by earthquakes caused by the fact that Mount Athos is located in a tectonic unstable area (Ibid, 5).

An analysis of available data related to the 2004 fire indicates that the fire-affected partitions of the dormitory (partition walls, ceiling, and floors) were constructed of wood. The fire completely destroyed the wooden structures, which, due to the preservation of the authentic appearance of the monastery during the restoration and the absence of fire protection, indicated serious security flaws. Parts of the monastery built of stone and materials resistant to high temperatures remained intact. Due to the high temperature during the fire, the frescoes on the walls changed the pigment, which was additionally damaged by the rain that fell the day after the catastrophic fire in 2004 (Ibid, 6).

Parts of the monastery that were completely destroyed due to wooden constructions:

- Abbess;
- Chapel of St. Sava and St. Demetrius;
- Monastic cells built during the 17th and 19th centuries;
- Entrance to the chapel of St. Nicholas;
- White inn.

The fire was repaired after a six-hour firefighting operation, without human casualties and damage to the monastery treasures archived in the Treasury.

The risk assessment of the Hilandar Monastery made using the EUROALARM method often used by insurance companies included (Folic & Bogdanov 2013, 6):

- structure risk assessment;
- evaluation of structural elements in the context of fire risk;
- selection of measures to reduce the existing fire risk.

The authors of scientific and professional literature in the field of fire protection emphasize the basic principles necessary for application when performing the process of restoration of cultural and historical buildings:

- minimal loss of existing material since the building that is the subject of restoration was built;
- application of the minimum number of necessary interventions;

- respect for the priority of preserving the authenticity of the architectural edifice;
- reversibility (Folic & Bogdanov 2013);

By analyzing the causes of the fire, the experts agreed that the restoration process carried out in accordance with the stated principles created favorable conditions for the outbreak of the catastrophic fire in 2004. The application of the principle of preserving the authentic appearance of the building resulted in the absence of the construction of fire protection partitions, especially in the parts of the monastery that were built of wood (attic). The renovation of the monastery lasted until 2014 and cost approximately € 17 million (Bogdanov & Blagojevic 2013). During the renovation period, fire and high temperature resistant materials were used. A new underground cistern with a capacity of 440 m² was built with the aim of strengthening the monastery's capacity to deal with fires as a form of routine risk.

CONCLUSION

Progressive growth of security risks and threats in a globalized environment has led to the design and implementation of strategies modeled to respond more effectively to various forms of security threats to reference facilities, protect the functioning of vital parts of the system and rapidly recover from negative consequences. The concept of resilience originally developed in technical sciences (in the context of physical resistance of materials) is analogously applied in safety studies through resilience capacities based on which the ability of a reference object to withstand negative influences without disturbing vital functions and identities is quantified, while demonstrating rapid recovery.

The frequency of fires as a form of routine risk, loss of human lives and material destruction are indicators of weak preventive and absorption capacities of the competent services. The analysis of fires in the Republic of Greece in the last few decades, the determination of the total number of victims and the material damage caused in the urban areas of the Hellenic Republic unequivocally indicates shortcomings in the fire protection system at the national, regional and local levels. A worrying circumstance in a country that has been facing an economic, political and migrant crisis in the recent past is the fact that fires and related media attention create negative publicity and reduce the number of non-residents who contribute to the budget of the Hellenic Republic.

The fire that engulfed the Hilandar monastery in 2004 pointed out the omissions in the application of fire protection during the restoration process, as well as the necessity of installing special fire protection measures for old buildings of exceptional cultural and historical importance. The principle of preserving the authentic appearance of the building applied during the process of restoration of the monastery complex and the absence of fire-fighting parts contributed to directly endangering the safety of members of the autonomous monastic community, worshipers and sacred buildings of exceptional cultural and historical

significance. The renovation of the monastery after the fire significantly improved the preventive capacities by building a fire-fighting tank, installing a hydrant network and using thermostable materials.

Fire risk reduction is an important component in building the resilience of urban communities. Stakeholder cooperation at the local, regional, national and international levels is essential to strengthen resilience capacity in the context of disaster management. The application of internationally agreed principles (such as the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction) to emphasize the importance of the role of the state in disaster prevention, engagement of all segments of society and compliance with the concept of sustainable development, is a vital core in the process of reducing urban exposure potential for prevention, response and recovery, i.e., creating a resilient environment in relation to catastrophic fires.

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PART TWO: COVID-19 AS A SECURITY CHALLENGE

UDC 616.98:578.834]:316.647.8

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COVID-19 AS A SECURITY CHALLENGE: CONSPIRACY THEORY OR QUESTIONS THAT REQUIRE ANSWERS

Abstract:

The COVID-19 pandemic has faced an unprecedented global challenge that produces strong economic, political and security turbulence globally. Under the influence of the pandemic, international relations are marked by a new dimension of mistrust and competition of great powers, so COVID-19 tests all elements of the Western leadership - global economy, and thus globalization, crisis management of governments and international organizations. Crisis communication between governments and the scientific community as an indispensable element of effective crisis management does not provide adequate responses to several aspects of this crisis, which deepens mistrust between citizens and governments. Although the scientific community as well as the media classify all these doubts as “conspiracy theories” in a situation of collective threat and uncertainty, as well as suspended principles of democracy, these problematic questions they have certainly need answers. Therefore, the aim of the paper is to place some controversial issues present in the analytical framework in order to stimulate social debate and thus restore confidence in the institutions of the system.

Key words: *Pandemic, conspiracy theories, vaccine, lockdown, new normality.*

INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic, declared by the World Health Organization (WHO) on March 11, 2020, has faced an unprecedented global challenge that, in addition to the economic crisis, produces strong political and security turbulence within nation states, the European Union and globally. Under the influence of the pandemic, international relations are marked by a new dimension of mistrust and competition of great powers, so COVID-19 tests all elements of the Western leadership - global economy, and thus globalization, crisis management of governments and international organizations, especially allied relations within the European Union.

A series of comprehensive epidemiological, and thus political, or the measures applied at the national, regional and global levels, according to the WHO recommendations are based on a method that has never been applied in the history of the fight against epidemics- a complete “lockdown” of people and the economy. The Orwellian slogans “stay at home” and “keep your distance” (social distancing) as part of experimental social engineering tend to suspend the current way of life. Because they target fundamental freedoms and civil rights, they in fact represent an unprecedented action of a strategic response to a disease of relatively modest mortality and social threat.

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New social norms that shape the dystopian vision of the future as new normality are shaped by the vision of private technology giants (Facebook, Google, Huawei) or world-famous philanthropists (Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation), pharmaceutical corporations, as well as informal international institutions (World Economic Forum, G-20) advocating global corporate governance. These actors almost entirely direct the work of the World Health Organization, but also the world's leading research institutes and universities, and impose themselves as key actors in resolving the COVID-19 public health crisis. Namely, the decision to close the global economy with the aim of "saving lives" was supported by frequent misinformation of the mainstream media, very contradictory views of science, as well as a campaign of fear on which politics relies. Stopping or restricting economic activities undermines the structure of social relations, culture, the nature of political power and state institutions. Lockdown carries with it a number of geopolitical implications, so it is necessary to scientifically discuss whether the coronavirus is just a "black swan" or another in a series of planetary events under the false flag since the beginning of the 21st century, aimed at initiating the process of economic, social and the political restructuring of the international (geo)political system within the framework of the "Fourth Industrial Revolution".

While the European Union, as well as the national governments of the member states, is making significant efforts to combat the growing number of intriguing information on the origin and spread of SARS-CoV-2 viruses, which are generally labelled fake news, the UN Security Council is paralyzed by "conspiracy theories" or a real information war that within this powerful organization, the so-called "World governments" are led by the United States and China. The great powers, no doubt, need to provide answers about the origin of the virus, the suspicion of biological warfare, and the consequences the pandemic has on society. The transhumanist vision of responding to a pandemic carries enormous challenges for the post-human future of humanity as it is shaped in the hands of powerful organizations and corporations. Therefore, it is quite obvious that the COVID-19 crisis, more than one so far seeks answers to many open questions that modern political science systematically neglects and unjustifiably subsumes under the so-called conspiracy theories. Namely, the ways of crisis management in which politics relies exclusively on expert, technocratic approaches and contradictory knowledge of biomedical sciences whose scientific research tools are increasingly in the function of the interests of powerful informal groups are becoming socially harmful.

Our intention is to analytically present the facts due to which some aspects of the public health and safety crisis COVID-19 are very controversial for a part of the public, although academic and media discourse considers them obscure, and positions them in the so-called "conspiracy theory". In a situation of collective threat and uncertainty, as well as suspended principles of democracy, these problematic issues, which have a strong impact on public attitudes, certainly require answers. Such an approach deepens the social divide between government and citizens, and increases

distrust of scientific expertise and media reports. Therefore, the aim of the paper is to place some of the controversial issues present in the analytical framework in order to stimulate social debate, and thus restore confidence in the institutions of the system.

1. Post-cold War “Risk Society”: securitization of public health

The relationship between human rights, individual freedoms and security is one of the key issues of contemporary international relations. In liberal democracies, but increasingly also in authoritarian political systems, citizens often defend their rights before the state, while demanding that the same state protect them from possible security threats. Thus, human rights and national security are very closely linked, and the concept of security, developed in 1983 by Robert Ullman in *Redefining Security* (Ullman 1983), is key to understanding the process of securitization of public health policies in the post-Cold War period.

Unlike the classic concept of security, which aims to preserve the political system, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state (Mearsheimer 1994), the post-Cold War dimension of human security is closely linked to the notion of interdependence in a global international system that has two fundamental characteristics - sensitivity and vulnerability (Grizold 1998, 77). Namely, in the circumstances of post-Cold War geopolitical relations, shaped by multidimensional processes of globalization, especially the accelerated development of information and communication technologies, the international community has become faced with new types of security threats - ramified activities of organized crime and international terrorist groups, regional ethnic conflicts, uncontrolled migration, the effects of climate change, as well as the spread of infectious diseases. All the above security challenges emphasized the global character of modern security, and the growing interdependence of all actors in international relations. Globalization has changed the identity of human communities everywhere, and shaped a global risk society (Giddens 2005; Beck 2001), which basic features are insecurity and relations. Globalization therefore become apparent that its political, economic, security, social, but also individual challenges require shifting the international public's focus to analytical risk assessment, prevention, and collective crisis management.

Since the early 1980s, a number of new global health challenges, such as the pandemic of HIV/AIDS, SARS, Ebola and Zika, have seriously destabilized the developing countries. Their spread in the developed countries has been facilitated by the processes of globalization, due to which the global interest in the protection of public health has significantly increased. In this context, infectious diseases have become a global security challenge (UN 1994), especially after the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1308/2000 declaring the HIV/AIDS pandemic a threat to international peace and security (SCUN 2000). The concept of public health securitization is generally associated with the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, whose leading theorists view the public health crisis as a political and security threat, and thus a priority security issue whose resolution requires the legitimate use of extraordinary means, sometimes

the suspension of legal restrictions and democracy in the name of security (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde 1998).

In the post-Cold War period, the global architecture of public health crisis management is based on the leading role of the World Health Organization, and the centralization of management competencies has strengthened its expert authority as well as the role of executive bodies, especially the Secretary General. Therefore, the WHO decisions and recommendations on the implementation of emergency measures contribute to the securitization of public health crises, thus shaping the authority of this international organization. However, international public confidence in the WHO became questionable during the H1N1 pandemic in 2009 and the Ebola epidemic in West Africa in 2014. Although the control of communicable diseases is the primary task of this international organization, its dysfunctional response, as well as the management of these health crises, which was based on the Secretary-General's unlimited autonomy, has received numerous criticisms. In addition to the recommendations that caused economic and thus social damage to a number of countries to which they referred; the international public also focused on the changed definition of a pandemic. Namely, in 2003 the WHO defined the pandemic as the emergence of a new virus against which the human population has no immunity, and whose consequences are visible in several simultaneous epidemics around the world with "a huge number of infected and dead". The definition was changed in 2009 after 74 states reported 144 deaths due to H1N1 virus infection. According to the new definition, it was no longer necessary for a certain disease to be extremely widespread, extremely deadly and dangerous to health, it is enough that it is a "new flu virus against which the human population has no developed immunity" (Engdahl 2000, 166).

However, mortality from H1N1 was soon shown to be negligible compared to mortality from an ordinary seasonal flu. When Dr Margaret Chan declared the sixth phase of the global pandemic as the WHO Secretary-General in 2009, member states began implementing emergency measures, including the procurement of billions of dollars' worth of H1N1 vaccine, as recommended by the WHO. Numerous scandals and allegations of corruption that may have taken place between the World Health Organization, pharmaceutical corporations and scientists have resulted in three independent investigations. Based on allegations that the pandemic had been rigged, in addition to the Council of Europe, one of the investigations was launched by the European Parliament's Health Committee, demanding an investigation into corruption. Although all investigations rejected these allegations, the bodies conducting them called for reform of the WHO, in particular the Secretariat, with the need to strengthen the capacity of member states. Unfortunately, in 2014, when the West African EVD epidemic was identified, it became apparent that the WHO had not implemented the required reforms, after which the UN Security Council reacted urgently by adopting Resolution 2177/2014 declaring the Ebola pandemic a "threat to international peace and security".

With this resolution, the issue of the infectious disease pandemic has gone beyond purely humanitarian issues. Health crises are beginning to be viewed through the prism of highly ranked security challenges that require, sometimes, military responses. According to this concept, the responsibility for health protection has been expanded. Namely, in the case of global epidemics, if and when the most vulnerable countries are unable to respond appropriately and protect the health of their citizens, the UNSC becomes the only body in the UN system responsible for adopting public health measures that may include military responses. Accordingly, in 2014, during the Ebola epidemic, the SCUN passed Resolution 2177/2014, according to which Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon was approved to launch the first UN public health mission - the UN Emergency Response Mission - UNMEER (UN 2014)

2. The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic and the structural weaknesses of international organizations

Although the European Union, as well as the national governments of the member states, is making significant efforts to combat the growing number of intriguing information about the origin and spread of SARS-CoV-2, usually labelled as fake news, the UN Security Council is paralyzed by “Conspiracy Theories”. Namely, despite the scale of the health crisis that gradually turned into the economic crisis of the century, and became an unpredictable security challenge, the UN Security Council has been divided by a series of procedural and political disputes since the outbreak of the coronavirus crisis. Serious allegations of the origin of the coronavirus between the US and China have turned into a genuine information war blocked by international organizations, most notably the SCUN, as well as the World Health Organization, which US President Trump has accused of being “sinocentric”. In July 2020, after 70 years, the United States withdrew from the WHO membership.

The failure of the Security Council as the UN’s most influential body to deal with the pandemic crisis is the result of mutual accusations that have led to tensions between two of its five permanent members - the United States and China. The UN Security Council has become blocked due to the United States’ efforts to get this body to adopt a resolution that would clearly blame China for releasing the fatal pathogen. The split in the Security Council has further highlighted the growing irrelevance of the United Nations as a universal international organization within which member states can resolve disputes and cooperate in overcoming global crises. Moreover, the conflicting US and Chinese views on the WHO’s response to the pandemic have fueled public distrust of the UN specialized agency that declared the COVID-19 global pandemic on March 11, 2020.

Namely, a series of comprehensive epidemiological measures applied at the national and global levels according to the WHO recommendations are based on a

method that has never been applied in the history of the fight against epidemics- a complete “lockdown” of people and the economy. It is the largest psychological experiment ever conducted within which 2.6 billion people is subjected to the experience of quarantine, which is why they suffer the emotional, social and financial consequences of an unusual method of social engineering.

Can liberal societies, individual freedoms and democratic values “survive” this global challenge, especially if we remember that humanity over the past century has witnessed a terrifying abuse of scientific knowledge and achievements, and that advanced technological tools have been turned into weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, the following chapters will seek to analyses some of the most commonly present suspicions in the public discourse.

2.1. The origin of the virus: Why are the origins of the pandemic so controversial?

Due to deep divisions and heavy accusations between the five permanent members of the UNSC and the United States and the World Health Organization (WHO), discussions about the origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus caused by COVID-19 soon escalated into a top political issue. The debate, which, thanks to the way the mainstream media reported, gained unjustified and unfounded status as a “conspiracy theory”. The origin of the virus has been the subject of controversy almost since the beginning of the pandemic. During the first months of the health crisis already, the scientific community offered an abundance of discordant and often very contradictory information, which caused public distrust in scientific (and political) interpretations of the origin of the virus.

US President Donald Trump is the “author” of one of the first and most widespread theories about the “Wuhan virus”, which strongly influenced the deterioration of the already bad relations between the United States and China, and generally strengthening geopolitical tensions in international relations. Namely, President Trump, citing intelligence, was the first to link the SARS-CoV-2 virus in a laboratory in Wuhan and publicly accused China of concealing and manipulating information regarding COVID (Mazzeti 2020). In Washington, many hold the Chinese government responsible for the initial inactivity, including the failure to quickly close Wuhan, the city where the epidemic began, and for the subsequent cover-up of the disease. President Trump, meanwhile, has accused the WHO of being “influenced by Beijing” and therefore biased towards rival power.

Trump’s “conspiracy theory”, meanwhile, was rejected by the US intelligence community in a statement signed by its director, Richard Grenell, stating that they have no evidence to support the assumption that the virus is the work of humans or a genetic mutation. But Grenell left open the possibility that the virus could have been accidentally released by a lab in China, so the possibility of a laboratory accident is an option that is still officially under consideration (Shesgreen 2020). This has brought to

the forefront of international attention two Chinese laboratories studying bat coronaviruses - the Wuhan Institute of Virology - WIV (Level 4 Biosafety) and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (Level 2) in Wuhan. The public soon had the intriguing fact that WIV, which is suspected to be a possible source of coronavirus caused by COVID-19, was funded from several Western sources, including the US National Institutes of Health (NIH). During the second phase of the project, led by a Chinese scientist Dr Zhengli Shi, the research included work on “gain of function” that investigates how a virus can acquire the ability to infect a new type of animal. This fact has resulted in public concern and suspicion that this research could artificially create COVID-19. The association of the Wuhan Institute with the NIH has raised doubts that the US government could be complicit in this very dangerous study. The question was - why would the NIH want to fund WIV? According to US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, the reason is logical and certainly reasonable - raising safety standards in Chinese laboratories, developing better security protocols, but also encouraging international cooperation and communication (Fendos 2020).

In response to the US accusations, the Chinese scientists ruled out the possibility that the virus “escaped” from the lab, and all allegations were labelled as conspiracy theories or as a worrying attempt by the United States to “stigmatize” China. But they recalled a scientific paper published in *Nature Medicine* in 2015, in which there were published claims that the American scientists had developed a hybrid version of the coronavirus on different animals. This created a chimeric virus that developed the disease in mice, which then spread to humans. “A small step for science, a giant risk for mankind”, said Professor Simon Wain-Hobson, from the Institute Pasteur in Paris calling these viruses a potential biological bomb (S. Wain-Hobson 2020).

In the context of various theories about the origin of the virus, a research paper published by a group of Indian scientists on January 31, 2019 as preprint (Pradhan, K. Pandey & Mishra 2020) suggests that the virus, known as COVID-19, may have been deliberately created using HIV. The findings raised suspicions of bioengineering and sparked a huge controversy. The authors soon withdrew the paper from the bioRxiv preprint server with the explanation that they “intend to revise it in response to comments from the research community”.

The widespread public doubt that the virus was created by manipulative techniques of laboratory engineering was unanimously rejected by scientists who in a joint statement published in the medical journal *Lancet* in February 2020 strongly condemned conspiracy theories which suggest that COVID-19 has no natural origin. The leading scientific journal *Nature* has also supported this view by referring to the existing research. Most scientists have supported the thesis of the natural origin of the virus. But, the French scientist Luc Montagnier, the winner of the 2008 Nobel Prize in Medicine, maintains that COVID-19 is a manipulated virus, produced by a laboratory in Wuhan. He accused molecular biologists of “having inserted DNA sequences from HIV into a coronavirus”. The similarity between Covid-19 and HIV has also been

noted by Peng Zhiyong, the director of the Zhongnan university hospital in Wuhan who warn that “the influence of Covid-19 on the body is like a combination of SARS and AIDS” (The Connexion 2020).

According to a study published in the Quarterly Review of Biophysics by Norwegian virologist Birger Sorensen and British oncologist Angus Dalglish, the virus has properties that are very different from another coronavirus, the cause of SARS, and have never been detected in nature. They claim that the coronavirus spike protein contains sequences that appear to have been artificially inserted (Nikel 2020).

Therefore, all claims about the natural origin of the coronavirus, as well as the theory that the Chinese or US government deliberately planted the virus, are just assumptions that raise a number of biosecurity issues which should be publicly discussed. It is well known that laboratory work in the US has been just as threatening as work in the Chinese laboratories. The US labs also operate in secret, and laboratory accidents are not known to them. Although there is no evidence for bioengineering, the possibility of a “laboratory accident” or accidental escape of a pathogenic virus from the laboratory is still questionable. This possibility, as well as other plausible scenarios, has been completely ignored in scientific discussions, the discourse of government officials, and in the reports of most major media. But regardless of the source of this pandemic, “there is substantial documentation that a global biological arms race taking place outside the public could produce even more deadly pandemics in the future” (Husseini 2020). Namely, the COVID-19 pandemic has confirmed that biological weapons, despite their destructive power (as opposed to weapons of mass destruction or WMD - nuclear and chemical), have once again “escaped public awareness and control” (Puri 2020). But, the dangers of a laboratory accident or the deliberate theft of biological pathogens from research centers in countries with uneven control systems are real. There are still concerns about the proliferation of laboratories around the world, which work with hazardous biological agents such as SARS-CoV-2. Such facilities raise issues of bio safety, and national and international oversight should be based on regulatory protocols agreed within international organizations. COVID-19 poses a serious security challenge, but none of these issues are of interest to international organizations, national governments, the scientific community, or even the media.

2.2. The role of private foundations and vaccine promotion

The method of financing the World Health Organization came into the focus of the world public immediately after the crisis broke out. The WHO, as the UN coordinating body responsible for managing global health challenges, including setting standards and monitoring and assessing health trends, is largely funded by private foundations, closely associated with private pharmaceutical corporations. Namely, the WHO receiving most of its funding through the so-called “public-private partnership”, which is dominated by private pharmaceutical corporations focused on the production of vaccines, and most are part of the group of sponsoring foundations of Bill Gates.

The European Union makes a significant contribution, but the contributions of the member states (membership fees) today cover less than 20% of the total budget. In the midst of the pandemic crisis and after the United States announced its withdrawal from the World Health Organization, on May 2020 the WHO Foundation launched “as a legally separate body to facilitate contributions from the general public, individual major donors and the WHO corporate partners and trusted partners to implement high-impact programs”.

According to William Engdahl (Engdahl 2020), the WHO, as one of the most influential international organizations to show impartial leadership during the COVID-19 pandemic, is burdened by “shocking conflicts” of interest, corruption and lack of transparency. In the last available WHO financial report (December 2017), just over half of the WHO budget of over \$ 2 billion is made by payments from private donors or external agencies such as the World Bank or the EU. The largest private or non-governmental WHO funders are the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, along with the Gavi Vaccine Alliance, as well as the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Both foundations are also funded by Gates. These three funds paid more than \$474 million into the WHO budget. Other private donors are the world’s leading vaccine and drug manufacturers, including Gilliad Science, GlaxoSmithKline, Hoffman la Roche, Sanofi Pasteur, Merck Sharp and DomeChibrey and Bayer. Drug manufacturers donated tens of millions of dollars to the WHO in 2017.

Although it is stated that donations are completely unconditional, which means that the WHO has the discretion to decide how these funds will be used, they are certainly intended for certain program areas according to donor preferences. So, Bill Gates says his foundation, the world’s richest charity, will focus “all its attention” on the Covid-19 pandemic, even at the risk of undermining a number of other health priorities. This support of the private pro-vaccine industry to the WHO program through the Gates Foundation and the pharmaceutical industry is more than a mere conflict of interest. It is the de facto usurpation of the UN agency responsible for coordinating the global response to the challenges of epidemics and disease, said Engdahl.

In April 2020, the Rockefeller Foundation (Rockefeller Foundation 2020) presented the “National Action Plan for Testing COVID-19” (*Pragmatic Steps to Reopen Our Jobs and Our Communities*), defining it as a document offering “pragmatic steps to reopen our businesses and our community”. The Plan provides the precise steps needed to conduct mass testing, monitoring and coordination to “safer the reopening of our economy” - starting with a dramatic expansion of testing from 1 million tests per week to 30 million per week during one year. According to the Action Plan, which was developed by scientists from some of the most prestigious American universities (Harvard, Yale, Johns Hopkins, etc.), a digital database of the American population will be established as a dystopian and the militarized social model that would lead to further concentration of political power in the hands of a very narrow circle of the elites.

Such mass testing will be paid for from public budgets. The Rockefeller Foundation and its financial partners will help create networks to provide credit guarantees and sign contracts with suppliers and large companies that manufacture drugs and medical equipment. In addition, technology giants are developing tools that will be built into iPhones and Android devices to help users identify infected people in their environment. The proponents of civil rights argue that the use of surveillance technologies should be limited in time, as their use in the fight against Covid-19 is increasingly reminiscent of the Chinese authoritarianism. Therefore, citizens rightly fear the loss of privacy and civil liberties as a result of technological mass surveillance that expands state power.

In the meantime, vaccination has become the subject of controversy, which is the reason for the great rejection of citizens. Namely, the results based on July 20 polling in Gallup show that between a quarter and a third of the US citizens would not want to be vaccinated against Covid-19 (Gallup 2020). But the final solution to the pandemic crisis is mandatory vaccination together with the issuance of a biometric health passport, without which employment, entry into medical institutions, but also the performance of numerous daily activities will not be possible.

It is not the intention of this paper to discuss the advantages or disadvantages of a future vaccine. But it is a very controversial fact that citizens are under enormous pressure from governments, the scientific community and pharmaceutical companies to accept the vaccine as a rapidly produced product (normally, it takes between 15 and 20 years to obtain an effective, non-toxic and usable vaccine) of unknown composition and with unknown side effects that is trying to impose the idea that only a vaccine can save us.

2.3. Lockdown

In addition to the above issues, the universally applied decisions to lock in the world economy are controversial. Global locking has triggered a spiral of mass unemployment, bankruptcy and extreme poverty. It should therefore be considered whether the coronavirus crisis is part of a broader macroeconomic program currently promoted by international financial institutions, and of course the European Commission. In the article *Coronavirus – consequences, the coming mega-depression* published in Global Research, April 9, 2020, author Peter Koenig (Koenig 2020) states that the focus is on global adjustment (*global reset*), which is why the mechanism for triggering poverty and economic collapse is significantly different and increasingly sophisticated.

The partial or complete closure of national economies has been prompted by the application of the World Health Organization guidelines relating to trade, transport, tourism and a range of other economic activities that include a number of unprecedented restrictions in history. It is also important to note the background of these decisions –international financial institutions and informal lobby groups, including Wall Street, Big Pharma, the World Economic Forum (WEF), the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and others have been involved in shaping the WHO-related pandemic activities.

Also, the COVID-19 pandemic is at the heart of unprecedented social engineering, within which the largest distance learning experiment (online) in human history has begun. Closing schools and colleges are one of the most visible and controversial tools of the global blockade. Namely, according to UNESCO, this unusual decision has so far affected almost 1.6 billion students in 190 countries or 90% of the world's school-age children. More than 100 countries around the world have closed their universities, affecting half of the world's student population. The question should be asked - what does this mean for the future of education, can such a practice become a new norm and what would it mean?

One of the most obvious consequences of online education is a delay in the cognitive, emotional and social development of the younger generations which increases the risk of mental illness. Globally, locking is expected to widen the existing inequalities around the world, and its devastating consequences will be visible over the next decades.

CONCLUSION

As we have stated, the aim of this paper is to analytically present certain issues due to which some aspects of the COVID-19 crisis are becoming very controversial. Namely, we should be concerned about the incredible social inequality that has become the "new normality" of the dystopian society in which we find ourselves. Unprecedented wealth and power appropriated by hi-tech corporations, avoiding any responsibility for the problems of society we now face, becomes a critical threat to democracy. The dubious promise of silicon giants - Oracle, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook and Google that digital technology is the only possible way to survive a pandemic crisis is the foundation of new global governance and the sustainability of a narrow circle of corporate/political elites. Although the scientific community as well as the media classify all these doubts as "conspiracy theories", in a situation of collective threat and uncertainty, as well as suspended principles of democracy, these problematic questions they have certainly need answers. Therefore, the aim of the paper is to place some controversial issues present in the analytical framework in order to stimulate social debate and thus restore confidence in the institutions of the system.

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UDC 616.98:578.834]:316.42

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SOCIOPOLITICAL CRISES IN THE TIMES OF COVID-19

Abstract:

The subject of this paper is research of impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on social and political crises world-wide. A special emphasis was put on elaborating interpersonal relations, given that “social distancing” and quarantine were the main measures applied world-wide, with the goal of prevention of spread of this virus. The author examines the changes in the security context as well, especially in light of denial of human rights and strengthening of state powers. The position of extremists and terrorists, who will use the fear caused by this pandemic for a deeper destabilization of contemporary political systems, was also analyzed. The author concludes that the COVID-19 pandemic will generate numerous sociopolitical crises, but that the only rightful response will be the global response, given that we are speaking of a global crisis. It is only a question when the contemporary political subjects will have an ear for such response.

Key words: *Pandemic, COVID-19, crisis, social crisis, political crisis, security, new world order.*

INTRODUCTION

On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared the pandemic caused by coronavirus (COVID-19). From that moment, the entire world faced numerous up-coming challenges which cannot be warned with ease. Despite advances in medicine, highly developed technique and technology, artificial intelligence, financial and military power developed by the contemporary society to a peak, a man has never felt more helpless. It is obvious that we are speaking of a disproportional power distribution between the unknown and invisible enemy (in the form of virus) on one side, and the entire planet on the other.

It seems that no one, not even the richest and the most powerful ones, was prepared for a pandemic of such proportions which, in the real sense of the word, made the entire world pause on March 11. Sooner or later, the majority of countries closed off schools, kindergartens, universities, cinemas, cafes, sports centers, malls, restaurants... The freedom of movement is restricted, states of emergency were introduced, countries sealed their borders, and the story of human rights was reduced to only one right (“meta-right”) – the right to live.

This pandemic has, in the real sense of the world, shown that we are all intertwined by the principle of connected vessels and that we live in a “global village” that is by many called “the new world order”. In the beginning, it seemed that the focus of the pandemic was somewhere far away from us, in Wuhan (China), but soon enough, it turned out that COVID-19 is not picky regarding faith, nation, religion, that it does not know of borders, and that, in the speed of

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light, it transferred to Iran, Italy, Spain, the United States... In Serbia, the first case of coronavirus was registered on March 6, and the state of emergency was introduced on March 19. At the time being, the entire world is still under siege of the invisible enemy, against which there is no weapon but “social distancing”.¹⁾ It is odd that the contemporary man succeeded in developing 5G network, unmanned aerial vehicles, robots, nano technology, weapons of mass destruction, but still stands bare-handed and powerless before one small, unknown virus.

Many countries were shocked by this new situation. Some, such as Sweden (and in the beginning the Great Britain as well), attempted to introduce the model of “collective immunity” by more or less continuing with their normal lives, without any special restrictions, while others, such as China, introduced the harshest measures of mandatory quarantine and social distancing. It seems that democracy was put to a serious test, since it turned out that, in this confusing situation, the countries to which neoliberalism often taught lessons about “human rights violations” and the democratic value system tend to cope better. It is known that China, even though it was hit first, successfully put the virus under control, while some European health systems (Italy, Spain) experienced a complete collapse.

The coronavirus has raised a number of controversial questions regarding a variety of challenges in the years ahead. It is a fact that this pandemic will lead towards redefining international relations and world politics. Besides human losses, the contemporary world is also facing terrible financial problems which will certainly lead towards economic recession. Based on historical experience, it is well-known that economic crises easily predispose to security and political crises. All the same, the occurrence of this pandemic will also have a strong impact on interpersonal social relations within which certain habits will change, and which will very likely result in restriction of certain rights and freedoms. Are we entering an entirely new era which will change our social and political life for good?

1. Social challenges

The pandemic caused by the COVID-19 virus is definitely nothing new in human history. For centuries, the man has been living with viruses, encountering and fighting various diseases and epidemics. Only throughout the twentieth century, pandemics were declared three times (which means that the illness spread on a global level and hit a tremendous amount of people). During the previous century, the Spanish flu, the Asian flu, and the Hong Kong flu had significant social and political consequences in the entire world. The Spanish flu, which ravaged the world from 1919 until 1920, had infected half a billion people worldwide and claimed more than 50 million lives, and is deemed as the deadliest

¹⁾ The term “social distancing” was later replaced by the term “physical distancing”, given that the point is not for people to stop contacting among themselves, but to only be physically distanced from each other.

pandemic in the human history (Humphreys 2018, 219). For example, this virus claimed more lives in certain countries than the World War One and the World War Two combined (Riccio 2006, 53).

It might be said that the contemporary world is currently in a kind of a state of war, only this time, we do not possess adequate weapons but the one tested for centuries in such situations – quarantine, that is, physical distancing. Exactly this distancing leads towards crucial changes on a global level when speaking of social context. By all odds, we might expect huge changes in the future regarding interpersonal relations, especially when speaking of communication, socializing and group gathering. The fear for life will, at least for a certain period of time, bear down the need for social contacts, which will possibly have significant implications to the psychophysical health (especially when speaking of the elderly and vulnerable groups of people). The crisis caused by the pandemic will most definitely intensify online communication, but the increasing impact of artificial intelligence as well, and probably the biggest turbulences might be expected on the economic plan, which will bring along certain security and political issues. We will take into consideration each of these issues separately and provide a prediction of possible scenarios as well.

1.1 Interpersonal relations

The most precious thing stolen from us by the coronavirus epidemic regarding interpersonal communication is – a hug. For most of us, the mother's hug was the first experience of touch, which we encounter at birth. Hundreds of studies and scientific papers have been written on the healing effect of a hug. John Bowlby defined the term *affective attachment* in 1969, stating that the child's attachment to the mother is a primary need, such as the need for water or food (Bowlby 1969). Hug is a form of non-verbal communication that gives us a sense of security, warmth and belonging. It is scientifically proven that emotional closeness that a child achieves with the mother in the first years (which includes the mother's embrace) creates the foundation for future emotional relationships we build throughout our lives. This means that a child, if awarded enough attention, warmth, love and embrace from the mother, would later in life have good predispositions for building healthy emotional relations with other people. Of this testify research conducted among children in orphanages that were not awarded with enough love and affection, which later had a very negative impact to their health – they were more prone to certain illnesses and suffered from premature death (Livingston & Smith 2010).

It is interesting that this need is almost identical among people and among animals. Therefore, even animals have the need for intimacy. Scientists have discovered that certain species of monkeys from the *Colobus guereza* family express intimacy in a form of some sort of a hug, which shows benevolent behavior towards

each other (Kutsukake et al. 2006). A similar behavior involving touching the face and hugging was observed in anthropoid monkeys as well.

Even the origin of the word “hug” in different languages points to intimacy, gentleness, acceptance, touching... In English, the word *hug* originated from Saxon and Teutonic words *hog* or *hagen*, translating to – *being gentle, to accept* (Forsell & Åström 2012). The similarity of these words can also be seen in Norwegian (*höggva, haggvan*) as well as in Swedish (*hugga*) words, which also might be translated as “to catch”. Another English word - *embrace*, a synonym of the word *hug*, etymologically originates from the Latin base word *brace*, with a prefix – *em*. The Latin expression *bracchia collo circumdare* is a synonym for hugging, that is “putting one’s arms around someone’s neck” (Forsell & Åström 2012). In Serbian, the word *zagrljaj* is linked to the word *grlo* (throat, neck), which corresponds with the previously mentioned Latin expression “putting one’s arms around someone’s neck”, which in fact means – hugging. Therefore, from the beginning of time, people always had the need to hug each other, as well as to articulate such behavior in an adequate manner.

Throughout history, people often hugged in order to express affection, as a sign of farewell, parting. It might be said that the entire history of humanity is, in a way, a history of hugs. And this chain of hugs is broken due to COVID-19 pandemic. The saddest thing of all is that some were not even able to give the last hug to their loved ones who fell ill, since in that way, they would risk becoming infected as well. From one point, the pandemic impacted the physical distance between people, but at the same time it caused more intense and more emotional connection as well.

1.2. Online communication

As a result of social distancing, online communication has intensified even more. For a very short period of time, people started organizing almost all of their activities online – the classes in schools and at universities started being held via internet (with the help of platforms such as Zoom, Webex, etc.), gym exercises are now available on a variety of applications, and meeting new people has long been conducted via certain platforms (Badoo, Tinder...).

The European Commission adopted the education plan via internet due to COVID-19 virus, based on two principles: *online platforms* (eTwinning, Learning Corner, SALTO-YOUTH...) and *EU projects* (Edu Hack, Bio talent, BINGO, Open Mind...).

The coronavirus will drastically transform education, given that even now we have various offers for organizing the so-called digital camps and summer schools which would serve for educating the youth. Does this mean that this virus will last more than we expected?

The World Health Organization passed clear recommendations to people regarding how to behave during the pandemic in all segments of social life. The point is that all possible activities should be reduced to online communication (WHO 2020).

In accordance with the global health crisis, many social networks have started certain research regarding communication during COVID-19 pandemic. Twitter started analyzing communication since January 28 using API and Tweepy streaming with the help of certain key words.²⁾ Over 50 million of tweets were collected from this date until March 16, which represents about 450 GB of materials. The majority of tweets were in English (61.76%), in Spanish (13.09%), while in third place were tweets in French (4.36%) (Chen et al. 2020).

1.3. Psychological effect of the pandemic

We should also pay attention to the psychological dimension of the pandemic, given that previous research has shown that every major pandemic leaves certain negative consequences on the life of an individual and the society (Li & Gang 2020). In that context, it is necessary to establish certain programs for psychological intervention, which is already being actively implemented in China, while some countries in the West, such as the Great Britain and the United States, have established clear procedures for psychological crisis intervention in order to address the public health issue.

Given that they were the first to encounter this virus, the Chinese are pioneers in research regarding psychological problems faced by individuals during quarantine as well. The research was conducted on a sample of 120 respondents in 194 cities in China. The impact of the epidemic on psychological state of the respondents is the following: 53,8% of respondents stated that psychological impact of the epidemic on them was mild or difficult; 16,5% of them noted that they faced mild or harsh symptoms of depression; 28,8% of individuals faced mild or harsh symptoms of anxiety, while 8,1% of them reported suffering from a serious amount of stress (Cuiyan et al. 2020).

The newest research showed that this pandemic might cause psychological symptoms, even among individuals who do not suffer from mental illnesses. In the majority of cases, people faced fear of infection and death, feeling of helplessness, but often blamed others who fell ill which, in total, led to development of mental problems. It was discovered that psychiatric morbidities varied from depression, anxiety, to somatic issues, panic attacks, suicides, which were in certain countries predominantly present among the youth, and which are associated with guilt (Ho et al. 2020). Such mental state might have far-reaching consequences for the society in terms of stigmatizing the sick, feelings of shame, creating greater social distance

²⁾ The following key words were used: Coronavirus, Koronavirus, Corona, CDC, Wuhan coronavirus, Wuhan lockdown, Ncov, Wuhan, Kungflu, Epidemic, Outbreak, Sinophobia, China, Covid-19, Corona virus, Covid, Covid19, Sars-cov-2, COVID-19, COVD, Pandemic.

and mutual distrust, but also the distrust that the state system can keep the epidemic under control. In such constellation of interpersonal relations, the economy suffers as well, especially those industries that are associated with mass gatherings (cafes, restaurants, malls, cinemas, theatres...), which results in financial problems that increase the feeling of frustration and negative motions. In Singapore, mental health issues were approached via Zoom application, with the use of behavioral therapy and mentalization-based therapy (MBT). In Serbia, psychotherapists also started with online sessions because an increasing number of people was in need of this type of help.

1.4. Fear in the time of Corona

It is known that man is a creature of fear and that this emotion is very familiar to him. Even the bravest men in the world fear someone or something. The fear of death³⁾ is a natural fear, imminent to every man. Sometimes those fears are irrational, and sometimes, such as in the times of pandemics, they are completely justified and rational. So, for example, the British started using the new model of combat against the COVID-19 virus only when new estimates indicated a possible mortality of 260,000 people (Mahase 2020). The fear of death predisposed a new, more strict set of political measures.

The fear of unknown and invisible enemy has made people throughout the planet return to the places from which they originated – they returned to their roots. Just as a wounded beast retreats into a cave in search of a safe haven from the enemy, so the people retreated to their “hiding places”: first to their countries, and then to their homes. The most beautiful (and safest as well) place is home, wherever it is and whatever it may be. The man is “rooted” where he was born, be it in the countryside, in the desert, in the world metropolis, or by the sea, in a fertile plain, or on the top of a harsh mountain. Like a plant, the man has its roots in the place from which he originated, and he often returns to them, especially in the times of a crisis.

It took ten years for more than half a million of people to leave Serbia⁴⁾, and only a few days for about 400,000 of our citizens to return during the pandemic caused by the COVID-19 virus! (B92 2020). This serves as another proof that “birds of a feather flock together” in the times of a crisis. Fear of the unknown made people return to their homes from abroad. Some did it due to financial reasons, because they lost their jobs and finances; the others returned in order to be with their families; others realized that, in the times of a crisis, it is best to be

³⁾ If the fear is intensive, then it can become anxiety, that is, thanatophobia.

⁴⁾ According to data provided by OSCE, from 2000 to 2019, a total of 654,000 people, of which the majority younger than 25, left Serbia. Source: Bukvić, Lj. 2019. “Mladi jedini dali predloge za sprečavanje odliva mozgova”. *Danas* 08.05.2019. <https://www.danas.rs/ekonomija/mladi-jedini-dali-predloge-za-sprecavanje-odliva-mozgova/>, 08.04.2020.

amongst your own kind. There are many reasons and many life stories. What they all have in common is – fear.

Besides the fear of unknown, the pandemic generated the fear of the future as well. What will the world be like after the pandemic? Will there be an economic crisis? Will we be hungry? How long will all of this last? Will we survive? Will the world be the same after this pandemic? When will we be able to hug our loved ones?

At first glance (and at least short-term speaking), it seems that people were worried the most about social distancing. Epidemiologists educated us well that the only “remedy” for this virus is – social isolation. The less we socialize, the less we hug, the less we kiss, the virus becomes weaker. In the Aristotelian sense of the word, this is the biggest challenge for a man seen as a *zoon politikon*. As a social (and political) being, one finds the conditions of social isolation difficult and reluctant.⁵⁾ From the first days of their existence, people have been interlinking in order to help each other, for the reasons of safety, existence, defense... The man is a *homo socialis* and as such, he longs for the company of other people. Only rare spiritual individuals succeed in overcoming the human nature and voluntarily isolating themselves from the rest of the world.⁶⁾

At this moment, when the entire world is waging an uncertain battle against the invisible and unknown enemy (called COVID-19), the fears are numerous. It might be that this fear of uncertainty is the one which bothers the modern man the most. But there is still one thing that, despite social distancing, brings us all together: we have all become the same. This virus has shown that the rich and the poor are the same, that there aren't any differences between the nations, races and religions. We all share the same fate. It sounds as a paradox but, even though we are deprived of social contact, we have never been as close as we are today. The closeness of the contemporary man is reflected precisely in the *communal destiny*, awarded to us by this virus. Apart from fear, the virus taught us of solidarity, but also of the fact that hope dies last and that there is something in a man that has enabled him throughout the long history to overcome various fears carried along by wars, illnesses, floods, fires, financial crises, poverty... that is, the will to live. Like the *Ramonda Nathaliae*⁷⁾ plant which grows in harsh conditions and gives beautiful flowers, and which regenerates even after it completely withers, a man as well in difficult times manages to resist the greatest temptations if he has the will to live.

⁵⁾ For example, solitary confinement in prisons is regarded as one of the harshest forms of punishment for disobedient prisoners.

⁶⁾ Such example are the monks from Sveta Gora, who retrieve to their cells to pray to the Lord in solitude.

⁷⁾ This plant is also known as *Natalie's ramonda* and the *Phoenix plant*, is the symbol of the Serbian army's struggle during the World War One. The plant was discovered by Sava Petrović, and scientifically described in the field of botany by Josif Pančić. Nathalie's ramonda, as a rare and protected specimen, grows only in Serbia, Northern Macedonia and Greece.

2. Political, security and economic challenges

It is more than clear that not one government in the world (including the ones of the richest countries) was not ready for a pandemic of this magnitude. To this testify the best the health systems of Spain and Italy (which are currently the most vulnerable ones in Europe) and the United States. Italy stepped into the COVID-19 pandemic with 5,200 beds in the ICU, which is insufficient for a pandemic of this type (Remuzzi & Remuzzi 2020). As many other countries, the United States faced the lack of medical equipment and respirators, and Donald Trump's advisor even gave a prediction in which, despite all the measures, he predicted the death of 100,000 of Americans (Zurčer 2020). Spain had been saving on public health and medical equipment since the economic crisis of 2008 which, in the midst of this pandemic, resulted in insufficiently developed capacities for intensive care and lack of medical equipment (Ledigo-Quigley et al. 2020).

In terms of state strategies for the fight against this pandemic, the countries were mostly divided into two sides: the majority of them accepted self-isolation measures, that is, physical distancing⁸⁾, while the minority of them, such as Sweden, favored the principle of “constructing a collective immunity”, that is, “the herd immunity”. There were also the ones who were stuck deciding between the health of their nation and the economy, but as they saw the collapse caused by the coronavirus infection, sooner or later, decided to introduce the principle of isolation.

Apart from drastic changes in interpersonal relations, the coronavirus will also introduce tectonic changes on the international level in terms of redefining international power, security and economy ratio. In the first place, the pandemic showed that the virus does not differentiate nations, religions and races and thus can happen to anyone, without exceptions. Besides that, the distinction between the rich and the poor, the celebrities and common people was blurred as well. We have all become vulnerable. In such constellations of events often starts the real fight for survival, to which there are no rules. The most explicit example is the competition of countries for respirators on the world market (in the beginning of the crisis), which were the only chance for survival of a significant number of the ill.⁹⁾

Solidarity is a rare occurrence in these times of crisis, but not an impossible one. To this testifies the best the international aid which arrived, first of all, to Italy from China, Russia and Cuba. This caused revolt among many Italians, and thus, it was not unusual to see throughout Italy the flags of China, Russia, and Cuba, as a sign of gratitude, instead of flags of the EU (which, in the beginning, did not help

⁸⁾ It is believed that people must keep at a distance of two meters, and the prohibition of social contacts, socializing and gathering is recommended as well.

⁹⁾ One of such scandals was also noted in Czech, which confiscated medical equipment sent to Italy by China. Source: RFI. 2020. “Czech Republic sends face masks to Italy after China shipment 'stolen'”. RFI, 22.03.2020. <http://www.rfi.fr/en/europe/20200322-czech-republic-sends-face-masks-to-italy-after-shipment-from-china-stolen-coronavirus>, 13.04.2020.

Italy, as it was expected). In such way, the so-called “soft power” of certain countries is increased, among which China especially stands out, given that it showed solidarity with many countries, including Serbia¹⁰⁾. The fact that Russia sent humanitarian aid to the United States in the form of medical equipment in the most critical moment testified to the fact that a crisis can sometimes, even for a moment, bring down ideological and political differences (Al Jazeera 2020).

The fight against the pandemic brought along another very important ideological issue. How is it possible that some “collectivist” countries did better during this pandemic in comparison to some richer countries of neoliberal capitalism? It turned out that public health actually makes a lot of sense and that, in critical situations such as pandemic, the state interventionism remains the only option. It is interesting that, during this health crisis, China, Singapore and South Korea did better, though at the expense of human rights of their citizens. So, in China, there are already apps used by the citizens to prove their health status, which impacts their freedom of movement, and algorithms and artificial intelligence give recommendations regarding the direction and the duration of their movement. Singapore even went one step further by introducing the “TraceTogether” (HealthHub 2020) app which, with the help of the Bluetooth signal, can determine with whom the individual infected with COVID-19 virus contacted. Artificial intelligence also found its use in the fight against the coronavirus, which might be seen on the example of China, where numerous robots conducted significant tasks regarding the care for the infected, and there are also indications that, in the future, robots might be used among the lonely people for their socialization (!?) (Clifford 2020).

In this context, Amnesty International determined several segments of human rights that were directly violated during the COVID-19 virus pandemic. Those are the following: media censorship, right to health protection, prohibition of public expression, fake news, discrimination and xenophobia, restriction of freedom of movement and border closure (Amnesty International 2020).

Introduction of curfews and states of emergency curtailed many human rights and freedoms but, on the other side, caused a significant reduction of number of criminal acts. Specifically, the number of criminal acts conducted in Serbia since the introduction of the state of emergency reduced by 55% (Danas April 8, 2020), but this does not mean that the criminals will not find a new way for conducting certain corruptive actions, trafficking of goods, transport of illegal migrants, etc.

The isolation measures have distanced us from other people, but have made us closer than ever to the members of our household. This has caused another security risk in the form of domestic violence, which significantly intensified during the

¹⁰⁾ China sent help in the form of medical equipment and manpower.

pandemic. In China, the domestic violence cases tripled¹¹⁾, in Montenegro, they rose by 20%, and in France by 30% (Danas April 14, 2020). The worrisome statistics in terms of domestic violence is registered in the Great Britain as well, with a 25% (Vesti Online 2020) increase, while in Turkey, an increase of domestic violence cases by 30% was recorded as well (Isik 2020).

The pandemic influenced the spread of “conspiracy theories” for which we are not sure anymore that they are only theories. What is characteristic for them is the fact that they emerge in the conditions of social crises and that they always have “easy solutions during the harsh times”. The following two conflicting views on conspiracy theories emerged during this pandemic:

1. According to the first view, conspiracy theories are not theories but absolute truths.
2. The second view points towards absolute untruthfulness and paranoia of the sympathizers of such theories.

The truth is probably somewhere in the middle, but a temporal distancing is necessary in order to determine this with certainty. The truthfulness is especially put to a big test, having in mind semi-information, news spinning and propaganda flooding the ordinary man on a daily basis. If we look back to the “conspiracy theories” phenomenon, we might notice that they are in fact a cultural phenomenon that culminated in the twentieth and the twenty-first century. When speaking of conspiracy, it is the property of the man since the beginning of the time. The basic element of every conspiracy is the secret, and the goal of the conspirators is usually of a dual character: to help or to hurt someone.¹²⁾ Thus, it is not really unusual that conspiracy is an integral part of many political phenomena such as terrorism, political killings, assassinations, etc. Thus, it is undisputable that the conspiracies exist; however, the problem arises with the phenomenon of the “conspiracy theories” which additionally confuses the contemporary man. Until now, it turned out that, in the ideological sense of a word, “conspiracy theories” are mostly dealt with by the right-wing which, in such way, express additional vigilance towards the group to which they belong (nation, race, religion).

Even though at first glance it seemed (at least in the beginning) that even terrorists and extremists withdrew before the coronavirus, the reality is completely different. The pandemic had consequences even in this segment of security, since terrorists focused on online action, especially when speaking of recruitment of young people who spend more and more time in the virtual space. The fear of corona joined

¹¹⁾ After the pandemic was over, the number of divorces in China increased by 20%. Source: Dekić, Dragana. 2020. “Nasilje kao zaraza”. Vesti Online, 13.04.2020. <https://www.vesti-online.com/nasilje-kao-zaraza/>, 13.04.2020.

¹²⁾ See more in: Simeunović, Dragan. (2009). *Uvod u političku teoriju*. Beograd: Institut za političke studije (pp. 109-110).

hands with the fear of terrorist activities¹³⁾, which created the feeling of collective anxiety and psychosis among people. Besides, we cannot but ask ourselves – what is the COVID-19 virus serves as an idea for some new form of bioterrorism?

At this point, the humanity stands at the crossroads between human rights and protection of general health. The majority of countries has, by introducing states of emergencies, neglected the idea of human rights, which was the “mother of all ideas” in the countries of neoliberal system. For example, France passed a controversial law on “comprehensive security”, which was met with public condemnation due to the disputed Article 24, which stipulated prohibition of taking photographs of policemen.¹⁴⁾ Therefore, new rules regarding media reporting were introduced as well, and thus the journalists, if they wished to report from some protest, had to put themselves on a list. How will all this impact the freedom of the media? The COVID-19 pandemic impacted the prohibition of movement, free reporting, breathing air without masks, the freedom of gathering. Is the world steadily going towards neototalitarianism?

For the economy, the COVID-19 crisis definitely carries along the time full of uncertainty and frustration. Small and medium entrepreneurs are the first to be hit, which will definitely suit the big production chains getting ready to swallow everything before them in the future. Even on the global level, there will be numerous challenges. Certain long-term predictions show that the US and the Great Britain will feel long-term deeper effects of the economic crisis, while China has 50% chances of being better (Chudik et al. 2020). The chances for the EU are also negative, even though there is a possibility that it will make a faster and better recovery when compared with the US and the Great Britain by the end of 2021 (Chudik et al. 2020). In any case, spillover of the problems will take on global proportions, reaffirming the well-known paradigm of the world as a “global village”.

CONCLUSION

The COVID-19 pandemic might be the biggest social and political challenge faced by the humanity until now. Even though the human kind was for centuries exposed to various states of crisis such as wars, natural disasters, collapses of world stock markets none of those crises did not hit the humanity at the same time and in the same way. Never was the entire planet stopped at the same moment, by the unknown and invisible enemy, which additionally complicates the situation and makes it more complex.

¹³⁾ Through brutal attacks world-wide and throughout Europe (France, Austria) in the fall of 2020 the terrorists showed that the crisis caused by the coronavirus suited them, given that it only deepens the fear among the “soft targets”, such as the citizens.

¹⁴⁾ This would mean that the citizens of France will be punished even if they record police officers during their excessive use of force. For violation of this law, a fine amounting to 45,000 EUR or one year of prison is prescribed.

Maybe exactly due to the fact that it is the problem of a global character should it be resolved in a global manner – by actions of all political subjects, together and unified. This idea seems utopian, having in mind the man’s imperfect and “perishable” nature depicted in the works and speeches of many anthropology pessimists for centuries. Still, even though the situation seems apocalyptic at a first glance, it is evident that, in some odd way, all people will connect when found in the same trouble.

The only question is, in which way will the new crisis be resolved: through constructive global solutions, or through insurgency, protests and mutinies, which is becoming more and more dominant in the world? While we await to exit from the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, maybe it might be the best to quote the words of the famous theoretician Ernst Bloch who stated that “the rebellion, as well as dreams, come from the stomach – but an empty one”.

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UDC 616.98:578.834]:316.776

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THE REPLACEMENT OF THESIS IN CORONAVIRUS CRISIS

Abstract:

This paper aims to analyze and discuss the evolution of coronavirus crisis management and communications, using complexity – the reading grid for the contemporary world. Communication based on the replacement of theses, a series of logical errors in the discourses of the ruling class, increases the disorder in social structures, provoke systemic instability, whose acute forms - crisis can cause mutation of the system, its revolution.

Key words: Complex thought, replacement of thesis, governmentality, strategy, 4IR, neoliberalism.

INTRODUCTION

„The more I read about the virus (Coronavirus), about control strategies, about lockdown and its consequences, the more I find the controversy, and the more I am in uncertainty. So, we have to endure the uncertainty tonically. Uncertainty contains danger and also hope.”

Edgar Morin¹⁾

During her reign, Margaret Thatcher often reiterated that there was no alternative to capitalism. Another neo-conservative, Ronald Reagan, rounded out the neo-liberal worldview: “Government is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem”. The neo-liberal ideal, the belief that markets would bring both economic and political freedom, and that from there our politics and economy should privilege individual private choice and profit-driven private-sector companies, could even managed to unite Eastern and Western elites in 1990s. Gradually, neoliberal unanimity has taken over planetary space.

Thirty years later, the onset of the coronavirus crisis in Western countries (January 2020), seeking how to stop Trump’s anti-liberal populist episode, at the time when all the world leaders have already shaped their governments in the image of markets and convinced their voters that only market solutions would suffice, American academic progressives announced a shift to a new progressivism paradigm. The Roosevelt Institute²⁾ (RI) published a report that draws on research and analyses which states that “something profound is happening in politics - in

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¹⁾ Edgar Morin is a French philosopher and sociologist who has been internationally recognized for his work on complexity and ‘complex thought’ (pensée complexe).

²⁾ Created in 1987, the Roosevelt Institute expanded its mission in 2007 with the launch of the Four Freedoms Center, a progressive policy think-tank and an economic policy blog. Felicia Wong who holds a PhD in political science from the University of California (Berkeley) and is formerly of the Democracy Alliance, became its President and CEO in March 2012.

the United States and around the world and that the chaos we are living in is a sign of something deeper: the death of one worldview and the ascent of another” (Wong 2020). As “neoliberalism, the once-hegemonic economic paradigm, is in ruins” (Brown³ 2019), we should expect the rise of the post-neoliberal era. In the meantime, the world is experiencing an ideological vacuum, hidden by the coronavirus crisis.

So, even when we get out of the COVID-19 crisis, we will still live-in controversy and uncertainty - in danger. In such an analytical framework, the result of the American elections (the victory of the Democrats) is the result of the aforementioned efforts of the new progressives, who, however, did not emerge from the internal party elections as the winning faction. Paradoxically, Joe Biden, “the last of the 1968 generation, but no radical always fixated on mainstream politics” (MacShane 2020), has been elected to defeat, together with COVID-19, a radical Republican Donald Trump and to get back the Western political sphere to the era of politically correct that voters rejected when they elected Trump. The comeback of old political actors has also been fueled by the temporary use of progressive social policies in coronavirus crisis management, mainly so that world leaders - after 30-year precariousness of the masses in favor of happy few - would not have to face popular uprisings for which the pandemic could have been the trigger.

When confronted with nano virus, those same leaders of Western democracies who have been imposing a belt-tightening policy on their populations for decades, in order to reduce budget deficits and government debts, have opened all the taps overnight. So, they decided to fund –whatever it costs- the confinement and reluctance of a healthy and active majority of their citizens (lockdown) to protect the inactive minority whose lives the virus could take; and to prevent overburdening of public health systems, which have become fragilized du to imposed savings despite growing health care needs. And that is the key moment in which it become clear that we are not living the great worldviews replacement, but the replacement of thesis in coronavirus crisis management, which is due to logical errors that occurs when the speaker doesn’t explain and prove the default thesis but its related one, by subtly or roughly moving the given theme. In the management of the COVID-19 crisis, we are witnessing discourses of the ruling class and their media that are based on a series of “logical errors” - it means on the attitudes and conclusions based on inadequate argumentation that thus become part of a generally accepted system of values and opinions in the public sphere (Stojadinović 2016). Hence, we have the feeling that we are living in dangerous controversy and uncertainty, but we hope for positive developments. Are our hopes justified?

³) Wendy L. Brown is Class of 1936 First Professor of Political Science and a core faculty member in “The Program for Critical Theory” at the University of California, Berkeley.

1. Neoliberalism and the end of biopolitics

Seeking to study liberalism as a general framework of biopolitics, in his 1979 course at the Collège de France, Michel Foucault defined neoliberalism⁴⁾: not as a theory intended to extend classical liberalism, for example by rearranging the boundaries between the respective fields of economics and politics, but as a doctrine which - beyond its multiple variants⁵⁾ - aims to establish an economic regime and a mode of "governmentality"⁶⁾ absolutely unique, where the State and society would become subordinate to the principles of the market. By placing his 1975 study of differential in the treatment of epidemics of leprosy and plague in that analytic grid, Foucault found out that the differential is representing the passage from one type of power to another. Moreover, he detected a new type of power which is exercised over the body and life, unlike preceding which was applied, according to the legal model, to subjects. Hence his idea of biopolitics as an exercise of power which no longer relates to territories but to the lives of individuals, to populations - to the 'biopower'⁷⁾. He uses this latter term "to describe the new tactics of power when it focuses on life, that is to say individual bodies and populations; when such mechanisms differ from those that exert their influence in the legal and political sphere of sovereign power" (Genel 2004).

Then, as population has a birth and death rate and morbidities, it can perish or on the contrary grow, biopolitics can be considered as a tool for optimizing collective strength, which objective is maximizing the lifespan of the population. So, Foucault defined biopolitics as a concerted action of the common power on all subjects as living beings. That is to say: the action on the life of the population, considered as a wealth of the common power in order to become object of attention and to make it grow and increase its vitality (Foucault 2004).

This is a general framework in which the management of the current coronavirus crisis should theoretically take place. However, during past 40 years, through the neoliberalism like defined by Foucault, happened a new disruption for which Jean-Paul Domin claims that it "constitutes a decisive disruption in the history of the health system, in particular by making health a private matter

⁴⁾ Prior to the English translation of *The Birth of Biopolitics*, Foucault's critique of neoliberalism was distributed in the United States by Thomas Lemke and Wendy Brown. The translation of the course by Foucault, the star of American student campuses and a mandatory reference in most social debates in the United States, comes at a time of crisis in 2008, when it revives questions about American capitalism, deregulation and taking over the debts of private companies by the states (Foucault 2008).

⁵⁾ The numerous differences within the neoliberal nebula, in particular regarding the role of the state, are the subject of the work by Serge Audier (Audier 2012).

⁶⁾ For Foucault, governmentality is a certain type of state control over the populations, a certain mode of exercise of the power where to govern is "to have towards the inhabitants, the wealth, the conduct of each and every one, a form of surveillance - of control no less attentive than that of the father of the family on the household and its goods" (Foucault 2004, 642).

⁷⁾ In *The will to know* (Foucault 1976).

whereas it was previously part of a biopolitical strategy, in other terms of government of populations” (Domin 2018). The next step was the emergence of healthcare providers and consumers; but also, the movement towards the privatization of the living, to the mechanization of bodies, of parts of bodies and to organ trafficking. Everything in conditions of maximized competition and free trade; achieved through economic deregulation and the abolition of customs duties, as well as through monetary and social policies that favor business but are indifferent to poverty, social deracination, cultural decimation, long-term resource dilapidation, and environmental destruction (Brown 2003). It is about the question of deviations brought by the neoliberal era, which western new progressives want to correct by transition towards the post-neoliberal worldview.

Therefore, if neoliberalism is in ruins, then that is also the end of biopolitics, imagined as a tool for optimizing collective power to maximize the life expectancy of the population. And this is what makes the control of COVID-19 pandemic impossible. Indeed, in his first 1974 Brazil course "The medical crisis or the anti-medical crisis?", Michel Foucault notes that the Beveridge report, published in 1942 in England that is advocating the establishment of universal health insurance, marks an important turning point in the relationship between state and health, as well as the relationship between health and the economy: "It even works by inverting the terms of the equation, as set out with biopolitics: the concept of the state in the service of the individual in good health replaces the concept of the individual in good health in the service of the state " (Foucault 2001, 41). The analysis of Alexandre Klein is on that path: "Referred to the responsibility of the individual, health has become a huge market into which many industrials are engulfed. All the more so since after a period of economic prosperity and the return of the welfare state, the uncertainties of the economy that marked the 1970s led the States to downsize public health spending" (Klein 2017).

So, is it possible that biopolitics, thanks to the replacement of thesis (mentioned by Alexandre Klein), and that put it in the function of maximizing the profits of industrials, instead of maximizing the life expectancy of the population, launches the self-destructive process inside the neoliberal system?

1.1. The race for the vaccine

Meanwhile, in the midst of the coronavirus crisis, we are witnessing a frenzied race for the vaccine. The first competitor, in the western zone race, to reach the finish line is American Pfizer with German research partner BioNtech. And, the "auction" opened immediately. Namely, although secrecy is the rule in negotiations between laboratories and the states that most often pre-funded research through reservations, some elements are known. For example, Pfizer does not hide the fact that in signed contracts the financial conditions depend on two criteria: the scope of the order and the delivery time. The larger the quantity ordered, the less the vaccine costs; and the invoice grows depending on the desired

delivery speed⁸⁾. The European Union, with its 300 million doses ordered, negotiated the best price for Pfizer's vaccine, which first hit the market: 12 euros per unit, according to a tweet from Belgian Secretary of State Eva de Bleeker, published by mistake and quickly erased⁹⁾. This is much lower than the price paid by Israel: 22.70 euros per dose, to immediately ensure the fastest delivery of a quantity of vaccine sufficient to vaccinate the entire population¹⁰⁾. So, the priority is those countries - clients who pay more. This happened while the crisis was being managed by general or partial population confinement. In France alone, the estimated cost of crisis management according to the "whatever it cost" model reached 186 billion in 2020¹¹⁾. With an indication that this is a minimum figure because it does not take into account loans granted by the State to private companies. Guaranteed by the state, this means that if a company cannot repay a loan to a bank, it will be done by the state, i.e., taxpayers¹²⁾. At the same time, private providers of health products and services, as well as providers of new technologies that enable the maintenance of certain activities during confinement, maximize their profits. States are weakening more and more, while the precariousness of the populations is preparing to reach the summits. And no one is crying foul. World leaders, imbued with neoliberal unanimity, accept and apply a mode of governance where the State and society are subordinate to the principles of the market. Even when the profit maximization was preceded by a rather dubious maximized competition and free trade.

1.2. Govern as a good father of the family

Among other duties, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is aimed to reduce poverty around the world and to work on high employment and sustainable economic growth promotion. So, what were the IMF's recommendations on these issues when pandemic appeared? Regarding follow up of the IMF's study on the French economy and its prospects, in November 2020¹³⁾, the head of the Washington institution for France congratulated the government. "Let us be clear:

⁸⁾ Pierre Kupferman for *BFM Business*, January 5 2020.

https://www.bfmtv.com/economie/vaccins-anti-covid-pourquoi-tous-les-etats-ne-paient-pas-le-meme-prix_AV-202101060316.html.

⁹⁾ *AFP*, December 19, 2020. https://www.bfmtv.com/economie/vaccins-anti-covid-une-secretaire-d-etat-belge-publie-par-erreur-leur-prix-dans-l-ue-sur-twitter_AD-202012190112.html.

¹⁰⁾ *The Times of Israel*, November 16, 2020. <https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-will-reportedly-pay-more-than-us-eu-for-pfizer-coronavirus-vaccine/>.

¹¹⁾ RF, Présidence de l'Assemblée nationale. « Projet de loi de finances rectificative n° 3522 pour 2020 », présenté par M. Jean Castex, M. Bruno Le Maire et M. Olivier Dussopt, le Novembre 4, 2020. https://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/dyn/15/textes/115b3522_projet-loi.

¹²⁾ RF, Ministère de l'Économie des finances et de la relance. « Situation au 30 Octobre : Prêt garantie par l'État » : https://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/covid19-soutien-entreprises/TableaudebordPGE30octobre.pdf.

¹³⁾ IMF, November 2, 2020. <https://www.imf.org/fr/News/Articles/2021/01/15/na011921-five-charts-on-frances-policy-priorities-to-navigate-the-covid19-crisis>.

the 'whatever it cost' of the President of the Republic (Emmanuel Macron) is the right decision," said Jeffrey Franks. For the economist, "the response to the crisis was appropriate, and the response rapid and flexible to contain an increase in unemployment". But then, for the period after the emergency situation passes, according to the projection - 2022, the IMF recommends a return to savings. First advice: French government will have to "give priority to strengthening equity and quasi-equity financing intended for viable companies, in order to stimulate investment and the dynamism of companies". Second IMF advice is "to increase the efficiency of corporate restructuring procedures, further simplify and modernize the tax system, rationalize taxes on businesses and liberalize the markets for goods and services". It is visibly that Washington institution is not abandoning its classic orthodoxy: the consolidation of public accounts which should not be achieved through tax increases but through cuts in public spending (De Calignon 2020). It means cuts in public health, i.e., the austerity which has already weakened European systems of public health protection and made that the crisis is managed by confinement of healthy persons, simply to slow the spread of infection and thus compensate the lack of equipment, caregivers and doctors.

So, the IMF practices a discourse based on logical errors - attitudes and conclusions, funded on inadequate argumentation that have become part of the generally accepted system of values and opinions in the management of the world economy. According to the concept of governance, the IMF should exercise a form of control over states, and states over the population, their wealth and the behavior of all, no less careful than the behavior of the father of the family over the household and its goods¹⁴⁾. A good father of a family would not advise an already indebted member of his family, who is in danger of losing his job due to a lockdown, to take on additional debt to finance the "keeping" of his job with the employer; nor does he repay that huge debt once he starts working again. He would ask a wealthy family member to provide for the needs of the one in difficulty. The IMF prefers the replacement of thesis. It does not explain or prove a given thesis (how to reduce unemployment and poverty of the population), but a related one (how to maintain the existing financial system and ensure the profits of financial operators), roughly moving the given topic.

¹⁴⁾ In *Sécurité, territoire, population*, op.cit., p.98, Foucault sees the family as crucial in the general arts of government, and the key for the family is economics: "the art of government must answer essentially this question: how to introduce economics - that is to say the way to properly manage individuals, goods, wealth, as can be done within a family, as can a good father who knows how to manage his wife, his children, his servants, who knows how to make his family's fortune prosper, who knows how to arrange for it the appropriate alliances - how to introduce this attention, this meticulousness, this type of relationship between the father of the family and his family within the management of a state?" (Foucault 2004, 98).

1.3. Is the governmentality solution to COVID problem, or is it a problem?

The replacement of thesis is also evident in the theoretical practice of maximized competition and free trade in which the race for vaccine should take place. As indicated in the table which escaped the secretary of the Belgian state, the most expensive vaccines won the battle, i.e., American giants Pfizer / BioNTech and Moderna. These vaccines have won the market despite the fact that the professors of medicine who are not part of the "anti-vaccines", like Professor Eric Caumes, head of the infectious disease department at the Pitié-Salpêtrière hospital in Paris, had estimated that there was a lack of hindsight on RNA vaccines¹⁵⁾, this new technology which is based on the injection of strands of the virus's genetic code to trigger an immune reaction of the body against the same virus. They won against 237 other competitors. How? First, because precisely they were not burdened with the lack of hindsight and could accelerated the scientific process to the maximum.

Second, it is logical that the American pharmaceutical giant had the best insight into the world's knowledge, which is written in English to be commonly approved and published in the best-rated Anglo-American journals, which are bringing together a multinational research elite that generates new technologies, such as messenger RNA (MRNA) vaccine technology. Moreover, European medical research elites often emigrate to the United States, and/or partner with American pharmaceutical giants who have the sufficient financial resources necessary to develop new technologies and encourage the creation of start-ups, such as biotech companies on MRNA technology. According to Camille Locht, INSERM research director of the Institut Pasteur de Lille, in COVID-19 vaccine race, key factors were presence of numerous biotech companies on MRNA technology and enough financial means to realize long and expensive clinical tests¹⁶⁾. A phase 1 clinical trial with only a few dozen guinea pigs costs between 3 and 4 million euros. For phase 2 (a few hundred people), it takes between 5 and 15 million euros. And for the last phase with thousands of subjects, the addition can climb to several hundred million euro.

Third, today research is not often done by national companies, but by collaborations between several companies from several countries and goes in the direction of maximized competition. But, when it comes to the exploitation of the

¹⁵⁾ On the *Radio France Inter*, Prof. Eric Caumes said le 8 decembre 2020 : « Malheureusement, on manque de recul, on n'a toujours pas les scientifiques » sur les vaccins à base de maétél genetique (ARN messenger) pour lutter contre le Covid-19. » In the Agency of American and European Medicines, it is not the only one. I will be vaccinated with products that I do not know, but I do not have the information that the communiqués from the press of pharmaceutical laboratories, which can be used to make a reliable and absolute trust: <https://www.franceinter.fr/societe/vaccins-a-arn-messenger-les-craintes-du-professeur-eric-caumes-ne-font-pas-l-unaninite>.

¹⁶⁾ Camille Locht for *Figaro Live*: <https://video.lefigaro.fr/figaro/video/pourquoi-ny-a-t-il-pas-de-vaccin-francais-contre-le-covid-19/>.

research fruits by the pharmaceutical industry, national diversity disappears as firms are mainly American, what distorts market competition within western zone. The laboratories that manage to provide all the above conditions are not numerous. Consequently, there are very few new vaccines coming out. Jean-François Saluzzo¹⁷⁾ says that a new vaccine for a given disease is released once every 10 years and generally comes from the United States. Thus, in the race for the vaccine, the only real competitors to the Anglo-American pharmaceutical giants were the "enemy" vaccines, Russian and Chinese, which arrived on the market before the American one. However, under the pretext of unreliability, because they are the product of an accelerated scientific process, they were not recommended to the countries of the western zone. By the replacement of thesis - roughly diverting their discourse from explaining and proving the default thesis (possible consequences of their own lack of hindsight on RNA vaccines) to related thesis ("unreliability" of competing RNA vaccines, and promotion of anti-Russian and anti-Chinese foreign policy) they avoided giving answers on the given topic. So, for example, the European Union, which practices a follower foreign policy, decided to meet its vaccine needs contractually and in advance with American and Anglo-Swedish suppliers (Pfizer, Moderna, Merck, Astra-Zeneca, etc.). Evidently, that is at odds with the neoliberal free trade principles and anti-protectionist rhetoric. In this way, Anglo-American pharmaceutical giants were given the opportunity to eventually neglect or abandon other research projects in which they participate, which do not apply the accelerated research process and MRNA technology and whose vaccine would be cheaper. Also, in order to fully dedicate themselves to the production of the most expensive vaccines, which the cheaper ones can no longer compete with, so profit maximization is ensured. All this in accordance with the laws of supply and demand. The law of demand states that, if all other factors remain equal, the higher the price of a good, the less people will demand that good. However, unless other factors remain the same as in the case of the vaccine race, so there are no cheaper products, and the expensive product is an essential need and rare commodity, the demand for it as well as the price rise. Consequently, after Israel, other rich countries could also pragmatically decide to offer a much higher price so that their order would be delivered as a matter of priority. Namely, financing a more or less strict confinement of the state (their economy) costs far more than the difference they would pay to the supplier for express delivery. Thus, the EU, which has concluded contracts with vaccine manufacturers with the best price, but with numerous shadow areas regarding delivery conditions, found itself in an unenviable situation that could generate an economic catastrophe of unimaginable proportions. How the EU opposes protectionism for ideological reasons; and has not worked to take control of the

¹⁷⁾ Jean-François Saluzzo is the virologist who works on the development of new vaccines at Aventis-Pasteur. In *BFM Business*, January 25, 2021. https://www.bfmtv.com/economie/pasteur-sanofi-la-france-a-t-elle-vraiment-echoue-dans-sa-recherche-d-un-vaccin-anti-covid_AN-202101250344.html.

vaccine conception, production and distribution process in the past year; nor on an autonomous foreign policy concept that would protect its specific interests and increase its influence on the world stage; non-existent responses to external threats such as a pandemic could not be built into its security system. Whence untimely reactions and the lack of any harmonized, coherent and long-term strategy to combat pandemic and its consequences; and potential "COVID-20, 21 and 22" are already appearing in the form of British, South African and Brazilian variants of coronavirus.

Within Foucault's concept of governmentality, supported by post-neoliberal progressives, good government is one that transcends the exercise of sovereign power to foster the prosperity, health, longevity, productivity, and happiness of the population. But political power is exercised in a number of ways through various agencies, social groups, and techniques, which can only be loosely linked to the formal state bureaucracy. Hence, governmentality is not the solution to our COVID problem; governmentality is the problem. As political power is already exercised through various informal power groups that influence formal political power more than the electorate.

2 Between the idea of world governance and a hold-up of the legitimate authority

Jacques Attali, writer and economist, once Secretary of State, Founder and First President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Special Adviser to President François Mitterrand, is today a successful businessman. His Foundation Positive Planet collects donations that help both donors and founders. First ones receive significant tax breaks. Second ones receive enough money to organize actions around the world to promote Attali's progressive worldview. Subsequently, the Attali & Associés Group is in charge of the sale of economic, financial, sociological, geopolitical, technological and environmental skills to support various governments, business leaders and investment funds in developing their strategies as well as in making and implementing decisions. Attali's worldview revolves around the idea of a world government, conceptualized and presented to the public under the intriguing book title: *Who will rule the world tomorrow?* The reader gets the answer to the question only on page 300, where Attali cautiously states that, in an ideal world, it is possible to imagine a democratic world government. He then elaborates a delicate topic with visionary boldness. Proposes a three-member parliament - a legislative institution with three chambers and a "Chambre de patience" (chamber of patience); the executive branch would be headed by a "heptavirate" composed of seven members appointed for seven non-renewable years, the world supreme court and contracts, etc. The concept is rounded off by a 'prophetic' message: "One day humanity will realize that by gathering around a democratic government the world can only gain, because it is a way to transcend the interests of the most powerful nations, protect the identity of every civilization and manage the interests

of humanity in the best possible way. Such a government will one day exist. After some catastrophe or instead of it. For the good of the world, one should urgently dare to think about it"(Attali 2012).

2.1. Hold-up of the legitimate authority

Attali, as an ardent supporter of a real democratic world government and currency, is a welcome guest of world clubs, such as Bilderberg and Trilateral, where informal power is concentrated, powerful people who influence the formal one at the regional and national level. As he did not stop advising French left-wing and right-wing presidents after Mitterrand, in 2014 even the left-orientated mainstream newspaper *Libération* wondered: "What if it is him: Jacques Attali, the real president of France? A president who was not elected by the people, who has no formal authority, but handed over to the government a program of urgent reforms that he wrote for right-wing president Sarkozy, but that should be executed by left-wing president Hollande" (Brisau 2014). Nor two four-year presidential terms were enough to draw up and implement the 300 emergency measures of the Attali Commission (in charge of drafting a report with proposals to restart France's economic growth); among which there were as many positive social measures having public support, as globalist ones that had not. Therefore, Attali's commission generated a new president from its ranks, Emmanuel Macron, whose victory Attali announced, celebrated, and immediately prophesied that after him, in 2022, France would get its first women president¹⁸⁾. Confirmation that Attali's "prophecies" should be taken seriously, because they are mostly being fulfilled, came with the appearance of the COVID-19 pandemic. In his 2008 book *What After the Crisis?* he predicted: "The globalization of the market and the free movement of people, goods and capital that it promotes raises fears that, in the next decade, one or more pandemics will pose a major threat to the survival of many people, companies, countries" (Attali 2008). When this message is linked to the aforementioned from 2012, about the catastrophe that will finally convince people that a democratic world government is a winning combination for humanity, it is clear why at the end of 2020 Jacques Attali was given a central role in the highly watched documentary *Hold-up*¹⁹⁾; whose title alludes to 'robbery', by informal centers of authority, of those powers that people have assigned to their formally elected representatives of democratic government (the legitimate authority), as well as to generalized cover-up corruption (camouflaged). The ruling class immediately marked this documentary of two and a half hours, which unites

¹⁸⁾ In *Courrier du soir*, June 28, 2019. <https://lecourrier-du-soir.com/attali-avait-predit-larrivee-dune-femme-presidente-de-la-france-et-si-cetait-marion-marechal/>.

¹⁹⁾ Authors of the documentary *Hold-up* are Pierre Barnérias and Christophe Cossé. November 2020. Paris : TPod. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MJQJ5syHpM>.

the thoughts (video documents) of eminent personalities from the sectors of health, science, sociology, philosophy and political life, as a conspiracy theory. Because a superficial journalistic sensationalist treatment of valuable videos suggests that the coronavirus crisis conspiracy was prepared at the highest level. Although, of course, there is no underplot- conspiracy. Simply because, as we have seen before, there is no *condictio sine quo non* for conspiracy: the secret association of several persons for the purpose of preparing, assisting, and carrying out a particular action to the detriment of a person or organization. However, due to the tendentiously interpreted link between the collected videos, a good part of the documentary's actors was forced to de-solidarize with the producer of *Hold-up* and, at the same time, stand firmly behind their own allegations from the documents used by the producer. Thus, the end of 2020, like its beginning, remained marked by a 'theatre of the absurd' in which everything ends with unfinished thoughts or nonsense.

2.2. Fighting against conspiracy by conspiracy

In the described case, the ruling class and their critics accuse each other of conspiracy (the replacement of thesis). For a tendentious interpretation of the origin of the pandemic and of how to manage the crisis. Although both perform openly, publicly. The ruling class seeks to discredit its critics by categorizing them as conspiracy theorists who develop hypotheses that either rest on unverified facts (documents), or on proven ones – but 'imaginatively' interpreted. Thus, in *Hold-up*, Nobel laureate Luc Montaignes of the Pasteur Institute - the same laboratory that discovered the vaccine against the previous SARS-COV-1 virus (less lethal than its second pandemic version) and created the controversial Chinese P4 laboratory in Wuhan, accuses the Wuhan Laboratory for inadvertently causing the SARS-COV-2 pandemic and warns of dangerous corruption that does not bypass scientific circles (in exchange for money, proliferate untruths). While the controversial pharmacologist prof. Jean-Bernard Fourtillan does not blame for the production of the virus the Chinese laboratory (like Prof. Montaignes), but the Pasteur Institute itself, on whose research relies the French pharmaceutical giant SANOFI. The latter is suspected of being transformed into a company that gives priority to the financial needs of shareholders. The intentions of the capital owners are commented on by the eminent French sociologist Monique Pinçon-Charlotte, director of research at the CNRS (French core institute), according to whom "the intention of rich people is to use the virus to get rid of 3.5 billion poor people as, given the development of new technologies and artificial intelligence, they do not need them anymore". In fine, a group of dignitaries from *Hold-up*, including Nobel laureate Montaignes, and infectologist Didier Raoult - whose team discovered more than 60 new viruses (including giant viruses), found themselves accused of charlatanism by supporters of the government's COVID-19 management team. Monique Pinçon-Charlotte was

publicly discredited, as one of Hold-up actors, by her CNRS colleague, philosopher and research director Philippe Huneman, without controversial debate: "Hold up mixes absolutely accurate facts with false statements and fantasy interpretations"²⁰⁾.

The method of fighting against conspiracy by conspiracy, in the manner of the large COVID-replacement thesis, serves the establishment's advocates to avoid answering legitimate questions about coronavirus crisis management, mainly with the aim of achieving career or material gain. Even when the possibility of asking questions is of primary importance, so that populations would not find themselves in a situation of suspecting ruling elite to hide something from them. In this regard, Marianne's editorial director, Natacha Polony, states: "People are treated as conspirators, especially journalists who do their job, ask questions, who deeply explore the economic system and the choice of guidelines adopted in the name of neoliberalism [...] As long as there is no real democratic debate on important issues, as long as each topic is treated as a struggle between good and evil in which certain issues are prohibited, we prepare to delegitimize the media and all structures that transmit public preoccupations, and allow citizens to believe that the truth is elsewhere."²¹⁾

So, the COVID-reality of the average Western Zone resident is super complex. Conflicting parties relentlessly intimidate him, and expect from him to assess on an individual level: whether he should be more afraid of often-oversized sanitary dangers, presented by the ruling class; whether they should be more afraid of an approximate assessment of the risks of vaccination against COVID-19 - related to cover up corruption practices which, according to the ruling class critics, has completely taken over the medical sector.

3. Premiere: health crisis management by closing a healthy majority

One year after the outbreak of the crisis, the time distance makes it possible to check the quality of health crisis management in the western zone by Edgar Morin's matrix. *The Method*²²⁾ is appropriated in approaching complex problems, as coronavirus crisis in which its numerous, different aspects are woven.

²⁰⁾ Nicolas, Arianne. (2020). Interview de Philippe Huneman : « Hold-up' est un tissu de mensonges, mais il exprime quelque chose de vrai ». *Philosophie Magazine*, November 18, 2020. <https://www.philomag.com/articles/philippe-huneman-hold-est-un-tissu-de-mensonges-mais-il-exprime-quelque-chose-de-vrai>.

²¹⁾ Polony, Natacha. (2020). *Marianne*, November 17, 2020. <https://www.marianne.net/politique/natacha-polony-hold-up-ce-qui-arrive-quand-les-questions-sont-interdites>.

²²⁾ *La méthode* is the life's work of the founder of complex thought, the French sociologist and philosopher Edgar Morin, who explained the new paradigm in 2 volumes containing 6 volumes; 1215 pages in total, created between 1997 and 2004. Edgar Morin is one of the most prominent thinkers of our time, director of research at CNRS, the French core research organization.

3.1. Complex thought

All starts with a paradigm shift. It is about returning upstream, deep into the hiding place of ‘premeditation’ of all our thoughts, with the aim of achieving a radical change: the transition from simplifying to complex thought, in which we need to weave together the views of different scientific disciplines and all analytical levels. They should be distinguished without separation, combined without identification or reduction. It is important to avoid reducing the problem to one of its identified dimensions, to prevent the pronouncement of a ‘final judgment’ and to provide a space for the survival of the unknowns on which the research work rests. Further, we need to bypass the Hegelian dialectic that would lead us to synthesis. Of course, we should connect complementarities, but by no means in a way that erases contradictions. In overcoming controversy, we should use the holographic principle (relief photographs). In a hologram, each point of the image encompasses the whole image. Thus, the whole (the whole image) is in each part, and the parts are in the whole. Part and whole are complementary, though antagonistic because they are included in each other. Therefore, one should observe the interaction - the dialogue between them. Thus, to the question posed: is the whole in the part, or is the part in the whole, or vice versa, we get the answer: the question is incorrect. It should be reformulated. That is a transition from linear causality (which would oblige to a decision between one of the proposals) to recursive one. That way, we come to the complex causality and the principle of recursiveness on which Edgar Morin's complex thought rests. It is a special form of circular causality, where there is not only continuous loop between the effects acting on the causes and the causes acting on the effects, but there is also a perpetuation of that loop, because the effects themselves are the producers of the causes, making the product a producer (Vujačić 2016). An example of the application of the principle of recursion is, for example, Anthony Giddens's ‘structuring theory’, according to which individual actions produce (and reproduce) the social structures that produce them (Genelot 2011). So, it’s a way of thinking that can quickly give way to clutter and seemingly increase complexity. Only seemingly, because - according to second principle of thermodynamics, any system (social structure) tends to disorder (entropy), but acts as a potential source of a new order; as it is the coronavirus crisis disorder. Are we moving towards Jacques Attali's 'socially sensitive democratic world government', or towards a 'soft tyranny that mixes consumerism society and intellectual regression of the masses' - as Natacha Polony sees it? In any case, order and disorder maintain a deep dialogue, as demonstrated in management of the COVID-19 crisis - which can be described as a 'dialogue of order and disorder'. It comes out that the order, imposed by European crisis management, constructs many rigidities (different degrees of lockdown) that lead to a disorder in the mental constitution of Western man (abolition of elementary individual freedoms), but which is self-resorbed precisely thanks to the resources provided by the initial ‘order’.

The disorder has an organizational capacity because it encourages unforeseen encounters, thanks to which new forms are created (new organizations). That way was born the Yellow Vests movement, but was self-resorbed precisely thanks to the resources envisaged by the initial democratic order (a repressive system that protects the democratic order). Because Yellow Vests, on an individual level, produced and reproduced the social structures that produce them. Therefore, it is possible to advance the hypothesis that the ruling class in European countries (especially in France, where the Yellow Vests movement was born), introduces order by long-term restrictive measures of closure of restaurants, coffee-shops, clubs and all cultural events where unforeseen encounters may occur. On the contrary, are tolerated gatherings dedicated to work, study and prayer (public transport, school canteens, company restaurants etc.). In other words, the new 'COVID order' controls the disorder - the effects from past decades economic and social disaster, and generates systemic errors which appear as logical errors - the replacement of theses in the discourses of the ruling class.

3.2. Media as a 5G cognitive tool

During the coronavirus crisis, by transmitting tendentiously interpreted data served to them by the ruling party and their critics, some in the mainstream - others in the independent media (if any existed), they acted as an extension of human perceptual organs. During the pandemic crisis, the media are preparing to take over the function of the 5G cognitive tool. By continuously informing the citizens, they have started endless controversies about the justification of government measures to restrict all human freedoms. In these debates, the consensus of citizens on the seriousness of the disease they face and the necessity of disciplined application of reasonable hygienic protection measures, as well as on the expediency of vaccines in general, crystallized. On the contrary, surveys from the end of 2020 showed that every second Frenchman still doubts the efficacy of the available rapidly designed vaccines against COVID-19, and still fears that some vaccines could modify the genome of future generations. For what reason vaccination will theoretically not be mandatory. But it will realistically be inevitable after the introduction of the "green passport" (the EU predicts until 2022), without which unvaccinated citizens will be unable to move, work, study. After a frenetic media pro-vaccination campaign, the desire to be vaccinated increased from 40 to 55% in one month (+15 points)²³⁾.

Most eminent French philosophers agree with the statement that the epidemic we face today is not much different from other viral ones from recent and distant history. What sets it apart from others is the way it is managed: by imprisoning healthy people. Namely, the attitude of the ruling class according to which

²³⁾ Ipsos, January 26, 2021. <https://www.ipsos.com/fr-fr/les-intentions-de-vaccination-des-francais-ont-augmente-de-15-points-en-un-mois>.

lockdown is necessary cannot be justified by COVID lethality²⁴⁾. Thus, low lethality - relative to that produced by other pandemics in the past in rich countries - does not justify crisis management based of COVID-fear and confinement. On the contrary, we note that, for the first time in history, thanks to crisis management through various forms of lockdown, a healthy majority found themselves closed and mutually isolated, under strict control. The emergence in Europe of three new, more dangerous, variants of COVID-19 that increases lethality, only confirms that there is no coherent, long-term biopolitical strategy that would make it possible to deal with any pandemic. After a year of coronavirus crisis, health systems are just as unprepared to accept large numbers of those infected as before the crisis. In this sense, the philosopher and writer Bernard-Henri Levy asserts that "the coronavirus epidemic is not an unprecedented health threat but that the way in which societies are reacting is both new and dangerous [...] So? What could have happened? Virality, not only of the virus, but of the discourse on the virus? Collective blindness, [...] great confinement theorized by Michel Foucault in the texts where he described the systems of power of the future - like the dress rehearsal of a new type of boarding and assignment of bodies?"²⁵⁾

4. Accelerated entry into The Fourth Industrial Revolution

The Paris Climate Agreement and the European Green New Deal are based on the Western geoeconomics turnaround envisioned by the American Democrats and European Progressives to overcome the 'crisis of Occidentalism' (belief in the superiority of the West). Namely, the latter spent Trump's presidential term in stand-by position; in anticipation of the return of their 'faithful' transatlantic protectors. This trend continued even during economic catastrophe, caused by lockdowns that benefited the Internet giants GAFAM, the value of whose shares doubled between January 2019 and July 2020. In this way, COVID accelerated the development of digital capitalism. Instead of the expected financial crisis, in 2020, the financial system was reset. So, in the context of the coronavirus crisis, under the guise of saving whatever it costs human lives, we have in fact again paid dearly (rising poverty and unemployment) to save the financial system by accelerating the transition from financial to digital capitalism. We live a moment where European coordinated global health crisis management through lockdown enables the controlled demolition of the old economy and its recycling towards a virtual and digital economy that monitors human activities in real time and provides a huge amount of data for big data analysis and artificial intelligence feeding.

²⁴⁾ See: *Imperial College London*, „Report 34-COVID-19 Infection Fatality Estimates from Seroprevalence“, 29 October, 2020. <https://www.imperial.ac.uk/mrc-global-infectious-disease-analysis/covid-19/report-34-IFR/>.

²⁵⁾ Bernard-Henri Levy. In: *Le JDD*, June 6, 2020. <https://www.lejdd.fr/Societe/bhl-en-colere-contre-la-grand-peur-du-covid-19-les-extraits-exclusifs-de-son-nouveau-livre-3973095>.

The EU, through its new European Green Deal strategy, proclaimed by Ursula Von Der Leyen in January 2020, combines 'planet-saving' with hyper technology and the united European digital market (5G, energy, free movement of services and data), (Godard 2020). Thus, COVID-19 found itself in the role of a catalyst that is accelerating the controlled introduction of the world into The Fourth Industrial Revolution²⁶⁾. This transition has been announced within World Economic Forum (WEF), the organizer of the Davos Forum, which 2016 report noted that the 4IR will lead to the loss of more than 5 million jobs over the next 5 years, in economies like those of the United States, Germany, France, China or Brazil. If no action is taken to manage this transition, "governments will face steadily rising unemployment and inequality."²⁷⁾"

Therefore, there is an open discussion about universal income. It would be funded from the products of artificial intelligence, big data, nanotechnology and robots. However, it all depends on the organization of a never-before-seen capital mobilization (5G, innovation, sensors, etc.) that would enable the realization of the 4IR plan (replacing people with machines, augmented man - by biomimetic robotics and artificial intelligence, according to the transhumanist ideal). It should provide investors (pension and other funds, etc.) with sustainable profits, as promised to them by the actors of the Davos Forum and the EU. So, the economist Klaus Schwab, founder and executive chairman of the World Economic Forum, already in 2017, expressed his optimism about unconditional basic income. Schwab called the idea "basically plausible" and predicted that the debate surrounding it would develop over the next decade.²⁸⁾ The management of the coronavirus crisis by 'whatever its costs' ²⁷⁾resulting in an economic and social catastrophe should speed up the process.

CONCLUSION

The period 2020-2025 is a transition period of exiting the globalization cycle 1990-2020 and entering a new one. At the geopolitical level, instability stems from a possible U.S.-China power transition. At the geoeconomics level, neoliberalism is in ruins and the western zone is gripped by 'Occidentalism crises. So that: poverty, social deracination, cultural decimation, long-term resource dilapidation and environmental destruction are increasingly visible. Seeking to correct these deviations that are coming out from the neoliberal doctrine of State and society

²⁶⁾ *The Davos Forum*, through its founder Klaus Schwab, promotes and works on the transition to the 4th Industrial Revolution (4RI) with global economic and political elites: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xV0dNm78cSQ>.

²⁷⁾ WEF. Report « The future of jobs », January 18, 2016. <https://www.weforum.org/reports/the-future-of-jobs>.

²⁸⁾ McFarland, Kate. SWITZERLAND: World Economic Forum founder considers basic income "basically plausible". *BIEN*, January 12, 2017. <https://basicincome.org/news/2017/01/germany-world-economic-forum-founder-assents-basic-income-basically-plausible/>.

subordination to the principles of the market, Western new progressives are engaged in a transition from neoliberal towards post-neoliberal worldview. The latter imagine good governance as one that transcends the exercise of sovereign power to foster the prosperity, health, longevity, productivity, and happiness of the population. The problem is that the progressive worldview, although it brought the Democrats back to power in America, has failed to impose itself as dominant even inside the parent political party. At the same time, the coronavirus crisis accelerated the transition to the Fourth Industrial Revolution and further increased unemployment and poverty in favor of the disproportionate enrichment of the happy few.

After the outbreak of the coronavirus crisis, it became clear that neoliberalism made health a private matter, whereas it was previously a part of a biopolitical strategy. Consequently, the Western ruling class does not have a coherent biopolitical strategy that would allow it to deal quickly and effectively with a complex problem such as a pandemic. However, complexity intelligence is strategic intelligence which is not based only on a predetermined program without the possibility of change over time. The strategy allows, starting from the initial decision, to consider a number of scenarios for action that can be modified according to the information that will arrive during the action, and according to the threats that will appear and disrupt the action. Without it, in order to avoid responsibility for the unenviable situation, the Western ruling class introduced the practice of the large COVID-replacement of the thesis into its crisis management. It is a question of political discourse transmitted by media, that refer to the attitudes and conclusions based on inadequate argumentation that become a part of a generally accepted system of values and opinions in the public sphere. That way, after an unconvincing attempt to implement a 'test - trace - isolate' strategy to protect a healthy majority from an infected minority, for the first time in history, a pandemic crisis is managed by different forms of lockdown for a healthy majority. Individual freedoms, on which liberal globalization relied, have been abolished. At the same time, the ruling elites remain attached to the neoliberal doctrine, and consequently subordinated to the pharmaceutical giants and world market regulators. Hence, even the vaccination campaign fails to calm the pandemic. However, the ruling class crises management by 'whatever it costs' is approved by world economic regulator, International Monetary Fund. But, for the post-crisis period, the IMF always offers the same advice: the consolidation of public accounts by cuts in public spending, what includes cuts in public health - the austerity which has already weakened European systems of public health protection, making that the crisis is managed by confinement of healthy persons to slow the spread of infection and compensate the lack of equipment, caregivers and doctors. It is clear that without strategic intelligence, so without multiple scenarios for their current actions change (resilience capacity), there is no coherent and long-term strategy to combat pandemic and its consequences, which would offer a sustainable way out from current and further crisis.

The Western ruling class fails to effectively manage the complexity of health, economic and social crises due to the neoliberal simple thought. Indeed, the complexity resides in the dialogue between the social structure as a whole and its parts. For sure, part and whole are complementary, but also antagonistic because they are included in each other. In the social structure which is affected by the phenomenon of 'simple thought', as is the case with the Western Zone, part and whole are simply complementary. They are included in each other, but not antagonistic. Thus, a productive antagonistic dialogue that would generate strategic intelligence is just not possible. So, from an ideological standpoint, the Western zone is today in a position very similar to that of the Eastern zone at the exit of the globalization cycle of 1960-1990, whose ruling class tried to maintain the communist simple thought by the replacement thesis method. Thus, in the Eastern governance systems, that method increased systemic risk as insufficient management capacity (incorrect, insufficient or inappropriate) in dealing with internal and external threats.

Certainly, governance systems are constantly fighting disorder which they fed on at the same time. This fight is the source of permanent system reorganization. But the replacement of thesis method can provoke 'abnormal dynamic equilibria' - systemic instability (errors) which should not be perceived only as an episodic anomaly, because acute forms of instability - crisis can cause mutation of the system, its revolution. It is about a phenomenon like implosion, from the inside, of the Soviet Union, entire Eastern zone, and the communist worldview. With the difference that neoliberal simple thought covers not only the Western, but the entire planetary space. For that reason, the consequences on world security, of all its forms, would be incomparably more far-reaching.

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UDC 616.98:578.834]:17.026.2(4-672EU)

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“SOLIDARY UNION” – PRESENT AND PERSPECTIVES

Abstract:

The text analyses the potential implications of the current coronavirus pandemic on the European Union and potentially, its further development, in the light of the harshly criticized “European solidarity” and the EU’s response to the crisis so far. The paper is based on the analysis of scientific and professional literature, review of the relevant articles, as well as reports and documents of official European and global institutions. It is concluded that the pandemic has undoubtedly triggered the foundations of the already fragile and weakened Union, increasingly perceived as a “Europe of nation states”, and that certain political and structural changes will follow, and ultimately, the changes that are critical to the survival of the EU. However, since this is an unknown that is still going on with an uncertain outcome, it will certainly continue to raise questions, debates and projections about the future of the EU and, inevitably, the future of the whole world.

Key words: European Union, coronavirus, crisis, European solidarity, European security.

INTRODUCTION

The crisis, as a commonplace in the discourse on the European Union, seems to have gained its full, real weight with the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19), revealing all the weaknesses of the EU - from unpreparedness, disunity, absence of solidarity, to the inefficiency of the supranational project, while on the other hand, it strengthened the narrative of returning to the nation state. Therefore, debates and analyses about the “world after coronavirus”, in the broadest sense, are based on the dimension of globalism/sovereignty. In a situation, where the virus has locked people in their homes and European countries, gathered around the idea of “unity, solidarity, peace, and democracy”, within their borders, the idea of “world government and supranational state” is seriously undermined. Just as the virus is gradually weakening the human body and destroying the immune system, so the pandemic, more than any previous crisis, has shed light on the inability of the elitist bureaucratic circles to keep the “European organism” united in the face of an “invisible enemy”. What is visible or obvious, however, is that the “defense mechanism” exists and functions only at the level of individual states and that the aid to the most endangered members comes, not from the Union, but from those outside the Union - from China and Russia. This causes inevitable changes at the world political scene, where the already predicted global role of China will gain wider dimensions after the pandemic and thus, show not only economic, but also ideological supremacy in relation to the Western, liberal world. So, geopolitical, security, economic, environmental changes and changes in value systems are what the world will face after the current crisis. At the same time, for some countries, the current

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events will be a corrective experience and opportunity, while for others – it will be failure from which they will emerge even weaker.

Specifically, when it comes to the EU, the permanence, multidimensionality and complexity of the crisis which the EU has long been faced with and which has become a determinant of the future of the Union, have made it particularly vulnerable to the current health problem. Therefore, the impact of the coronavirus pandemic is considered in the context of the synergy of the existing crises - from Brexit, through institutional, migrant and identity crises, to the enlargement crisis and issues of political and security position and the role of the EU in the world. The EU's perspectives in the “post-pandemic” world are considered primarily through the prism of security - at the level of the Union and the future relations of the member states, the relations between the EU and other global actors, from issues of the character of the global order to the issues of the security of the European societies and the security of “Europeans” in opposition to the powerless political and security structures, but powerful modern technologies, growing environmental and health challenges.

1. Crisis as a “development engine” or an indicator of the dysfunction of the European Union?

Perhaps, the European Union would not be in such a dramatic situation, if it had not previously been overwhelmed by many disruptive factors. Brexit made doubts about the survival and purpose of the Union real and justified. Beside Hungary and Poland, which are seen as the first potential initiators of further disintegration, it is not excluded that Italy, due to dissatisfaction and indignation with the “treatment” during the pandemic, will be the next candidate to leave the EU. The members which are the most unstable and unpredictable in this sense are also those which “turn their heads” in front of the still smoldering problem of the influx of migrants in order to protect their security and national interests (Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Austria, the Czech Republic).

The disunity and division of states regarding the migrant crisis, economic development, political influence, the attitude towards further enlargement, the establishment of the EU armed forces, in addition to right-wing movements, civil protests and riots, crowned with Euro skepticism and dissatisfaction, indicated that European solidarity has already been seriously eroded. The increasingly unstable EU will probably play only such a role in the process of reshaping the world order, to be a zone of spreading the influence of global players (as so far, obviously) - panicked preservation of the remnants of the US world power, consolidation of Russia's “great return” and, above all, of the unstoppable rise of China. If the European leaders until recently were skeptical about economic dependence on China, in this crisis they have become aware of how dependent they are on Beijing in the most vital areas for the good functioning of society, such as health.

Moreover, the health crisis provides a real opportunity for Beijing to further strengthen the relations with the EU countries participating in the “17 + 1” platform, within the Belt and Road initiative (Otašević 2020). However, what will complicate the future relations is that the multi-polarity promoted by China, is not the same as the multilateralism advocated by the European Union. As China gives great importance to the traditional concept of sovereignty, it is difficult for both sides to reach a consensus on the strategic vision of the international economy and politics (Men 2011).

However, if the EU is initially reduced to a “multi-speed Europe” or several parallel regimes according to different criteria, it is possible that relations with China and other global actors would be primarily based on a bilateral basis in the future, what could be the impulse for strengthening sovereign tendencies within the EU. Not only the relations between the EU and China, but also China and the United States can be expected to change, in the direction of deterioration, considering the existing economic tensions, technological competition, as well as mutual accusations regarding the outbreak of the coronavirus.

The fact that the EU institutions needed permission from the member states for quick and crucial decisions at the beginning of the pandemic, points to the EU as an unfinished and dysfunctional project, because some of the most important powers remained in the hands of the member states, what caused that in panic and due to the weak reaction from Brussels, they close their borders and thus destabilize the single market. The chaotic, belated, uncoordinated response from the top of the EU is only a part of the wider institutional crisis of the Union, reflected in the dysfunction of the Brussels bureaucracy, over-standardization of the system, democratic deficit and therefore, the current discourse on the need for internal EU reform. Attempts to implement institutional reforms, with the aim of strengthening relations and regaining lost credibility, could hardly overcome the harsh truth faced by the most severely affected members - that in a serious crisis, they can rely exclusively on their own health systems and economic capacities and obviously, on the help outside the Union. Even if some quickly adopted and implemented reforms and measures of “solidarity” would preserve “the vital core” of the EU, it would probably not be the today’s Union, but some kind of its disintegration. On the other hand, the official position of the European Commission is that the corona virus is a serious test for the EU, but also a chance for renewal. Hence the announcement of a new “Marshall Plan”, a complete reorganization of the joint EU budget, the allocation of the European Investment Bank and proposals for a “corona bonds” as an instrument for financial assistance to Italy, Spain, France and Germany (Rigert 2020). However, the EU can come out stronger, primarily if it takes actions truly relevant to the crisis and uses its scope to overcome the limitations of national policies, which means that the pandemic would be an argument for giving Brussels greater power for researching, standardization and coordination health policies (Erlandžer 2020).

The existential crisis of the European Union has lasted for some time, but the pandemic has additionally highlighted the already existing difficulties. The issues of “European interests” and “European identity” are now becoming particularly meaningless. The idea of the “Europeans” remained abstract, because it is distant from the citizens themselves, due to the lack of a sense of authentic unity and belonging to the “community of European nations”. Hence, their understanding of themselves and others remains within the national framework and instead of a federal state; an alliance of states that follow their own national interests rather than imagined European interests is becoming a reality. Whose or which “European interests” will the member states defend after the pandemic crisis? Or, what the core of the most developed and richest countries could offer others to follow as common, European interests? Given that the argument about commitment to “European values” would be hypocritical and empty, it might be the common market and economic interests first, because the EU actually started as an economic project. However, the pandemic showed that the common market and freedom of movement were suspended very quickly and easily, and the long-lasting economic crisis is one of those that seriously divided the EU into the “rich north” and the “poor south”, and while the economic consequences of the pandemic will be the most harmful, it is not difficult to assume that the existing gap will deepen further to the point where remaining in the EU becomes “more expensive” than leaving others remains fact, the transition from economic to political community is the reason why European identity was not built as a political identity (Koljević 2017) and as for now, there are only gloomy perspectives for economic unity, nothing better can be expected for political, and even less an identity unity.

Although in the process of adapting to changes, the European Union has really successfully overcome certain crises, using them as an incentive for development, the impression is that the current crisis has completely exposed the consequences of all previous ones, as a result of the EU’s inability to solve them. From that point of view, the European Union will increasingly immerse in the consequences of the accumulated problems, while the inability to solve them in a coordinated manner and with “one voice” will lead to new security challenges. Due to the dissolution of the formed interest, geopolitical, economic and political lines, the crisis of institutions and the reduced influence in global geopolitical relations, we need to prepare for Europe in which the EU will have an insignificant or negative role or it will not be the EU at all, but again the Europe of nation states (Jovanović 2017). The EU is unlikely to collapse relatively quickly, as was the case with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia or the Roman Empire, but can easily experience the fate of the Holy Roman Empire (962-1806), which was full of various “agreements, ceremonies and institutions”, but was increasingly emptied and without real significance (Garton 2015). This fatalistic scenario, given that it would return the international order to the level of nation-states, would potentially mean greater security threats, because of a larger number of individual actors, each of whom

would fight for its own interests. On the other hand, there are also opinions that this return to state sovereignty, by breaking down the utopia of the “world government”, is the only way to protect states in an increasingly dangerous globalized world - by regaining control over all those processes and areas that are now managed from global centers of power, invisible bureaucratic circles and financial institutions.

2. “A secure Europe in a better world?”

Globalization, the abolition of borders, the marginalization of the state as a political creation, freedom of movement, limitless networking and connectivity, have shown their dark side - from the inability to control the influx of migrants to the unstoppable spread of the virus. Important security issues opened by mass immigration to the EU - terrorist attacks inspired by Islamic fundamentalism, human trafficking, drug trafficking, public safety, xenophobia, intolerance and conflicts will manifest their explosive dimension once the pandemic is put under control. If solidarity was lacking when it comes to human lives, the question is: who will want to invest in “European defense” in the future and defense against what? Whose borders will be protected? The mission and role of NATO, as an instrument of American interests and “protector of Europe from the Russian threat”, in a situation of energy dependence on Russia, obviously also dependence on the aid provided during the pandemic, will be seriously questioned by many dissatisfied EU members. The likely weakening of the Union that will follow and bring Germany and France to the forefront will be a challenge for the United States in terms of preventing the rapprochement of these countries with Russia. It is inevitable that the current situation will be reflected on the geopolitical level, primarily in favor of those countries that will most effectively overcome the crisis, and thus preserve political stability, while the importance and influence of the EU in international relations will weaken, as well as its real ability to act (diplomatic, military, economic) in some future crises. Some kind of transformation of the Union is likely to follow - in the structural, functional sense and the sense of international influence and position, but whether it will be an introduction to disintegration remains to be seen in the coming years, which will also bring new changes and challenges.

The current situation with the corona virus pandemic raises the question whether the fight against climate change in the future will also be led by each country for itself, even though it is a global problem? According to research by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), climate change will increase the likelihood of systemic failures in European countries caused by extreme climate events affecting several sectors - from health issues, environmental sustainability, through the economy, agriculture, forestry, energy production and use, to transportation, tourism, and labor productivity (IPCC 2014). If the global restriction of the movement of people, their activities, stopping traffic and industry have shown only a slight recovery of the environment, it is clear that individual contributions of states in this regard, without global efforts, cannot give significant

results. The motivation for such joint investments, due to the economic problems, economic stagnation and unemployment that will follow the pandemic, is unlikely to be at the top of the agenda of many countries. This indicates how difficult it will be to solve the problem of ecological safety, and neglecting it can only contribute to further disturbances in the environment, the emergence of new diseases and infections, which would be just moving in a circle.

The contradiction of modern technologies, reflected on the one side in the ability to keep people “connected and engaged” during current isolation, and on the other, in a series of security challenges, imposes new dilemmas regarding the future efforts for more advanced technologies and especially medical advances, because the blurred line between legitimate use and misuse leaves possibility for great uncertainty and global consequences. The question is: who will control and manage these technological opportunities and challenges? Some kind of “global government” or, as it is now increasingly predicted, a nation-state, which will regain the lost role? If they were guided by the experience during the pandemic, European countries would probably try to selfishly keep achievements and innovations, which would lead to a scenario of competition in technological achievements, and consequently new conflicts, conquest of power and primacy on the world stage. Modern technology and human activity, probably have the most dangerous and uncertain consequences in the field of genetic engineering, as we can say” a good servant, but a bad master”. Experimenting with genetic engineering usually begins with the goal of curing certain diseases, but the constant expansion of knowledge and frontiers of science and the need for improvement tempts man to lose control and change roles - to become controlled instead of controlling what he creates. In the context of the coronavirus pandemic, there are concerns that if a drug/vaccine is discovered for what is now very unknown, who will control and how the further use or, in the worst case, the manipulation of such discovery? However, the current global health crisis and its consequences can be seen from a brighter side, as a prevention of the future experiments, as a warning of what the misuse of scientific and technological achievements for the purpose of a possible biological war could bring to humanity.

According to the World Economic Forum’s Global Risk Report 2018, the fourth industrial revolution, except that it will bring incredible technological progress, undoubtedly improve and transform people’s lives, it will also expose humanity to new forms of security threats, such as internet fraud and data theft, cyber-attacks, large-scale spontaneous migrations and climate change (WEF 2018). Potentially, the most drastic upheaval is the convergence of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information and communication technologies, embodied in artificial intelligence, or “intelligent machine”, which could replace people in many sectors (Shwab 2016). It is not difficult to assume that such a development would lead to higher unemployment, social tensions, frustrations, deepening social contradictions and ultimately, conflicts. Already now, global networking and informatization have made cyberspace a new

battlefield and hybrid wars, as a complex of all the existing methods and means - from classic (military), through economic, energy, technological, to media and psychological, are presented as a special threat to the EU security.

At the same time, the current situation of panic fear, control of movement and activities of people, daily exposure to contradictory information and “virtual life” of the mass population affect the reduction of critical thinking, so the current crisis is also assessed as social engineering for creating desirable public opinion for some future decisions and processes. Namely, the “survival” of many world leaders on the political scene will depend on the way they react during the crisis, and this, although a tragic circumstance is an opportunity for political manoeuvres and greater influence on the masses due to greater suggestibility and susceptibility in a situation that is increasingly referred as a “war situation”. Justifying by the “war on virus” the use of a number of surveillance tools - such as monitoring movements via smartphones, various mobile applications, ubiquitous sensors and cameras, it is possible that some governments would find their application in the regular state as well.

3. Instead of a conclusion– “European future” of Serbia

The already existing enlargement fatigue and in that context the gloomy European perspective of Serbia gained additional weight after the absence of the European Union assistance to Serbia during the pandemic, and then the “quick correction of the mistake”. Serbia’s European path so far, faced with constant slowdowns and delays but with promising rhetoric, will become even more uncertain. Moreover, bearing in mind what can be expected if a state becomes a part of “a community of solidary and united”, and what the cost of the exit is, the membership in the European Union requires serious reconsideration. Even in the case of the so-called “enlargement without membership”, if Serbia became part of certain cooperation regimes, it would not bring much optimism for its future position. Already uncertain European perspective of the Western Balkan countries is further discredited by the fact that in the midst of the pandemic, the EU is opening accession negotiations with Albania and Northern Macedonia, probably trying to maintain the narrative of enlargement and the illusion of control over the situation. The EU’s management during the pandemic indicates that after the crisis, the arguments that “the European path has no alternative” will weaken, and that the Union will have less capacity to condition Serbia in the accession process, which opens space for serious reconsideration and redefinition of Serbia’s national interests and foreign policy goals. Endless discussions and predictions about the future of the EU enlargement seem to be best illustrated by Patten’s statement that “the question of further EU enlargement raises the most important question of Europe’s identity - what Europe will become, what Europe will be in the world” (2006, 145). If the current predictions are mostly in a pessimistic tone, from a completely different but insignificant Union, through a reduced and disintegrated EU, to a Europe of nation states, the prognosis of enlargement, and thus Serbia’s place in European integration, does not provide a brighter future.

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UDC 616.98:578.834]:341.231.14(497.11)

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SIGNIFICANCE OF JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONDITIONS OF THE COVID-19 VIRUS IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

Abstract:

The spread and proclamation of an epidemic caused by the COVID-19 virus required, in order to protect human health, to take, in addition to health, and other measures, some of which encroached on guaranteed human rights. In that sense, the paper analyzes the principles created by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, whereby the Court clarifies the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, starting that it is a living instrument, whose provisions should, in new situations, during its now seventy years of validity, adapt in a creative and evolutionary way.

Keywords: *Rule of law, quality of law, proportionality, legitimate expectations, discrimination.*

INTRODUCTION

The introduction of a state of emergency in the face of threats from the spread of the epidemic caused by the COVID-19 virus in the Republic of Serbia was to confirm the determination to protect human health and take appropriate health measures to prevent the spread of the epidemic, and to provide guarantees that in the period after the introduction of the state of emergency is justified, the rights defined and guaranteed by the Constitution and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms will be respected. This is more important because the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was created as an expression of the aspirations of European countries to accept *the principle of the rule of law* and provide conditions for all citizens to enjoy the same human rights and fundamental freedoms. The control bodies of the Strasbourg Convention already in the early stages of its implementation emphasized the importance of the principle of the rule of law in terms of preserving a democratic society. These bodies determined the scope of this principle by "identifying its immanent factors necessary for the creation of a legal order based on the rule of law" (Jakšić 2006, 25) and mechanisms for monitoring the exercise and protection of these rights and freedoms. The aim of this paper is to apply a positive legal method, analysis of cases from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, to determine the most important principles that guide the Court and point out the need to respect them in conditions of virus COVID 19 in Serbia when some of the established rights are violated.

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1. Introduction of a state of emergency

Since the state of emergency establishes a special human rights regime, it acquires a supranational character, and standards are set regarding the conditions for its proclamation and for defining the corpus of absolutely protected rights during the state of emergency. Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights stipulates that any state may "in time of war or other public danger threatening the survival of the nation "take measures that derogate from the obligations set out in the Convention, emphasizing that these are "the most urgent measures requiring urgency situations". The European Court, considering the role of the state and its free assessment of the fulfillment of the conditions for declaring a state of emergency, took a position in the case of *Aksoy v. Turkey* (1996), that each state imposing a state of emergency should determine the existence and severity of the state of emergency, as well as the nature and extent of the measures necessary to overcome such a situation. The discretionary decision of the state on these circumstances is subject to the supervision of the European Court. Further, the Court specified that the danger must be *real* and *exceptional*, that its effect should be felt by the whole nation, and that the usual measures or restrictions are not sufficient and adequate (case *The Lawless v. Ireland*, 1961).

The imperfection and absence of the standard of "free assessment of states" was pointed out by Judge Martens in the case of *Brannigan and McBride v. UK* (1993), noting that the situation in the Council of Europe changed after enlargement to Eastern and Central European countries, so that standards that were acceptable in conditions when members were "democratic societies aware of the importance of individual rights to freedom" were no longer adequate.

The European Convention has set a *minimum standard* of protection below which no signatory state to the Convention can go. Moreover, the High Contracting Parties are free and encouraged to offer individuals higher standards of protection. In that part, each state has the opportunity to show its uniqueness - what can distinguish them is precisely the protection that is above the basic universal standard. In resolving human rights disputes, the Court generally opts for the highest level of human rights protection that exists among Member States, "inspired by the constitutional traditions common to Member States, in the sense that measures incompatible with fundamental rights are recognized as such. the constitutions of these states are not acceptable in the Community either; and that, similarly, international human rights agreements to which Member States have cooperated or are signatories can provide guidance that should be followed within the framework of community law" (Jakšić 2006, 25).

2. The creative role of the Court

In interpreting the provisions of the Convention, the European Court of Human Rights starts from the fact that the Convention is a living instrument (doctrine) and that it lives in the light of current cases, which gives the Court the opportunity to approach it in a creative and evolutionary way. Rights and freedoms may also apply in certain situations not provided for in the original text of the Convention, and that the Court has the power to define the actual meaning of words and expressions introduced into the text of the Convention at the time of its creation, and new standards and values. Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights requires a fluid, flexible and modern approach in order to preserve its effectiveness and avoid its transformation into an instrument of stagnation (Dzehtsiarou 2011, 1742).

Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights have *interpartes* effect. However, having in mind its nature, the judgments of the Court, not infrequently, go beyond the dispute and the parties in question, and thus produce the effect of *erga omnes* and become sources of law (Gerards 2009, 407). That is how the Court reasoned in the judgment in the case of *Christine Goodwin v. UK* (2002), noting that “although the Court is not formally obliged to follow its previous judgments, it is in the interests of legal certainty, predictability and equality before the law that it should not deviate, without good reason, from precedents set in previous cases. ”. In addition, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, by Recommendation No. 1535 of 2001, suggested that national courts directly apply the judgments of the European Court, as well as that this right be incorporated into national legislation. The Convention also stipulates that *no institution is above the law, nor is there immunity from legal liability for those who violate the law protecting human rights.*

3. The most important principles

In its judgments, the European Court of Human Rights emphasizes several key principles, which could have been the direction and framework for dealing with the state of emergency in Serbia. We will analyze the dominant principles and reasoning of the Court, starting from the importance of their respect.

In reasoning and deciding whether a decision on human rights violations is in accordance with the law, the Court uses the term “*quality of law*”, which implies its *clarity, accessibility and predictability*. This would mean that the law should be made public and accessible in a way that citizens have a clear knowledge of the content and validity of the law in a particular case. In addition, a norm cannot be considered a law if it is not formulated precisely enough to enable a citizen to harmonize his behavior.¹⁾ The law should be clear to the most ordinary citizen about the circumstances and conditions under which the authorities can restrict his rights.

¹⁾ Case of Hewit and Harman v. The United Kingdom (application no. 121175).

The principle of *legitimate expectations* is also related to the previous one, which implies that community measures, except in exceptional cases, cannot be to the detriment of the legitimate expectations of those interested. A legitimate expectation is an expectation that a reasonable person would cultivate in terms of exercising his rights. In order for there to be a violation of this principle, it is necessary that the person had legitimate expectations, that he acted by relying on them and that he suffered damage as a result of the measure. In order for such expectations to be met, authorities need to make *consistent decisions*. The Court particularly emphasized the need to respect this principle in decision-making and the application of measures by the executive branch.

Measures of the executive power during the epidemic of COVID-19 in the Republic of Serbia were determined and proclaimed, mainly by bylaws, decrees and decisions of the Government, with frequent changes, introduction of new and change of existing measures by new bylaws, which conditioned their number, diversity and frequent variability and indicated inconsistency. Citizens, often, despite their desire and will, could not know frequent changes of decisions and adjust their behavior to such decisions.

The application of the principle of *proportionality* in taking measures that violate human rights implies that the government cannot impose obligations on citizens to a greater extent than is necessary in order to achieve the goal of the imposed measure (obligations) in the public interest. If it is obvious that the imposed measure is disproportionate to the goal to be achieved, it should be annulled. This principle is expressed as a *reasonable relationship between the goal and the means* and implies two things: that it can be reasonably expected that the means will lead to the goal and that the damage of those who are injured by the measure must not be disproportionate to the benefits society receives (Tzu, 1995, 67). The principle of proportionality should have been specifically re-examined in all cases of restriction of movement (especially people over the age of 65), and the introduction of quarantine measures lasting several days.

The Court's interpretation of whether the restriction of rights is necessary in a democratic society is also related to the previous principle. In the *Silver* judgment (Series A, no.61, 25.3.1983.), the Court explained that proportionality in the restriction of rights means the following:

- a) necessary in a democratic society does not mean at the same time necessary, nor desirable, reasonable or permissible;
- b) States parties to the Convention enjoy a degree of discretion as to what is considered "necessary in a democratic society", but the Court has the final say and appreciates the harmony of what has been done with the provisions of the Convention. In the case of *Olsson* (Series A, no. 130), the Court reasonably reasoned: "A law conferring a discretion is not in itself contrary to the condition of predictability, provided that the scope of the discretion and the

manner in which it is exercised are sufficiently clear, the aim of the measure in question is to provide the individual with sufficient protection against arbitrary violation of his rights;"

- c) the term "necessary in a democratic society" also means the compatibility of the measure with the provisions of the Convention;

The Court's reasoning as to when a measure is considered *discriminatory* is particularly important because of the restrictions on the movement of persons over 65 years of age. The European Court of Human Rights has established its own notion of discrimination for the purpose of applying the Convention. In order for discrimination to exist in the light of the application of Article 14, it is necessary alternatively:

- a) that the same or similar factual situations are treated differently,
- b) that different factual situations are treated the same.

According to the Court's settled case-law, a difference in treatment is discriminatory if there is no legitimate aim and if there is no reasonable proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved by applying measures of difference in treatment. Here, when conceiving this measure, it was necessary to respect the principle of proportionality and determine the prevailing degree of better, faster, better achievement of the goal, which influenced the decision on such a measure and whether the same goal would be achieved if this, the older part of the population, given the opportunity to leave the house. In such a situation, could the state, by strictly and consistently applying the penal policy, primarily misdemeanor responsibility, achieve the same goal, without restricting the right to freedom of movement of persons, at least not in the scope and duration in which it was done?!

Finally, we will make a distinction regarding the following terms - deprivation of liberty, detention and restriction of freedom of movement, as these terms are often used imprecisely. According to the case law of the Court, *deprivation of liberty* means a measure of public authority by which an individual is kept in a limited space for a certain period of time, *against or without his or her free will*. When delimiting arrests, deprivations and restrictions on liberty, the basic criteria are the manner of territorial restriction of movement, the length of that restriction, as well as the special legal status of the person in question. *Deprivation of liberty* means staying in a prison within which freedom of movement is allowed. Detention of a person in a prison, detention facility or similar establishment where a person is physically restricted in movement by order of the police or other public authorities shall also be considered as deprivation of liberty under Article 5 of the Convention. Any forced detention in a space that is limited and does not constitute a closed institution does not constitute deprivation, but a restriction of the right to liberty. The distinction between *deprivation* and *restriction of the right to freedom of movement* was made by the Court in the *Guzzardi* case (Series A, no 39 of

6.11.1980). The applicant was placed under supervision by a court decision for 30 months, with the obligation to live on an island with an area of 2.5 km². The court, considering whether in this particular case it was a deprivation of liberty or restriction of freedom of movement, concluded that it was a deprivation of liberty, because the person was under constant surveillance, he was forbidden to leave after 22.00, he could not use the phone, nor did he maintain social or family contacts. The actual duration of the measure of 16 months (although the measure was imposed for a period of 30 months) also indicates that it is a measure of deprivation of liberty.

During the epidemic caused by the COVID-19 virus, citizens over the age of 65, in urban areas, and over the age of 70, in rural areas, were banned from moving, with the aim, as explained, of their personal protection and the protection of other citizens, noting that anyone found on the streets will be prosecuted. Based on the above-mentioned criteria of the European Court of Human Rights for distinguishing between the notion of deprivation of liberty and the notion of restriction of freedom of movement, in Serbia it was a matter of restricting freedom of movement, i.e., determining forced residence of persons, or, when urgent medical assistance is required or in the case of certain groups of agricultural producers. During the duration of this measure (close to 50 days), citizens stayed in their houses / apartments, where they could maintain direct social contacts exclusively with their residents. If the legal status of the persons to whom this measure is imposed is taken as a criterion, and starting from the observation made by the Court in the *Guzzardi* case, where interpreting Article 5.1, it states that the measure of imprisonment is carried out against mafia members, mentally disturbed persons, drug users and alcoholics, as the Court calls them, socially maladapted persons, when their deprivation of liberty, in addition to being considered dangerous, may be in their interest, and that the measure of deprivation of liberty may be taken to compel the person to fulfill a certain obligation, which he did not fulfill, as well as when justified in order to prevent the commission of a criminal offense, we come to the confirmation that in our country it was a *restriction of freedom of movement* of persons whose only "legal status" was 65 or 70 years of age.

The European Court of Human Rights has found that the *right to access information* is protected by the Convention, especially if the requested information is necessary to fulfill another right guaranteed by the Convention - for example the right to life, the right to a fair trial, the right to respect for private and family life, freedom to expressions (Tiilikka 2015,79). This right is enjoyed by citizens, as well as journalists, when performing their journalistic work, in relation to the information they need for reporting.²⁾ The Court's interpretations are very important and are especially relevant in the context of the COVID-19 virus epidemic in the Republic of Serbia, when, not infrequently, they need to clarify the admissibility or prohibition of access to

²⁾ The UN Human Rights Committee also addressed this issue, emphasizing that this right implies the right of the media to access information on public affairs and the right of the public to receive media information.

information, especially when it is important for public health, that only the Government can be a source of information, such as information on the number of respirators, the method of procurement and the amount of medical and protective equipment available to medical institutions, etc.) or other issues of general interest.

Thus, in the case of *Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary*,³⁾ the Court emphasized that “the law cannot allow arbitrary restrictions which may become a form of indirect censorship if the authorities create obstacles to the collection of information. This activity represents a key preparatory step in journalism and an integral protected part of press freedom”.

It is also interesting for the Court to interpret whether access to information, which has been declared *secret*, is allowed, and whether access to it can nevertheless be granted, provided that the obligation of confidentiality is kept. In the case of *Kennedy v. Hungary*⁴⁾, the Court found, appreciating the principle of proportionality, that the denial of the right to free access to information by stating that it was a state secret could not be justified as "necessary in a democratic society" and violated this right. In the dispute of the *Youth Initiative for Human Rights against Serbia*, the Court, emphasizing the right of journalists and citizens to free access to information held/run by state authorities, emphasized three important implications: the difference between "journalism" and other members of society and public authorities should be open and transparent to all citizens, and that the rules for access to personal data should not be more restrictive than the rules for access to information for general use.⁵⁾

In assessing whether there has been a violation of this right, the European Court has always emphasized the legitimacy of the aim pursued by the request for access to information, and has particularly emphasized the need to respect this right in matters of public interest or improving public administration.

Finally, the European Court, when deciding on the responsibility of the state in a specific case of human rights violation, analyzes whether the state has fulfilled its positive and negative obligations, i.e., whether it has prevented all violations by the government, and if so, whether it has taken all measures falling under the notion of effective investigation and cooperation with the European Court of Justice during the application procedure. Also, the Court assesses whether the state has complied with its negative obligations in terms of preventing and refraining from violating established rights.

³⁾ Petition no. 37374/05, judgment of 14 April 2009.

⁴⁾ Petition no. 31475/05, judgment of 26 May 2009.

⁵⁾ Petition no. 48135/06, judgment of 25 June 2013.

4. Reasoning of the Court in case of restriction of freedom of movement in order to prevent the spread of infectious diseases

The reasoning of the Court in the case of *Enhorn v. Sweden*⁶⁾, where it was a matter of forcible isolation of a person infected with the HIV virus, is illustrative. The applicant is Swedish citizen EieEnhorn, born in 1947, infected with HIV, which he transmitted to a 19-year-old. The municipal health worker submitted, to the best of his knowledge, a request to the Municipal Administrative Court to issue an order to keep the applicant in involuntary isolation, in accordance with section 38 of the Swedish Communicable Diseases Act. In the judgment the Municipal Administrative Court ordered the applicant to be kept in compulsory solitary confinement for up to three months, after which the measure was imposed on him several times because the applicant had escaped from isolation.

The applicant alleged that the detention orders constituted a violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. Convinced that the restriction on freedom of movement had its basis in Swedish law, the Court further examined whether it constituted a “lawful deprivation of liberty to prevent the spread of communicable diseases” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the European Convention. The court found that the basic criterion in assessing the “legality” of deprivation of liberty for the purpose of “preventing the spread of communicable diseases” is whether the spread of a contagious disease is dangerous to health and safety, and whether deprivation of liberty of an infected person is a last resort. preventing the spread of the disease, thus emphasizing the need to apply the principle of proportionality. The court further reasoned that it was indisputable that the first criterion was met, and that HIV was dangerous to public health. However, with regard to the second criterion, the Court found that the Government had not considered, or even implemented, less severe measures against the applicant, in order to achieve the objective of protecting public health and preventing the spread of the HIV virus. In these circumstances, the Court concluded that the applicant's forced isolation was not the last resort and that the authorities had not struck a fair balance between the need to prevent the spread of HIV and the applicant's right to liberty. The European Court of Human Rights awarded the applicant EUR 12,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage and EUR 2,083 in respect of costs and expenses. This is the first case in which the Court has considered an exception to "prevent the spread of communicable diseases" and the criteria established by the Court provide a framework for all future similar cases, namely: whether the spread of the disease is dangerous to public health and safety and whether restricting the movement of persons is the last resort for the purpose of preventing disease, since milder measures have been considered and declared insufficient to protect the public interest. When these criteria are not met, the reasons for restricting freedom of movement cease to exist.

⁶⁾ Petition no.56529/00, judgment of 25 January 2005.

CONCLUSION

The need to know the case law of the European Court of Human Rights, the standards and principles established by the Court when interpreting the Convention, as well as the manner of reasoning in specific cases, is particularly important in a state of emergency. In order to avoid classification according to the degree of internal democracy (see Judge Martens' opinion above), to conduct proceedings before national courts and later before the European Court, to measure the effectiveness of measures and apply proportionality as the dominant principle, better regulate the legal framework and apply the principle of legality in the way it is defined by the Court, spared citizens, courts and the state itself to be actors in some future proceedings, spared our budget possible eventual awarded compensations, it was necessary for the legal profession to actively participate in resolving the crisis situation.

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UDC 616.98:578.834]:008

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CULTURE AS A DRIVER OF DEVELOPMENT AFTER COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Abstract:

Culture can offer are new approaches in solving even the most difficult problems facing society, for which current approaches are not adequate. Engaging in creativity offers transformational opportunities, and through such activities, new development policies can be determined and solutions planned. This is exactly what the corona crisis showed us, because regardless of the fact that the cultural sector is one of the hardest hit sectors, the employees of that sector showed great adaptability, continued with activities, strengthened optimism, gave strength to others. In the recovery period, cultural workers and creatives will play an important role, because through cultural activities it is possible to access information, strengthen awareness, tolerance, and build capacity for the societies of the future.

Key words: culture, corona crisis, globalization, democracy, public policy.

INTRODUCTION

“There can be no future without culture... it is through the culture that we will forge our collective resilience and it is the culture that will bring us closer together.”

Ernesto Ottone Ramírez
Assistant Director-General
for Culture of UNESCO

The idea that culture and art can influence and change the individual and society has long been accepted. Culture and the arts have a stimulating effect in different areas of society, and its great potential is in achieving the goals of economic and social policy. Through culture, the effects of technological change, the process of globalization, and other changes in modern society can be observed. It is culture that can promote social cohesion, and through cultural participation social capital is formed. Creativity plays a key role in cultural activities aimed at social transformation. Creativity based on culture plays a key role in creating social innovation, because a creative solution in this context can easily involve a new approach. Cultural activities can lead to a change in self-perception and the development of new skills that help people break with previous ways of thinking or understanding the world. What culture can offer are new approaches to solving even the most difficult problems facing society, for which current approaches are inadequate. Engaging in creativity offers transformational opportunities, and through such activities new development policies can be determined and solutions planned. Culture and the arts are key resources for tackling societal challenges, which can: improve social mobility, promote new skills for new jobs, promote healthier lives, fight poverty and social exclusion, and create

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equal opportunities for all. The use of art is a relatively new approach in solving existing and enduring social challenges, and it is art that has the power to initiate behavioral change at the individual and group level, by creating new social relationships and social capital.

When the pandemic with the COVID-19 virus ends, the consequences it has caused will be present for a long time to come. The crisis has already hit the global level in all areas, especially the economic one, and it will not be easy to overcome. Especially because we have entered a new era, in which the application of high technology is advancing irresistibly forward, which the pandemic has made us strongly awake. The sudden application of sophisticated technology, unfortunately, does not follow the development of consciousness, so there is a great danger of misuse. In this process, culture could take an important position, as a driving force, because it carries inspiration and awakens hope for a better life for people. Artists, creatives, and cultural professionals, as well as cultural organizations, have a fundamental role to play in promoting well-being and resilience among individuals and communities, guaranteeing access to information, fostering awareness, tolerance, and building capacity to create the society of the future. Cultural communities have responded to the crisis, many actions have been taken, new forms of expression have been created, and thanks to technology, different ways of connecting people have been used. Progress has been made in the presentation of art, encouraging creation and creativity, a huge energy has been launched to preserve mental health and strengthen optimism. The impressive power of culture has to build healthy, resilient communities and improve well-being for all has been recognized. Culture plays a key role in democratic societies, and a strengthened cultural sector can act as a catalyst for democratic change and provide a driving force for the transformation of a society in which creative and socially engaged voices can express themselves freely. Investments in the field of culture, in addition to intangible, social profit, have an economic dimension, because the economic base is expanding, which gives impetus to further development. The amounts of subsidies for cultural institutions have increased thanks to a culture that contributes to increasing employment and creating the gross value of the national product. This development is reflected in the improvement of the market and marketing situation of existing commercial entities, the improvement of living standards (expansion of cultural infrastructure and increased access to culture) as well as the increase in the number of jobs related to the investment process. Now in times of crisis, the cultural sector is severely affected, but due to its adaptability, it can be launched quickly. The potential it has is enormous, it shows the strength of the human community and that is why it can be the one that could start building a new society based on humanism.

1. Culture during the Corona

By declaring quarantine due to the COVID-19 virus pandemic, thousands of museums, festivals, libraries, and other cultural institutions, from global to local events, have temporarily closed their spaces to visitors. In a sector where activities are carried out in direct contact, where it is precisely this interaction between the performer and the audience that is important, the loss of the audience means disaster. But performers, galleries, museums, and other institutions have shifted their activity to the digital arena, using streaming services and virtual reality, transmitting live events through existing and emerging applications designed for this purpose. The world has got a chance to access and at the same time an extraordinary opportunity to virtually visit the most precious works of art and works, many of which are difficult to access, either physically or financially. Although the world has never felt more physically isolated, digital media has offered a bridge to a range of exciting experiences. The pandemic further stimulated and accelerated the process of transition to the sphere of virtual reality, augmented reality and mixed reality (Feinstein 2020), and the issue of the technology itself was rapidly addressed in order to respond to broad user needs. The shift to digital was inevitable, with or without COVID-19, but it surprised with the astonishing speed of adaptation, and it can be said that this is just the beginning of a new era of experiencing art through digital spaces. In real life "it's pretty hard to attract audiences of such magnitude and diversity, and now much of the work is driven by democratization opportunities and it's possible to transcend traditional structures and reach different audiences" says American artist and designer Brian Donnelly (Douglas 2019). Prior to COVID-19, digital space was almost always treated as the next step to expand audiences beyond the reach of physical spaces. Cultural events are designed primarily for a narrow audience or on-site experience and are later transmitted over the Internet via video or a series of recordings on the web for documentation purposes. At a time when physical spaces are no longer a priority, the cultural sector has sought to fully adapt events and experiences to a digital audience. According to JiaJia Fei, a digital media expert and advisor to the Guggenheim Museum, this was both a "moment for digital innovators to push the limit of our creative and technical vision and a chance to openly experiment" (Feinstein 2020). In times of crisis, culture is more important than ever. Millions of citizens were locked in their homes, had access to music, movies, books, plays that were a source of comfort and hope for them, and were an important factor in psychological well-being and played a key role in strengthening community and inclusion.

Employees in the cultural sector create all those things - books, games, TV shows, music, movies, etc., that make life in and out of quarantine bearable and enjoyable; but it also provides a sense of belonging, human connection, social cohesion. Trying to get closer to their visitors in this unprecedented situation, museums, galleries, and many other performers around the world, we're united in

overcoming the challenges posed by isolation. They offered visits, performances, and other types of artistic experiences via the internet. While nothing can replace an intense live concert experience or a unique encounter with art in museums and galleries, thanks to increasingly accessible digital platforms, art is just a click away. There is plenty of evidence showing that art and culture contribute to well-being, serenity, inspiration, intellectual stimulation, and resilience. There is a long list of activities and places to visit without leaving the comfort of your own home.

The Google *Arts&Culture Initiative* (Google 2011) was first launched in 2011, with modest ambitions. Today, thousands of users are exploring the art treasures of the world's art galleries and museums, leading to the flourishing of virtual reality projects. The *Metropolitan Museum of Art's* award-winning video series, *Project Met 360*, invites viewers, among other attractions, to explore the Temple of Dendur, using 360° spherical technology created by celebrated producer Nina Diamond. Recently, the digital team reported a 4,106% growth in streaming viewership, with YouTube video views up 150%, and both socials and the website experiencing significant increases in engagement. The *New York Public Library* and the *92nd Street Y* previously enjoyed modest success with their digital efforts but, since Covid-19, have gained new audiences with dynamic initiatives, shifting discussions with celebrated culture figures YouTube and introducing free online tutoring for students. In Vienna, an ambitious campaign has put almost all of the city's cultural treasures online, from the Belvedere to State Opera, which currently offers selections from its archive of video performances as well as a VR/360-degree experience, recently gaining 130,000 new registrations on the opera's streaming platform and apps.

The public testified that art happened on its own initiative. Shorter or longer music videos that arrived from all over the world showed all the imagination and ingenuity of their authors, who also conveyed health guidelines or sent messages of hope. Songs were chanted from the windows of skyscrapers, neighbors sang together on balconies and terraces, danced on empty streets, and this is proof that people have a need to express themselves creatively, whether it is their profession or not. UNESCO Secretary-General Audrey Azoulay pointed out that this period of confinement could also be "a period of openness to others and culture to strengthen the links between artistic creation and society" (Azoulay 2020). These challenges require far-reaching cultural policies and will require "listening to the voices of the art world in their globality and diversity," she stressed, urging everyone to participate in "this strong cultural impetus" (Azoulay 2020) to prove that art, even in the age of personal distancing, brings us closer than ever before. According to her, in order for art to survive, a dual approach is needed to support professionals in culture and institutions and to promote an approach to art for all.

2. Economic Impact to the Culture


The effects of the global crisis caused by the coronavirus came immediately, pushing the global economy into recession. The global economy suffers \$ 1 trillion in damage during 2020 (UNCTAD 2020). Billions of people around the world have turned to culture as a source of comfort and connection, but the impact of the COVID-19 crisis has not spared the sector. Although very active and sought after, the cultural sector is one of those that suffer the most damage. Namely, due to the closedness and inability to receive visitors, cultural institutions and facilities are losing millions of incomes every day, and many have had to lay off their staff. Artists around the world, most of whom have already worked part-time, on an informal basis or under precarious contracts before the pandemic, are struggling to survive. The pandemic has uncovered and greatly increased the existing instability of the creative industries, and weakened the professional, social, and economic status of artists. Closing measures around the world have had a direct impact on the sector's ability to create and distribute new artistic expressions outside the digital spectrum while reducing the diversity of cultural expressions.

According to research by the nonprofit organization *Americans for the Art*, the impact of Covid-19 on the arts and creative industries in the United States is measured by a loss of \$ 4.5 billion. The organization with offices in Washington D.C. and New York City began surveying members in late March on economic losses, and by early April, more than 11,000 organizations reported the loss, including museums, performing arts centers, dance societies, theaters, literary associations, historic sites, libraries, and art schools. Due to the coronavirus epidemic, 94% of them canceled events. In the United States economy, arts and culture generate \$ 878 billion, accounting for 4.5 percent of state GDP and supporting 5 million jobs, according to the *Americans for the Art*, which cites data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (Fang 2020).

In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, governments took steps to restrict the movement of people and access to certain areas. More than 80% of the UNESCO World Heritage Site is closed, so the survival of local communities and cultural workers is questionable. Natural and cultural World Heritage sites in 167 countries where they are located have been closed. The list includes a total of 1121 sites of natural, cultural, and mixed world heritage (UNESCO 2020). The map shows 167 countries with World Heritage sites - 80 countries (48%) completely closed the sites, while 46 (28%) countries kept the sites open. For 41 countries (24%) partial closure is indicated, which includes countries that are slowly reopening World Heritage sites after the crisis (UNESCO 2020). But many of the world's natural and cultural sights were possible to visit with a virtual walk, of course, free of charge.

Figure 1. States that have closed to visit natural and cultural sites

Public access / Accès au public (08/06/2020)



UNESCO has launched the ResiliArt project (UNESCO 2020), which should provide insight into the current state of creative industries in the midst of the crisis, initiate global discussions with key cultural professionals through social networks, and aims to raise awareness of the far-reaching consequences of the crisis, and also should provide support to artists during and after the crisis. An introductory discussion was held on April 15, 2020, on World Art Day, in partnership with CISAC (International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers) (CISAC 2020). This first ResiliArt discussion covered urgent issues affecting the lives of cultural workers, including the social and economic rights of artists, copyright protection, digitization of content, and freedom of expression. UNESCO Secretary-General Audrey Azoulay stressed the need for these issues to get the place they deserve in the political and social debates that will shape the post-crisis world. Opening the meeting, she stressed the fragility but also the resilience of the creative sector, quoting CISAC President Jean-Michel Jarre: “Achievements of several decades of cultural policies are now endangered because of the fragility of the cultural sector. Employing around 30 million people worldwide and make 3% of the global GDP, the economic importance of the cultural sector is undeniable and there will be no sustainable economic recovery without it.” (CISAC 2020). Panelists noted that mitigation policies and measures are slow to develop, and stressed that support for artists and the arts is necessary. They stated that the blow dealt with the creative sector by the crisis was catastrophic, but stressed the innate resilience of the sector, as well as the adaptability of companies and individuals. When the pandemic tranquilized, governments should protect the rights of all stakeholders in the sector, both large and small, and provide them with compensation. An important step towards recovery is the recognition of professional status, so that they can, like others, participate in various forms of assistance. The COVID-19 crisis has shown the vital importance of the digital

environment. She also pointed out the need to educate creatives about their rights and compensation for works performed online. Creators must be equipped with modern technological tools that will facilitate their presence in the digital world and enable them to work smoothly. Panelists concluded that the priority must be a quality dialogue between cultural institutions and governments. This will create an environment that promotes a better understanding of the problems facing the sector and will help governments devise targeted solutions. Directives and contracts such as the EU Digital Single Market Copyright Directive and the Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances adopted to protect the rights of creators, especially on digital platforms, must be implemented at a national level. Creative communities and policymakers are invited to launch their own ResiliArt movements in their countries and organize discussions with cultural professionals, so 69 debates have been held so far, 39 more are planned, and 48 countries have launched their own Resili Art project (UNESCO 2020).

3. How to continue?

Culture Action Europe (CAE), the main European network of cultural networks, organizations, artists, activists, academics, and policymakers, which is the starting point for informed opinion and debate on art and cultural policy in the EU, in a joint statement with the European Cultural Foundation (ECF), encourage the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the Member States to recognize the cultural and creative sectors as an integral part of the economic and social recovery for Europe under the next Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF 2021-2027) and to support the cultural and creative sector with at least 7% of the Recovery Fund during the first programming years. Furthermore, both organizations are committed to integrating culture into the IMF, and to ensure that the next Creative Europe program is strengthened by a double financial envelope. As the Creative Europe program does not cover all the needs of the sector, they advocate that an additional 1% of funds be allocated from the IMF for culture (CAE 2020). The European Commission is coordinating a joint response at the European Union level to the coronavirus epidemic and has taken a number of measures to combat the effects of the pandemic on the cultural and creative sectors. A number of horizontal measures have been adopted, linked to Creative Europe, the European Commission's program to support culture and the audiovisual sectors. These measures include 1) a temporary framework for state aid measures to support the economy in the current crisis, and also apply to culture as a sector particularly affected; 2) two packages of measures to provide direct liquidity to the Member States, consisting of unused cohesion policy funds. Cultural institutions should turn to their competent managing authorities at the national or regional level for assistance from these funds; 3) a support package to help protect jobs and workers up to € 100 billion in financial assistance to the Member States to help workers keep their income (self-employed costs); 4) eight billion euros for current financial relief to small and medium-sized enterprises across the EU (European Commission 2020).

An online debate convened by UNESCO on April 22 on ways to strengthen the cultural sector, which brought together more than 140 culture ministers, supported a global strategy to help culture and the creative sector survive and recover from the effects of the crisis. Although one of the first sectors affected by this crisis, culture is often the last to receive budget support. Many participants pointed out that culture is a collective experience of all mankind and that direct human contact is irreplaceable. Ministers of Culture highlighted the different strategies implemented by governments around the world, encouraging the exchange of experiences and best practices. Recommendations included developing guidelines on what policies are required at such times. Measures have also been called to ensure stronger protection of intellectual property in the transfer of culture to the digital world. Measures should be taken by governments in response to the crisis are presented. They include 1) protection of the health and safety of the cultural and creative sector; 2) guarantee for the well-being of artists through government funding through the creation of special funds; interest-free loans, tax breaks, various cost reduction measures; providing online tools to assist artists in creating, producing and sharing their works online; creating cultural archives (audio recordings, visual arts, recordings, etc.) to help acquire first-hand knowledge of the needs of each cultural sector and provide targeted aid; 3) ensuring the recovery of the cultural sector through a series of activities. Ministers of Culture reiterated the vital role that culture played in providing a safe haven for people in this period and its important role as a driver of economic recovery after the end of the pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic is a global challenge that requires a globally coordinated and supportive response. It showed how dependent societies are and how initiatives must cross borders driven by solidarity and mutual support. Despite the catastrophic impact of COVID-19 on the economic stability of the cultural and creative sector, an opportunity has been created for the sector to adapt its practices in new ways, responding to the increased interest in online cultural works. The sector must embrace the digital world and policies should be tailored to the dissemination and protection of intellectual property rights. The cultural sector has created a more united society and in its creative way has given an answer to this situation (CISAC 2020, 23).

In late March, the U.S. Congress passed a \$ 2 trillion package of incentives, of which \$ 300 million went to arts and cultural organizations. Additional opportunities have been designed to provide economic assistance to independent actors, musicians, artists, and others working in the creative industry (Fang 2020).

During this period of crisis, representatives of numerous associations and institutions in culture, as well as prominent artists and cultural workers, spoke and presented their thoughts and experiences, as well as suggestions on how to mitigate the consequences. Hartwig Fischer, director of the British Museum, told *The Guardian* that the institution would definitely need government help to get through the crisis. He added that visitors to the British Museum often come to

learn about the history of mankind, and how people have faced challenges in the past, and “this is something that has now become even stronger” (Bacare 2020). Serpentine Galleries artistic director Hans-Ulrich Obrist has proposed an interesting project that should be similar to what was carried out by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Public Works of Art (PWAP) project was an artist recruitment program, as part of the New Deal during the Great Depression. It was the first such program to run from December 1933 to June 1934, under the office of the United States Department of the Treasury, and was paid for by the Department of Civil Affairs. Under the program, “artists went out into the community: they received salaries and were able to research and create works during the New Deal period. More than 3,700 artists were employed, they created more than 15,000 works, and this program helped launch the careers of Jackson Pollock and Mark Rothko”, said Obrist.

CONCLUSION: Why culture is important?

In times of crisis, we need art more than ever before. In self-isolation, people have shown that culture and creativity are connected and give strength. Art allows people to express themselves and maintain social connections despite the limitations of physical movement. Art makes people resilient. Many artists and cultural professionals have devised innovative and creative solutions, often using digital tools to continue their activities and connect with the public, and new initiatives are emerging every day that allow artists and cultural institutions to connect with audiences in new ways. The voice and influence of innovators and artists are invaluable, as is the role of the cultural and creative industries in informing and raising awareness. Artists can share and amplify key information among fans and followers as they use their talent and various forms of cultural expression to reach a huge audience and interact. This is especially important now, as the coronavirus crisis could affect political systems. Approaches to tackling a pandemic vary from state to state, from very liberal measures to those that put citizens in complete isolation and completely restrict movement. Some presidents and governments, in order to implement measures to combat the coronavirus pandemic, have made decisions that result in restrictions on the rights of citizens. This may have been justified at some point, due to the urgency of the new situation, but there is a possibility that some of them will not want to give up the powers they have thus acquired. The most glaring example is Hungary where Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has been given the right to rule by decree for as long as he deems appropriate (Szekeres 2020). Prime Minister Orbán has been steadily accumulating increasing powers for some time, and a parliament controlled by Orbán's Fidesz party has passed a series of laws that are a good cover for dictatorial powers.

In addition to measures that affect each individual and determine his way of life, there were other forms of state intervention in the sphere of economy and politics, which undermined the foundations of parliamentary democracy. The crisis we are facing has caused health and epidemiological shock which in turn has led to

a shock in the economy and a very specific one - the ban on production and provision of services. This leads to a decline in company revenues, layoffs, supply difficulties, etc., which necessarily requires state intervention and its greater role in regulating and normalizing the process primarily in the economy and further in other sectors. The question is how long it will last, i.e., whether the role of the state will be reduced once the crisis passes, and it is evident that it has encouraged the emergence of "illiberal democracies" in several places. Even beyond their closed borders, illiberal leaders could be an inspiration to each other. Cultural cooperation and intercultural dialogue contribute to building trust and nurture a sense of community and belonging. This is becoming increasingly important in an insecure world, with increasing attacks on human rights, freedom, and democracy. Culture has proven to be an effective tool for implementing prevention and resolving conflict. Cultural actions create safe spaces for free expression and exchange of opinions. Opening public and private spaces for coexistence, culture becomes a laboratory for social innovation, and such spaces are constructive in cases of potential conflict. In achieving sustainable human development, culture is increasingly a driver of economic growth. Protecting, preserving, and valorizing cultural heritage, cultural and creative industries to fostering jobs, empowering young people, and contributing to the creation of resilient and tolerant communities. It is therefore necessary to recognize and actively support artistic freedom, freedom of expression, and cultural diversity. By creating a modern environment, through adequate cultural policies at all levels, creative industries, civil society can be strengthened, and innovative ways of cooperation can be developed that will bring together professionals in culture, as well as artists. Empowering them will encourage them to be creators of change, designers of jobs, and human rights, advocates. All of this will contribute to building a fairer, more peaceful, and sustainable world.

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UDC 616.98:578.834]:321.6

Jure Vujic*

THE BIO-POLITICS OF COVID-19 AND THE QUESTION OF POST-TOTALITARIANISM

Abstract:

The sanitary crisis of the Covid-19 pandemic has shown the weakness of the "global governance" model, but also the return of the effective role of sovereign states in managing the health crisis. However, the introduction of a "state of emergency" under the pretext of preventing the spread of the pandemic, with the advent of the rule of experts, medical specialists, rehabilitates the bio-political power, theorized by the French sociologist Michel Foucault. By declaring targeted, infected or potentially vulnerable territories a zone of management of a medically assisted state of emergency, it actually coincides with the classic dispositive of bio-policy population management, but also placing individuals who lose any right to autonomy (self-isolation, quarantine) under the tutelage of sanitary-medical expertise. In this direction, the "state of emergency" is progressively becoming the normal paradigm of government, and in the context of constructing new figures of visible and "invisible" enemies, the current pandemic can serve as a pretext for expanding emergency measures and lex specialis, with new restrictions on fundamental civil liberties. Biopolitics addresses the issue of power relations in social governance as well, and at the same time constitutes political strategy, a means of scientific power, and institutional practice. Its field of activity / management is comprehensive and encroaches on the processes of medicalization of the population and general health: birth rate, mortality, hygiene, food, sexuality, social behavior. Therefore, as a means of total control and management of the population, biopolitics is a means of organized power of institutions over life in general, by scientific and technological regulation of knowledge as a new form of state control, or repression of citizens' lives. Thus, new restrictions on fundamental civil liberties and threats to democratic acquis, reveal the totalitarian dynamics of bio-power, which cannot be understood or broken down through the classical conceptual and explicative categories of classical totalitarianism of modernity. Namely, such all-encompassing bio-power raises the question of post-totalitarianism present in modern liberal democracies, in which diffuse power and control are based on internalization processes, while techno-engineering painlessly destroys social coexistence. In this context, biopolitical power and control of "naked life" in the name of the imperative of health, produces in society a "permanent state of instability and anxiety", with successive cycles of total mobilization-mobility and isolation-immobilization.

Key words: biopolitics, experts, power, control, society, totalitarianism, population, health.

1. Between totalitarianism and post-totalitarianism

Jean-Pierre Le Goff points out that post-totalitarianism destroys democracy from within through perverted dispositions of totalitarian logics in place of pointing to the reproductive mechanisms of totalitarian dynamics (Le Goff 2007). In this direction, Marcel Gauchet points out that "nothing succeeds better than success itself", referring to the rise of democracies that are contradictorily destroyed from within. The worldview geoteks@gmail.com of 68, the anti-authoritarian discourse, the ideology of perpetual autonomy, gave birth to a new

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form of consumer and mental totalitarianism in the form of voluntary slavery. Post-totalitarian ideology has made it possible to turn the discourse of autonomy and emancipation into self-exploitation within the “ideology of organization” and the discourse of modernization management and the business world. Namely, such a post-totalitarian ideology, which is entering the fires of education and universities, promotes the dynamics of management and professionalization through the contradictory "demand for autonomy". Beaston calls it double bind, as a double compulsion of the imperative of positivity but also of the individualization of social contradictions. Pierre Legendre has a similar opinion, seeing in the turn and transformation of "anti-totalitarianism" into a new "anti-dogmatic dogma", and the "anti-normative norm" the cause of the new total domination of "non-thought" and the negation of democracy. Le Goff speaks of a "new totalitarianism" in contrast to classical previous totalitarianisms, whose nature, origins and dynamics cannot be broken down or understood by classical conceptual and explicit categories of globalization or "market dictatorship", but rather require insight into the role of internalized "symbolic" representation - representations, which actually destroy social coexistence and the meaning of civism (citizenship). Post-totalitarianism thus becomes what Alain Caillé calls "a place of social integration that questions itself."

1.1. New totalitarianism: freedom in exchange for security?

The model of modern liberal democracy, and especially after Fukuyama's triumphalist announcements in the 1990s to establish "eternal peace", failed to fulfill its messianic emancipatory mission, retaining elements of coercion and introducing new forms of soft "soft power" totalitarianism in the name of imperatives of "security" and terrorism "; especially after the 9/11 assassination. That all intelligence services, and especially the services of the United States and other superpowers, monitor their own citizens is today a general public secret and information at the high school level. It is also clear to everyone that large Internet companies - Google, Facebook, Skype, and even mobile phones are suitable "smart" technology, an inexhaustible source of personal data and information that is instrumentalized for the purpose of monitoring, tracking and creating "profiles" of all citizens. What is always astonishing, however, is that most U.S. citizens support computer surveillance of citizens in the name of the imperative to fight terrorism, which means they obey the restriction of their constitutional fundamental freedoms and rights to privacy.

How to explain this paradox that the country is a beacon of democracy and human rights at the same time the country where the Orwellian scenario of general control and video surveillance of citizens takes place? Due to the fact that a man-citizen prefers security to freedom, and is willing to sacrifice freedom and even others in the name of his own security.

Hegel wrote long ago that "it is easier to be a slave than a free master." Only there is a thin line between the need for security and the abolition of freedom and the establishment of a totalitarian regime. Benjamin Franklin was well aware that "he who prefers security to freedom when he loses both." The phenomenon of voluntary obedience to external intelligence oversight is at the heart of all "soft" democratic totalitarianisms and hard repressive totalitarian regimes of the past such as communism and Nazism. We find the core of totalitarian liberal democracies and communist people's democracies, as shown by Tocqueville's *On Democracy in America* and later by George Orwell in what he called "voluntary slavery" in the early days of Etienne de La Boetie in *The Debate on voluntary slavery* ", which, like Big Brother, uses soft psychological methods to force the passive consent of the masses and their conformist orientation of thought, as well as social anomie and the encouragement of "cultural arbitrariness" that enables the masses to be conditioned and socialized by the media.

The atomization of society in liberal democracies, as well as in totalitarian regimes, was stigmatized by Hannah Arendt, as a product of egalitarian individualism and totalitarian machinery. According to her, liberal as well as totalitarian regimes are a response to the "desacralization of the world" and the exaltation of modernity as a paradigm of the rise of modern industrial and post-industrial societies.

1.2. Painless diffuse totalitarianism

John Kenneth Galbraith holds that the same power, composed of a combination of great organizational concentration of power and its great diffusion to numerous individuals in its actual or apparent use. On the other hand, within diffuse totalitarianism, cultural and ideological discourse has become, through the media, a powerful means of diffuse power of conditioning and the so-called The role and meaning of diffuse power verified within Foucault's paradigm of the "Biopolitics of Agamben's conceptualization of naked life" (*Homo sacer*), which in the form of sophisticated methods of social engineering and the neoliberal social-market discipline dissolves not only the notion of the principle of political sovereignty but also the very destruction of life. A similar conclusion is reached by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in "Empire and Multitude." They find that the combination of diffuse decentralized modern power-biomass relations is actually at the heart of modern molecular wars as a permanent state of emergency. Diffuse power is in the true sense of the word "total" because it penetrates, permeates and encompasses the entire social reality, private and public spheres and cannot, as before, reduce to a visible aspect of the great state and bureaucratic machinery. In this direction it is necessary to distance oneself from the substantialist thesis in the philosophy of science but within the very field of society and politics.

The modern state today cannot be thought of and analyzed and understood exclusively as a substance or essence but as a complex set of processes and operations. Today's power is not a being but an omnipresent and all-encompassing "totalizing procedure." There is no unity but a multiplicity of strategies and tactics of enslavement and subjugation in a given historical development. It is a fluid and network mechanics that constantly mobilizes various tools (machines, appliances, plans, files, computer programs, etc.). Michel Foucault rightly presents a new figure of power that is applied not only to bodies but also to spirits and mind (political anatomy) within the framework of "total dressage" and social orthopedics that seeks not only to force but also to encourage productivity. The social body resembles an anatomical corpus permeated by various relations of power, resistance, and conflict, relations of power that are fluid in unstable.

1.3. Postmodernity and reflexive totalitarianism

After the assassination on September 11, until today's threats of Islamic terrorism, the imperatives of the fight against asymmetric and often "unpredictable" terrorism are increasingly imposing the need for systematic monitoring of citizens and society. The "security syndrome", in the name of which fundamental freedoms and human rights are gradually being restricted, is becoming the main reason and lever for extorting citizens' passive consent to the restriction of freedoms and submission to a new form totalitarianism of security". Namely, terrorist assassinations, as unpredictable events and factors, have become part of the generally accepted every day and modern risks and threats, at the same level of technological risks, natural disasters and natural disasters. Let us recall how U. Beck in his work "Risk Societies" spoke about the reflective modernization of post-industrial society, which marks the emergence of risk society as a new dynamic that abolishes the period of the first classical modern, as a project of linear or industrial modernization. The new social configuration in the postmodern, raises the question of repartition and distribution of risk. The growing certainty of natural disasters and terrorist attacks certainly increases the demand for security and risk insurance, especially in the context of nuclear risk, climate change, but also terrorist risk. However, the same demand for security correlatively produces a restriction of fundamental freedoms in the context of risk management, which actually boils down to an introduction to a kind of security soft-totalized system. When U. Beck (Beck 2001.) talks about reflexive modernity, he places emphasis on a reflective process based on scientific discourse, which critically dissects, constantly questioning modernity (technology, progress) and the risk society.

1.4. Totalitarianism as a security syndrome

A security syndrome affecting individual and collective perceptions of the ubiquitous terrorist threat and often the media could in the long run erase the classic dividing line between enemies / friends (Schmitt's notions of Hostis, inimicus) and lead to a revival of Hobbesian model of conflict societies, highly polarized and

belligerent. a permanent war of "all against all", by applying the social Darwinist phrase "Homo homini lupus" "man is a wolf to man. Indeed, the generalization of such a security syndrome at the level of society, could very well turn the "imperative of the fight against terrorism" into a form of total war, and thus lead to the disintegration of the political in Schmitt's sense consists of the political extreme intensification of the existing x antagonisms. In fact, in Schmitt's conception, the figure of the enemy appears as a projection of specific policy criteria relating to a multilayered relationship, that is, "the highest degree of intensity of communion" (Verbindung), or cracks (Trennung), merging or separating.

1.5. New Numerical Leviathan

The original organizational system of control within "modern totalitarianism" depended on a central element that was constantly improved, adapted, and tested, and whose initial model was Bentham's prototype Panopticon of Circular Control. However, today in the XXI. century, the emergence of artificial intelligence in the form of specialized "smart" algorithms, based on neural networks "deep learning" "data mining", disrupts the classical control system that evolved from a circular shape into an algorithmic network, transverse and asymmetric shape. Artificial intelligence today monitors human numerical activities, answers questions, treats and stores information, and its effectiveness is constantly increasing, while numerical speed is inconceivable to a human being. Absolute respect for norms and rules is at the very essence of totalitarianism. Given that artificial intelligence is actually a collection of rules applied within algorithms, the totalitarian performativity of such new system actors is obvious. This system is constantly being upgraded, adopting more effective rules every year that inevitably limit the space of individual freedoms, and always in the name of the common good, security. It could be said that artificial intelligence algorithms are the "invisible guard dogs" of the modern system. Everyone knows that they are there at every step and on every corner, that they are constantly watching us, selecting us through statistics about our profiles, behaviors about our movements, but despite this awareness of totalitarian control, we passively agree to sovereign voluntary slavery. Bentham's principle of total panoptic space is possible today precisely thanks to artificial intelligence and numerical technologies. It is "algototalitarianism" which is a simulation of imprisonment in various countries and beyond on a global scale, automating the repression of "rule violations" and inciting self-censorship. The ideology of continuous growth is closely related to security control. Namely, the more the world modernizes, the more dangerous it becomes, because it generates more and more risks of different natures. On the other hand, modernization and sophisticated security measures are growing in parallel with the growing sense of insecurity. The emergence of a techno-totalitarian society in the name of the obligation of "greater security for all" could turn against its architects themselves and jeopardize the future of humanity.

Angamben's thesis about *homo sacer* in modern society is realized through numerical technology that dissects, profiles each citizen in relation to their cognitive and social capabilities, and the exchange of such information between various high-tech startups from Silicon Valley and various intelligence or paraintelligence services, represent powerful means of control far broader and stronger than the bare former totalitarian systems of the twentieth century. The legitimization discourse in the name of "fighting terrorist nihilism" is accompanied by the strengthening and expansion of consumer society globally, through which voluntary slavery is carried out, and such "soft-totalitarianism" is perceived as a factor of stability and peace. However, behind the imperatives of security, there are strategies of subjugation and neutralization of citizens who should survive only in the form of a passive and loyal consumer. The exchange and proliferation of information data has been captured and recovered from various actors of GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon) and other NATO networks (Netflix, Airbnb, Tesla et Uber) which can jeopardize the functioning of democracies as they open the way to abuse and various manipulations. The rule of a real "algorithmic government" that would replace the classical state and society, as the apotheosis of the "total project", is on the horizon.

2. The new expertocracy and the question of the democratic legitimacy

Health as a priority over the economy: The rule of experts (Ismard 2015) and while health remains a national competence of states, the lack of control over the rapid spread of the virus still points to the need for an instrument of global sanitation. A common global approach and sanitary coordination shows effectiveness in the case of this form of natural globalization of threats, as we could see in the fight against global warming. It could be imagined that in the future, in addition to the classic international institutions, expert institutions or commissions of experts would be established to establish coordinated measures together with political officials. It is very probable that there will be excellent political decisions in a government of authoritarian type, which Tocqueville appeals to as "intelligent despotism", and as Estlund designates the neologism of "epistocracy" (Estlund 2011), On the verge of educational differences, of a social and experience milieu that affects the individual, it is unintelligible that he holds, in a small number, has a "superior political policy", which is not the only thing that connaissances and de-savoir-faire techniques and a strategic sense plus development, but also an element and surtout, of a "plus great moral sages" The democratic decision is a legitimate part of the result of a procedure which tends to a certainty of certainty as to the result of just or correct (epistemism), and which is acceptable to all members of the political association.). The experts don't have the political legitimacy of "epistemically proceduralism".

The decision-making procedure of decision is in effect the only thing that cannot be re-established as illegitimate by the people of decision. Imaginations of a society in the lakes and a small group of experts to keep the power of politics.

These experts are responsible for passing an assisted suicide. The epistocracy, the political authority of experts (and not the sole authority, social or moral authority), is not acceptable to the generality of the citizens, as one of the two experts who contested to the expert. In the context of Covid 19 pandemic, the legitimacy and structures of the new biopolitical government are built on the imperative of fighting the invisible enemy of the "virus", and not on the ideas or democratic will. Medical military-expert power will be marked by a post-liberal logic that regulates and controls "naked life," whose holders have neither rights nor identities. The new order is based on the dichotomy of "infected versus healthy" (enemy / friend), and this double code becomes a generally accepted and internalized new social code. All different and critical counter-expert opinions and views are categorized into "conspiracy theory" and suppressed. -In the form of a new postliberal antiviral rule, the human dimension and human traits give way to dehumanized forms of "naked life" management, in the form of effective artificial intelligence and abstract mechanical computing. Within that rule, the cybernetic dimension becomes crucial because if "naked life" is chaos, it requires the existence of a rigid mathematical and mechanistic order. This order does not require the consent of a society that loses everything but the instinct for survival, and the criterion of its ability is to make a balanced logical decision without being affected by unnecessary emotions and passions. Consequently, even if individual experts manage at the beginning of biopolitical power, its main bearers and executors in the future will be machines, robots, sanitary cyborgs. -Biopolitical rule does not need ideological narratives to motivate or gain the passive consent of the masses, and moreover, patriotism, family, social solidarity only strengthens human dignity, self-awareness and civic sense of society which are contrary to the rules of total atomization of "naked life". All religions and rites are forbidden and the only allowed official religion is the globalist religion of Statistics, a kind of Kabbalistic sanitary magic. Only two criteria are valid for society: to be in good health or to be ill. All other forms of national, cultural identity do not make sense. All these ideologies are archaic, meaningless, superfluous and counterproductive in the fight against coronavirus. -The processes of mass conditioning and domestication are at work, which use "waves" of induced panic and collective psychosis by applying media amplification and dissemination, and then waves of "relaxation", relaxation and calming. Such a methodology of social engineering has been tested on narcissistic sociopaths for many years, and is a well-known method of social conditioning. Such conditioning keeps citizens immersed in a permanent crisis atmosphere, in a constant state of stress and insecurity, and controlled moments of calm become a placebo that prevents their rebellion against order.

2.1. The new dimensions of society of control

The effectiveness of the modern "society of control" lies precisely in the dialectic of the one who controls and the one who is controlled. So, the key question is can control exist even without the controlled, without passive consent

to it? It is precisely the secret victory of modern technological mechanisms that lies in the very awareness of control: Big Brother succeeds because everyone knows they are the center of attention and agrees to it. Control works so perfectly because it is based on low urges, narcissism, exhibitionism and voyeurism, which are satisfied today on Facebook or the Internet, but also by legitimizing the ideology of complete transparency. In this sense, self-censorship is the perfect realization of censorship, and the fear caused by control is an integral part of the dynamics itself. The control society actually wants us to know that we are controlled. Such a model of society seeks to include individuals in statistics and reduce humanity to numbers and data. This is the last stage of Heidegger's "calculated thoughts," or what René Guénon calls the "empire of quantity." To better justify increasing surveillance of citizens, society often calls for the fight against crime or terrorism, but this is actually a false excuse because the ultimate goal is the abolition of the private sphere and complete control of the individual. Recall that the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham in 1785 designed the Panopticon, a circular prison in which any prisoner could be observed without knowing that he was being observed. Bentham himself pointed out that such a system of control is "a new form of achieving mind control over the mind on an unprecedented scale." Later, Foucault's book "Supervision and Punishment" will re-contextualize Bentham's Panopticon in modern society, emphasizing the "total" notion of punishment and control that seeks to control the whole person and his soul, and the body itself. It is an "architectural device" that enables ubiquitous supervision. Michel Foucault is credited with the notion of biopolitics, proposed as early as 1974, to which he would attribute the legacy to his master, Georges Canguilhem. It is a term that refers to the interspace between politics and the life of the human being, and denotes the organized power of institutions over life in general, by scientific and technological regulation of knowledge as a new form of state control, or repression of citizens' lives. So, a combination of biology and politics is at work. Giorgio Agamben in "Homo sacer: Sovereign Power and Naked Life" takes the notion of biopolitics from Foucault, linking it to Hannah Arendt's analysis of totalitarianism. Giorgio Agamben's study (Agamben 2016) shows how throughout the history of the Western political world there is a connection between sovereign power over the life and death of citizens and biopolitical control over the lives of citizens - a connection embodied in Nazi concentration camps that still runs through democratic societies. today efforts to frame the bare life in the processes of political integration and exclusion in a normative way.

Biopolitics refers to the question of power relations in social management as well. And at the same time, it constitutes political strategy, a means of scientific power, and institutional practice. Its area of operation / management is comprehensive and touches on the processes of medicalization of the population and general health: birth rate, mortality, hygiene, food, sexuality, behavior. Is the notion of biopolitics in the age of digital media, algorithms of huge databases and even partly in the age of artificial intelligence still relevant? For some, including Pierre Dardot and Christian

Laval, biopolitics has experienced an epistemological shift, from the form of control exercised over bodies of individualized control, today such control implies a new way of working and managing (Dardot & Laval 2010).

3. Bio-politics and medicalization of life

During this highly anxiety-provoking climate of COVID-19, we discover how easy it was, and without any sign of collective revolt, to make, as Giorgio Agamben shows, the state of emergency the normal paradigm of government. Indeed, by largely maintaining a collective imagination of the catastrophe, the imperative to fight against the health crisis legitimized the societal rigidification of the usual lifestyles, an "authoritarianization" of the mode of government, an ever-greater restriction of our freedoms, with of course the risk of taking advantage of this health crisis to smuggle many special standards, or even decisions or reforms not very popular. We are in the middle of the nightmare of the population control biopolitics regime under the pretext of epidemics, developed by Michel Foucault. It is an exceptional regime which is exercised on the body and on life, unlike the oldest which applied, according to the legal model, on the subjects.

Economic collapse and social misery, the imperative of fighting the "invisible enemy" of control for health purposes, actually produced the extinguishing of all forms of political resistance and dissent, economic and national sovereignty, and the transfer of power to a medical-economic-technocratic protectorate that guaranteed financial flows and budget. Namely, the pandemic caused a change of natural power, and a permanent state of emergency led to the transfer of power from official political leaders to technical officers, such as the military, epidemiologists, medical staff and institutions specifically created for these extreme circumstances. A self-proclaimed co-opted expertise emerges without democratic legal and political legitimacy. Historical and political moral models from the past and war heroes are discredited, new posthumous heroes, epidemiologists, spin doctors, technicians are promoted, and mass rallies and relay races are organized in honor of the new medical heroes. As Foucault describes it in "Surveillance and Punishment," (Foucault, 1994) it is indeed an environment in which the prisoner was to be consciously and permanently visible which ensured the "automatic functioning of power." The introduction of a "state of emergency" under the pretext of effective prevention of pandemics and sanitary crises, is preceded by the appearance of experts, medical specialists and behind-the-scenes technocratic advisers who appear every day as TV stars in the media offering us saving recipes. By declaring cabled infected or potentially vulnerable territories a zone of management of a medically assisted state of emergency, it actually coincides with the classic dispositive of bio-policy population management, but placing individuals (self-isolation, quarantine) under tutorship and losing their autonomy. In this regard, Giorgio Agamben warns of the possibility of a "state of emergency" progressively becoming the normal paradigm of government, and

points out that in the context of constructing new visible and invisible enemies, terrorism is clearly worn out, while the current pandemic could serve as a pretext for expanding emergency measures, and *lex specialis*, with new restrictions on fundamental civil liberties. On the other hand, the media maintain and generate collective panic and psychosis that allows for passive acceptance of restrictions on freedom of movement, assembly and personal autonomy in the name of the need and desire for security. This anxious demand for security is at the heart of Hobbes's social contract, in the name of which the Prince (Machiavelli) must produce and maintain a certain level of collective fear in order to legitimize an extraordinary measure for the security of citizens and the stability of the state.

CONCLUSION

A security syndrome that affects individual and collective perceptions of the ubiquitous terrorist threat and often the media could in the long run erase the classic dividing line between enemies / friends (Schmitt's notions of *Hostis*, *inimicus*) and lead to a revival of Hobbes's highly polarized, belligerent and belligerent conflict society. A permanent war of "all against all", by applying the social Darwinist phrase "*Homo homini lupus*" "man is a wolf to man. Indeed, the generalization of such a security syndrome at the level of society, could very well turn the "imperative of the fight against terrorism" into a form of total war, and thus lead to the disintegration of the political in Schmitt's sense.

The spiral of terrorism / counterterrorism, virus pandemic health global risks, and the adoption of exceptional bio-politics rules, and *lex specialis*, pave the way for a form of collective psychosis, but also for what Beck calls an obsession with "simulating the control of the uncontrolled." The constant growth of the demand for security and the correlative tendency for stronger and more branched control, monitoring the Internet, telephone, can degenerate into "security totalitarianism". Namely, it should be reminded that the neoliberal ideology of constant deregulation and liberalization of the market, promoted by the leaders of global corporations. For centuries, technological and scientific advances have allowed Western civilization to constantly push the boundaries. The discovery of nanotechnology, the numerical revolution is not immune to totalitarian impulses and projects. For example, in parallel with scientific and pharmaceutical research, and regarding human life extension and trans-humanistic utopias, Silicon Valley's large corporations are already thinking of eternity, not as an ethical and existential issue, but at the level of a technological problem to be solved.

Futurologist Ray Kurzweil, on behalf of the Google Group, conceives products and services for the future, and believes that immortality is at hand as we enter a "new era in which the fusion of technological and human intelligence is taking place". In such a trans-humanist project, essayist Evgeny Morozov already sees a new form of contemporary totalitarianism which he calls "technological solutionism. (problem solve paradigm).

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AUTHORIZED SPEECHES FROM THE CONFERENCE

UDC 616.98:578.834]:005.32

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LEADERSHIP IN THE TIME OF COVID

2020 was not the year any of us expected, least of all our political leaders. Today, I want to pose the question - what should good leadership look like in a crisis such as this? I look around at the performance of our leaders over the last few months and I am reminded of the old joke. “Why is leadership like a teabag? You only find out how good it is when it gets into hot water”. Certainly, it is in a crisis that true leadership is put to the test. P. G. Wodehouse, the English comic writer, summed it up in his 1932 novel, “Hot water” - “If it is true that the Hour produces the Man, it is also true that it remorselessly reveals the wash-out”.

And, of course, predicting crises is hard. Despite this, most countries do try to assess the risks they face and plan to mitigate them. Epidemics have occurred traumatically throughout history. Pandemic flu has been in the top tier of the UK’s National Risk Register since it was first published a decade ago. The latest edition showed it as having the highest impact severity and in the highest category of likelihood in the “Hazards, diseases, accidents, and societal risks” matrix. Yet, COVID is not flu and the UK, like many other nations, struggled to respond rapidly and effectively.

Such assessments are a matter of judgment. For example, the impact of “New and Emerging Infectious Diseases” (which would have included COVID-19) was assessed as having “a low likelihood” of spreading to the UK and “the impact could be on the scale of the SARS outbreak in Toronto, Canada” with 251 cases over several months. So, in the UK, the risk was logged, but it was not assigned with a sufficiently serious level of risk and it was felt that the preparations in place for a pandemic flu outbreak would probably be sufficient. That was wrong and the UK now has the highest number of COVID deaths in Europe.

There had been a simulation exercise in October 2016 to estimate the impact of a hypothetical H2N2 influenza pandemic on the country. Exercise Cygnus showed that such a pandemic was likely to cause the National Health Service to collapse from a lack of resources and highlighted problems with availability of medical ventilators, and the importance of personal protective equipment. Some years before a stockpile of personal protective equipment had been created for the National Health Service. This included 26.3 million respirators for medical staff. The only problem was that almost 21 million of them had passed their use-by date by May 2019 and were not safe. Much of the stockpile had a shelf-life of five years but had been obtained in 2009 and 2010 and not replaced since. This included 84 million needles and syringes that had expired in the second half of 2019. What is more the stockpile had shrunk significantly in the last decade

despite the UK population continuing to grow. Even more significantly, the stockpile was designed to cope with flu. COVID-19 requires additional personal protective equipment. Last year, the New and Emerging Respiratory Virus Threats Action Group had recommended to Public Health England, in particular, that a proper supply of surgical gowns was needed. This was not acted upon and medical staff had to rely on much flimsier plastic aprons.

The UK was not alone - many Governments had their failures either in preparation or in execution of their response to COVID-19. In India, the first case was identified on 30th January. The Government had already implemented a surveillance and tracing regime, but this was hampered by a chronic shortage of testing capacity. When the curfew and lockdown were imposed eight weeks later, only 6,500 samples had been tested nationwide and the daily capacity was just 1,400 samples. This has increased dramatically since then. There is now a daily capacity of 300,000 – this is similar to the UK’s theoretical capacity, but India’s population is 1.4 billion (twenty times that of UK). The Indian overnight lockdown had a severe impact on many millions of low-income migrant workers and daily wage earners. With no savings and little financial help from the Government, these workers and their families faced immediate food insecurity and hardship that led many to walk hundreds of miles to their villages. Many were killed along the way in road and train accidents. One estimate I have heard suggested that the numbers moving as a result were similar or even greater than those 14.54 million who moved during the partition of India in 1947. As the Brookings Institute has commented, this 2020 movement had “serious implications on the already fragile rural health infrastructure” and, of course, meant that the virus spread from the inner cities to the rural expanse of the country.

Some Governments have acknowledged their misjudgments and mistakes. President Macron of France addressed the nation on primetime TV on 13th April. An unprecedented 35 million tuned in – 86.6% population – and heard him apologize for his Government “not being prepared enough” for the virus. Other leaders have claimed the response that they have presided over has been “a triumph” when it has palpably been the opposite – I will leave you to fill in the names.

So, what should good leadership look like in a crisis such as this? The nature of this crisis was that it unfolded in a matter of weeks. Events rapidly became fast and furious. And none of the choices were easy. But that is what any crisis is like and effective leadership under such circumstances needs to be quick, agile and innovative. It is true for nations; it is true for cities and communities; and it is true for businesses and organizations. Whatever the crisis – and COVID was no exception – the effective crisis leader will need to be focused on the direction of travel towards the strategic objective, while ensuring that she or he is carrying people with them during what almost certainly will be a difficult period.

I want to focus on two elements of effective crisis leadership. The first is about being strategic, and the second is about transparency. There are, of course,

many other elements of effective leadership, including empathy and pragmatism. Leaders need to listen to those they lead and understand what they are facing. Likewise, she or he cannot be driven by ideology or prejudice. Or be hidebound by the way things have been done in the past. This may well be the time to be creative and innovative, but the driving force must be what needs to be done and above all what will work.

So, what is strategic in this context? It is, of course, a lot more than a focus on the immediate. It is not simply about what is needed to keep the hospitals going over the next week. Nor is it about what is needed now to prepare for the likely development of the disease over the next few weeks or months. It should be a given that, at the point you realize what is happening, you start to plan for your reasonable worst assumption. You assess how many hospital beds will be needed (commission and opening new hospitals, as they did spectacularly in five days in China or as the UK did with the so-called Nightingale facilities); you work out your equipment and personal protective equipment, and you need to start to procure them; you divert medical resources and personnel. All of that. But that is standard crisis management. It is not strategic.

The effective crisis leader has to think ahead - what will come next? In chess terms, she/he needs to be thinking four, five or six moves ahead, and will have to confront the trade-offs. Diverting medical resources will mean that other medical needs will not be met. What will be the consequences for long-term cancer care of people not being processed for tests that would have previously been considered urgent; of people not presenting at hospital with cardiac issues; and so on – in the UK, we estimate a potential premature death toll of 150,000 plus. The effective crisis leader will have identified such consequences and considered a mitigation strategy.

And there is the fundamental dilemma - what will be the economic and social consequences of locking down to prevent the spread of the virus? In India, it led to the mass movement of people returning to their villages. In the UK, we tried to move out of lockdown in a context in which our economy has suffered the most severe fall in national output for 40 years and with GDP likely to fall by 10-12% over 2020 – figures mirrored in France, Italy and Spain. But COVID figures are now rising again rapidly and yesterday, more stringent lockdowns were imposed on large parts of the country.

It is that dilemma that all national leaders have been wrestling with. There is no easy answer, but veering from one extreme to the other is not an option. The effective crisis leader has to find a balance and do what she or he can to mitigate the consequences of both the virus itself and trying to contain it. And all the while, the effective crisis leader is looking to what else might happen. In the UK, in health terms, we will soon be dealing with normal cyclical flu in addition to COVID. What will that mean for hospital beds and demand for testing and tracing for COVID, given that many of the presenting symptoms are the same?

But other things can and will happen. Most businesses – indeed all of us – have become reliant on remote working (Zoom and the like). This has created or made even more significant another vulnerability - how resilient is our Internet to sudden shocks which might be malignant in intent? In any event, we should never assume that crises come along singly. Are we ready for the traditional hazards (natural disasters, earthquakes, cyclones) when our infrastructure and economy is weakened by COVID-19? Remember, an Act of God is an event that no reasonable God would bring about.

We should neither assume that geopolitics will be put on hold. It is no coincidence in my view that China has chosen this moment to tighten its grip on Hong Kong. Nor it is just a chance that Russia chose to test a satellite weapon in space orbit a couple of months ago. And in Britain, we are leaving the European Union in 79 days-time, whatever the degree of readiness to cope. So, strategy is a big ask for our effective crisis leader.

What about transparency? In any crisis, maintaining trust is vital. It is essential to be honest. If the effective leader does not know, she or he should say so. When things go wrong (and they will), like President Macron, the effective crisis leader should admit it. Being overly reassuring is a mistake. If things turn out worse than you said, the assumption will be that you have been trying to mislead or to cover things up. Do not over-promise and under-deliver. And do not lie about meeting the unrealistic targets you set yourself. To do so, undermines trust. And trust matters.

Similarly, make sure that messages are consistent and clear. Announcement by leak does not help. Nor does it help when senior figures contradict each other. Swearing solemnly that something will not happen, and then two days later announcing that it will, does not inspire confidence. Following the science is a good mantra – until you do not. The important thing is that it has to be clear who has the responsibility and that ultimately is the leader - the Prime Minister or the President. I would like to feel that they are listening to the best available expert advice, but ultimately a judgment has to be made and that has to be a judgment for the politician. That is what leadership means. And the politician cannot rely on the scientific advisors to be sort of human shield.

Finally, the public needs to be able to believe what you are telling them and have confidence in what you are asking them to do. If there are rules, make sure you and your team are following them. People will comply if they feel that, genuinely, we are all in this together. But dishonesty damages credibility; as does there being one rule for us and one rule for you. And in the UK (as elsewhere) there have been many such examples. And, of course, experience helps. If you have not done it before, listen to those who have. In the UK, I do not blame the Cabinet for being relatively inexperienced, but be prepared to bring in those who have had to face serious challenges in the past.

The lesson for all of us - the over-riding lesson – probably in every country, is that we have probably not been investing sufficiently in our preparedness and resilience. Above all, we must be prepared to expect the unexpected. Making every organization more resilient and more strategic in the way it manages risk and the threats faced means it is easier for a society to address potential global crises – whether it is COVID-19 or a massive cyber-attack or climate change – and it is certainly easier to manage the consequences both for ourselves and collectively. Preparedness and resilience need to be designed in and part of society’s fabric. And that is what true leadership looks like.

UDC 616.98:578.834]:005.334

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COVID-19: LESSONS FROM A “NEAR-MISS”

All of us, whatever sector or activity we are involved in, have been introduced with certain truths about the crisis situation we have been faced with, and have challenged to the absolute fore and fundamental level, in terms of what we can offer this world in these chaotic and challenging times. The truth is that if strategic management has any significance and meaning, it must surely be to create a picture, a rational picture of what the world is, of the challenges it brings, and the solutions that we can offer. And it seems to me that COVID-19 has been a very powerful wake-up call that has made us question those beliefs and those fundamental principles.

Mike Tyson, the boxer, has a very famous phrase that everybody has a plan, until they are punched in the head, and when they are punched in the head, their plan just disappears. It seems that we have a modern understanding of crisis, or strategic risk and crisis management that works perfectly until the exact moment when a crisis occurs. And whether that crisis is environmental, or it is a pandemic, or it is an infrastructure failing, or it is a breakdown of the structures of our cities, in that exact moment the crisis management capabilities we have in place seem to disappear like “smoke in the wind”.

The purpose of the Institute of strategic risk management is to create a space where academics, practitioners and policy makers can come together to have an honest and grown-up conversation about these challenges that we are facing. In discussing COVID-19, and the impacts that it has had on our global society, at every level down to the neighborhood, the community and the individual household. The first thing that we have to say is that, of course, COVID-19 is not a particularly bad pandemic. It is only a mid-range pandemic. If we look at something like *Ebola*, for example, *Ebola* has a mortality rate of 50%. COVID has a mortality rate of 2-4%, depending on how you manage the figures. And certainly, it cannot be considered as an unprecedented event. We have been having regular global pandemic for the last 20 years. We have had *SARS* in 2003, *MERS*, *Zika*, *Ebola*, *H1N1*, Avian flu, swine flu, and of course, the annual influenza pandemics, that have killed millions of people, as well. So, in terms of our global risk register, the possibility of a pandemic should not have been a surprise. And in fact, when we look at the risk register of the United Kingdom, the National Risk Register in 2017, published by the Cabinet Office, pandemic influenza was the number one risk, it was the one with the most likelihood and most impact. COVID-19 and *Corona* virus pandemic was at the same level of likelihood, but with less projected impact. But it was still in the top right-hand corner.

And so, I think we have to differentiate between crisis management and emergency response management. COVID-19 was absolutely not an unexpected event. What was unexpected was the impact that it has had on our society. And if we look at the risk environment that we are moving into that are on a foreseeable basis from 2020 through 2025, then it seems reasonable to presume that we will be having repeated incidents of high-impact events, which we are not planning for and which we are not modelling for. And one of the significant issues that we have not modelled for is the lack of recoverability, the fact that we are not recovering from these events. We have almost always presumed in our modelling of crisis events that we will return to normality within a few hours, within a few days, certainly within a week. But the idea of an event that carries on for 7 months, and longer, has not really been something that we have modelled.

I have been worked with Lord Toby Harris on a UK programme, which he led, around the modelling the impacts and consequences of a long-term critical national infrastructure failure. And the truth of the matter is that we do not understand the significance of the impact or the consequences or the reality of those events. And it seems to me that if we are to prepare ourselves as a global community to model and engage with these issues, then we have to look at the issue of culture, over and above that of tactical and strategic capabilities. One must have tactical and strategic capabilities, but that in itself is not enough if the culture is wrong. And the culture I am looking at is very, very simple. It is a culture of acceptance of responsibility for strategic risk and crisis management. And I think if we look at the global scale, and the national scale, and perhaps the local scale, it is something we have not accepted appropriately or effectively until now.

My understanding of risk and crisis management has actually changed quite radically because of COVID. It is something that I have been talking about for close to 30 years, for 15 years as an academic and as a “pracademic” now, a practitioner who brings academic doctrine, academic research to try and create models, methodologies and frameworks that work in the real world. And my understanding of crisis management has now changed. Because I thought that crisis management was about the management of crisis. It is not. Because you do not manage a crisis. My understanding of crisis management now is that crisis management is designed to downgrade a crisis to a major incident. And a crisis is by definition irrational. It is something you do not understand, you cannot model, you cannot engage with. It is transcendental, it is unprecedented, and it goes beyond anything you planned or prepared for. Whereas, a major incident is a rational problem. It is something you have frameworks and structures and capabilities for, and a range of options and tactics and strategies you can bring to the game.

And the single most significant differentiator between a crisis and a major incident, in this context, is sense-making – that you make sense of it, that you understand it, that you can see patterns. And if we look at the countries of south-east Asia, which went

through *SARS* in 2003, they were able to make sense and recognize the significance of the news that was coming out of Wuhan, China in late 2019. And they were able to recognize the significance over the horizon, before it impacted them, and because they had been through *SARS*, they were able to discuss it in a rational way. They were able to think about potential consequences and impacts. They were able to put in place a range of potential solutions, they were able to bring in multiple stakeholders, and they were able to create national framework that would support the development and implementation of policies, which, of course, is what strategic risk management is all about.

The countries, I will take Europe as an example, because I think that is what we know best, to a large extent did not have that. They did not recognize the significance. They did not recognize the importance or the urgency. And it was very, very late in the game they began to realize that they needed to take this seriously and to think about responding in the way that was outside their normal strategic risk management capabilities. They did not understand how challenging it was. And there is no question in my mind that if those countries and agencies who had the responsibility for strategic risk and crisis management had, for example, been aware of the significance of *Corona* virus six weeks earlier, been able to engage with it and consider it in a rational way six weeks earlier, then everything they would have done would have been more effective. And then, people would have been safer. They would have fulfilled their responsibility, which is to ensure safety, security and wellbeing of their population.

And what is the one thing that would have allowed them to do that? It would have been to recognize patterns. This is a Recognition Primed Decision-Making, RPDM, from Gary Klein. In terms of maintaining operational functionality, in stable situations we can operate, we have efficiency. But in unstable situations, we do not think about what the textbook says, but we use our own archive of personal experiences and memories to build a picture of what is happening. And there is no question that the countries of south-east Asia were able to build a picture, a rich picture concerning the significance of *Coronavirus*, as it then was. But the beauty of Recognition Primed Decision-Making is, it does not just allow you to build a three-dimensional rich picture of the environment you are operating in, but it allows you to build a four-dimensional rich picture projecting into the future. And it allows you to say: "OK, this is where we will be in two days-time, in three weeks-time, in six months-time, whatever it might be". And speaking from a UK perspective, it seems to me that a UK government has still not managed to achieve that. It does not have a genuine understanding of the longer-term perspective. It is still thinking in terms of two weeks, three weeks or five weeks.

And so, if we are to look at developing capabilities and frameworks and methodologies that would allow us to deal with the undoubtedly challenging crisis events that are coming towards us, some of which we can think about, some of which

are – to use Patrick Lagadec’s (another fantastic conceptualist) phrase – “unthinkable and inconceivable risks”, which undoubtedly will be coming over the horizon, then it is the ability to recognize those potential issues as early as possible, and to create sense and pattern-making out of it. And in order to do that, what is the single, most significant issue? It is that we learn fast, as a society, as a culture, as organizations. We have to be fast learners. And therefore, the question is, are we learning from COVID? Because the greatest gift, God’s gift to the security manager or the risk manager, is a close miss. A near miss. Almost, but not quite. Because that is what allows us to practice our moves.

CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији
Народна библиотека Србије, Београд

005.334:61(082)

616.98:578.834]:351.861(082)

INTERNATIONAL scientific conference Security crises in the 21st century and how to manage them (2020)

Security crises in the 21st century and how to manage them. Vol. 1, Social and security aspects / proceedings of the international scientific conference held online, october 13 and 14, 2020. ; [organizers Center for risk analysis and crisis management ... [et al.] ; editors Zoran Keković, Marija Đorić, Jadranka Polović]. - Belgrade ... [etc.] : Center for risk analysis and crisis management ... [etc.], 2021 (Beograd : Jovšić printing centar). - 228 str. : graf. prikazi, tabele ; 25 cm

Tiraž 200. - Str. 3-6: Editorial / Jadranka Polović. - Napomene i bibliografske reference uz tekst. - Bibliografija uz pojedine radove.

ISBN 978-86-902810-1-5

а) Корона вирус -- Безбедносни аспект -- Зборници б) Кризни менаџмент -- Зборници в) Управљање ризиком -- Зборници

COBISS.SR-ID 40075017

ISBN-978-86-902810-1-5